Jump to content

Search the hub

Showing results for tags 'Omissions'.


More search options

  • Search By Tags

    Start to type the tag you want to use, then select from the list.

  • Search By Author

Content Type


Forums

  • All
    • Commissioning, service provision and innovation in health and care
    • Coronavirus (COVID-19)
    • Culture
    • Improving patient safety
    • Investigations, risk management and legal issues
    • Leadership for patient safety
    • Organisations linked to patient safety (UK and beyond)
    • Patient engagement
    • Patient safety in health and care
    • Patient Safety Learning
    • Professionalising patient safety
    • Research, data and insight
    • Miscellaneous

Categories

  • Commissioning, service provision and innovation in health and care
    • Commissioning and funding patient safety
    • Digital health and care service provision
    • Health records and plans
    • Innovation programmes in health and care
  • Coronavirus (COVID-19)
    • Blogs
    • Data, research and statistics
    • Frontline insights during the pandemic
    • Good practice and useful resources
    • Guidance
    • Mental health
    • Exit strategies
    • Patient recovery
  • Culture
    • Bullying and fear
    • Good practice
    • Safety culture programmes
    • Second victim
    • Speak Up Guardians
    • Staff safety
    • Whistle blowing
  • Improving patient safety
    • Clinical governance and audits
    • Design for safety
    • Disasters averted/near misses
    • Equipment and facilities
    • Human factors (improving human performance in care delivery)
    • Improving systems of care
    • Implementation of improvements
    • Safety stories
    • Stories from the front line
    • Workforce and resources
  • Investigations, risk management and legal issues
    • Investigations and complaints
    • Risk management and legal issues
  • Leadership for patient safety
  • Organisations linked to patient safety (UK and beyond)
  • Patient engagement
  • Patient safety in health and care
  • Patient Safety Learning
  • Professionalising patient safety
  • Research, data and insight
  • Miscellaneous

News

  • News

Find results in...

Find results that contain...


Date Created

  • Start
    End

Last updated

  • Start
    End

Filter by number of...

Joined

  • Start

    End


Group


First name


Last name


Country


About me


Organisation


Role

Found 19 results
  1. Community Post
    What is your experience of having a hysterscopy? We would like to hear - good or bad so that we can help campaign for safer , harm free care. You'll need to be a hub member to comment, it's quick and easy to do. You can sign up here.
  2. Content Article
    In a blog in the Patient Safety Movement newsletter, James Titcombe talks about his son's death and how speaking out can save lives.
  3. Content Article
    This regulation 28 is around testing of patient call bells in care homes. Questions: Have you got a system for checking call bells where you work? Are the call bells always in reach of the patient?
  4. Content Article
    To use the tool, you just need to enter your height and weight into the online calculator, along with your height and weight 3-6 months ago. You will be given a rating that will tell you if you are at high, medium or low risk of malnutrition. You will then be able to download a dietary advice sheet that gives basic information and suggestions for improving nutritional intake. If you are worried about your weight or having difficulty eating, make sure you talk to your GP or a healthcare professional. The dietary advice sheet was developed in partnership with a number of professional organisations. NB this site is intended for adult self-screening only.
  5. Content Article
    The study used quality improvement methods to develop and test interventions to extend drinking opportunities and choice in two care homes. Initial activity included observation of the systems for delivering fluids and involving staff, residents and carers in describing and mapping the organisation of care. An interactive training programme was indicated by staff as an important priority and was therefore introduced as a first step to improve hydration care. Subsequent interventions were co-designed with care staff and tested using Plan Do Study Act (PDSA) cycles. Their efficacy was measured through data captured on the amount of fluids served and consumed, and staff and resident feedback. The long-term impact of the interventions was assessed by measuring daily laxative and antibiotic consumption, weekly incidence of adverse health events, and average fluid intake of a random sample of six residents captured monthly. The link below shows the I-Hydrate presentation which summarises the project and its findings.
  6. Content Article
    Social normalisation of deviance means that people within the organisation become so much accustomed to a deviant behaviour that they don’t consider it as deviant, despite the fact they exceed their own rules for the elementary safety. People grow more accustomed to the deviant behaviour the more it occurs . To people outside of the organisation, the activities seem deviant; however, people within the organisation do not recognise the deviance because it is seen as a normal occurrence. In hindsight, people within the organisation realise that their seemingly normal behaviour was deviant. Diane Vaughan uses healthcare to illustrate why deviance is normalised in companies. She gives four major reasons why it happens: "The rules are stupid and inefficient." System operators will often invent shortcuts or workarounds when the rule, regulation, or standard seems irrational or inefficient. Knowledge is imperfect and uneven. System operators might not know that a particular rule or standard exists; or, they might have been taught a system deviation without realising it. "I’m breaking the rule for the good of my patient!" This justification for rule deviation is where the rule or standard is perceived as counterproductive. Workers are afraid to speak up. The likelihood that rule violations will become normalised increases if those who witness them refuse to intervene. Yet, studies show that people feel it is difficult or impossible to speak up. Solutions Vaughan offers the following suggestions for helping to prevent deviant behaviours from becoming normalised: Education is the best solution for the normalisation of deviance. Diane Vaughn states, "the ignorance of what is going on is organisational and prevents any attempt to stop the unfolding harm." Being clear about standards and rewarding whistleblowers is part of the education that should take place. A company must be transparent about their standards and consequences of not meeting them. Also, creating a culture that is less individualistic and more team-based is helpful to stop the normalisation of deviance. Each person should be looking out for the company and team as a whole. If it were more team-based, each person would feel like they were letting their colleagues down if they were to break the rules. A top-down approach is very important. If the employees see executives breaking rules, they will feel it is normal in the company's culture. Normalisation of deviance is easier to prevent than to correct. Companies must make sure they take the correct steps to prevent it.
  7. Content Article
    The PSHO found that the Trust failed to: act on the results of the ECG and chest X-ray consider Baby K’s history and symptoms ask for input from specialist staff escalate his care when his condition was getting worse. If these failings had not occurred, it is likely that the Trust would have recognised that Baby K had a problem with his heart. In these circumstances he would have received the correct treatment instead of being treated for suspected pneumonia. The PSHO found that on the balance of probabilities, his cardiac arrest would not have occurred and it is more likely than not that his death would have been avoided. The PHSO also found that the Trust was not open and accountable in its handling of Miss K’s complaint, as it failed to acknowledge and apologise for its mistakes in a timely manner. It also failed to signpost Miss K to the PSHO at the right time and in the right way.
  8. Content Article
    My much loved daughter-in-law, Mariana Pinto, died on 16 October 2016. She was 32. Her tragic and unexpected death raised many questions for us about standard practice by psychiatric services and about patient safety. The evening before she died, Mariana was taken by ambulance to her local A&E department, escorted by four police officers, and handcuffed for her own safety. She was psychotic – delusional, paranoid, violent and very distressed. She had attacked her husband (my son) who had visible bite marks, scratches and bruises. It was a first episode and totally out of character. She had not eaten or slept for several days. In A&E she was brought food and drink but spat it out, believing it to be poisoned. She kept trying to escape from the cubicle. The police stayed, stating that she was extremely vulnerable. Eventually she agreed to take a sedative – but not before she had held it under her tongue for some time, and only after we, her family, were able to persuade her that she should take it. Once she was finally sedated, she was given various tests to rule out any physical cause, and a mental health act assessment. This was done with her and her husband together. There was no attempt to see him separately. She was deemed competent to make decisions about her care, and as she wanted to go home, was discharged, with a referral to the local Crisis Team, who we were told would receive the referral at 8 am the following morning and would arrange to visit. The psychiatric team operate within A&E but for a separate mental health trust. This same trust runs the Crisis Team. It is deemed outstanding by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The following morning, there was no contact from the Crisis Team. My son rang them at midday to ask when they would visit. They said normally between 5 and 7 pm on Sundays and to ring back if he needed to. He rang back at 3.30 pm stating that she had deteriorated rapidly and asking for the visit to be brought forward. He was told that it could not be. At 4.00 pm Mari ran out of the open door to the roof terrace and jumped off it. She did not survive her injuries. The Coroner gave a narrative verdict, making it clear that Mariana did not know what she was doing, though her actions were deliberate. She also gave a Prevention of Future Deaths Report. Whilst the trust is obliged to reply, there is no statutory obligation to demonstrate that the actions they have promised have actually been taken. There was no attempt at any risk assessment. There was no attempt to check that my son could speak freely (he could not – it was a studio apartment). There was no attempt to call the emergency services on his behalf, and no attempt to check he had been able to do so. None of this is regarded as negligent or especially problematic. Since her death the Crisis Team do visit on Sunday mornings. We also found out that the number we were given to call was for service users already allocated a key worker, rather than a more general number – but as my son spoke to senior staff on each call, this should not have made a difference. After her death we raised the following questions: Surely given the bite marks and bruising, her husband should have been allowed to give his information to the psychiatric team separately? No, it turns out that while this would have been good practice, it was not negligent. Surely, given that her family knew and loved her, we should have been asked post sedation if she seemed like herself (she did not). No, it turns out that this is not seen as necessary. It’s not even regarded as good practice. Surely, given that she was paranoid and had told the police that she did not trust her husband, her husband should have been given private space to discuss the discharge and rehearse what to do if things went wrong once the sedative wore off? And surely we should have been told that the Crisis Team is not instead of calling 999 in an emergency. And efforts made to help us to decide if the situation was an emergency. No, it turns out that while this would have been good practice, it was not negligent. The mental health trust has now introduced a written discharge template for care and contingency planning. We have been told that the circumstances of Mariana’s death were unusual and could not have been foretold. That may be. But there are still lessons to be learnt. To improve patient safety in mental health crisis and to learn from deaths, we need to change standard practice. It should become standard to: See family and friends separately if someone is paranoid, to understand the family’s concerns, learn more about the patient and work together to consider how best the patient can be kept safe and helped. Provide written care and contingency plans to patients and their family Use one number for a Crisis Team helpline, with clear policies to offer help and support to service users and to their carers, and proper protocols in place to assess risk and intervene if someone is at immediate risk of harm. Make it very clear to patients that a referral to a Crisis Team is not a substitute for calling 999 in an emergency (where there is an immediate risk of harm to the patient or others) and to distinguish between a crisis and an emergency. Other professionals have a role in this too: On discharge, the A&E staff (who were very kind and very concerned) could invite the family to come back if the situation deteriorates, making it clear that it was an emergency, was a legitimate use of 999 and of A&E, and that the Crisis Teams are not for emergencies. The police could do the same, if they are trusted by the family (in many cases they are not).
  9. News Article
    Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS trust has uncovered dozens of avoidable deaths and more than 50 babies suffering permanent brain damage over the past 40 years. But how many more babies must die before NHS leaders finally tackle unsafe, disrespectful, life-wrecking services? The NHS’s worst maternity scandal raises fundamental questions about the culture and safety of our health service. Too many hospital boards complacently believe “it couldn’t happen here”. Instead of constantly testing the quality and reliability of their services, they look for evidence of success while explaining away signs of danger. Across the NHS there are passionate clinicians and managers dedicated to building a culture that delivers consistently high quality care. But they are undermined by a pervasive willingness to tolerate and excuse poor care and silence dissent. Until that changes, the scandals will keep coming. Read full story Source: The Guardian, 2 November 2019
  10. Content Article
    This Inquiry examines the involvement of numerous agencies with the events at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust within a defined period: January 2005 to March 2009. This is the executive summary which includes 290 themed recommendations.
  11. Content Article

    Walk on by...

    Anonymous
    It's midnight on the acute floor, just before Christmas. As I walk through the Emergency Department (ED), I can hear the ambulances reverse up to the door, people shouting, doors opening and closing, phones ringing and the general white noise of the department. You wouldn’t know it was night-time at all, the lights are beaming and it's as noisy now as it is in the day. I am a junior doctor. I’m on my fourth night shift of six. I have a patient on the acute medical admission unit that I need to check up on. I take the opportunity to seek some darkness and quiet away from the hustle and bustle of the ED. As I go into the unit, I spot a young man in his 20s. He has a carer at his bedside. I stop. I say "hi"’ to the carer and just take a quick glance at the saturation probe that is on the young man’s finger. It’s reading 94% (normal is >95%). "Is that number of 94% normal for Eddie*?" I ask the carer. "Yes" he confirms. "What about the heart rate, that’s reading 140?" I asked, but didn’t want to come across alarmed, as this is quite high. "No. It usually reads 90. I was worried, but assumed you were dealing with it". My time is limited, I should be checking on my patient I originally came in to see. I have now seen a vulnerable adult with an abnormally high heart rate. However, the nurses are here… they can act on it , can’t they? I need to see my patient. I have patients backing up in ED, what about the four-hour target? Those thoughts go through my head in a split second. I now find myself pulling up a chair alongside Eddie and his carer. I find out that he has been admitted as his feeding tube had fallen out; he is here to have it replaced in the morning in theatre. I find out that it had fallen out 18 hours ago. As Eddie is unable to swallow without the risk of choking, he relies on the tube for all his medication and fluids. I take a look at the observations. Respiratory rate 18, heart rate 140, blood pressure 89/48, aprexial, not confused. He has a NEWS2 Score of 6. I see a sepsis screening tool that has been completed. It has been deemed that Eddie has a high suspicion of sepsis. But... he’s only come in for a tube change? I use the expertise of the carer. I find out that Eddie hasn’t had any fluids all day and his pads have been dry. At this point he should have had 3 litres of fluid via his tube. He also has not had his medication for his seizures. This is vitally important as it is highly likely he will seize this admission. I put some fluids up. I need to be quite aggressive with replacing his fluids as he may go into acute kidney injury. I write up his epilepsy medication, this time via his cannular. I explain to the nurses to give hourly observations and to call me if there are any problems. I check on Eddie that morning. He’s bright as a button. Smiling and ready for his tube replacement. If I walked on by, what might have happened? Eddie would continue to be treated for sepsis when he wasn’t septic and received antibiotics he didn’t need. Eddie would become more dehydrated and possibly acquired an acute kidney injury. Eddie may have suffered a seizure that could have been prevented. Due to these complications, Eddie may not have been fit for his tube replacement. Eddie's length of stay may have been increased, therefore increasing his risk of contracting a hospital acquired infection. What stopped me from walking by? Eddie reminded me of my brother, *Sam. My brother has cerebral palsy and needs 24-hour care. He’s funny, he can wrap mum around his little finger, he can play pranks on you, he is still my annoying little brother but coming into hospital always poses such a huge stress on us as a family, not to mention Sam. He always has people around him that know him. So, coming into this environment is alien. Due to his physical problems, he doesn’t ‘fit the normal patient mould'. Will he get the right treatment? Will he get his medication on time? Will there be anywhere for the carer to stay? Will the nurses know how to re-position Sam? How will they communicate to Sam? Will they read his patient passport? Will they act on his patient passport? Or will they walk on by? *Names in this blog have been changed for confidentiality purposes.
  12. Content Article
    Key learning points Two approaches to the problem of human fallibility exist: the person and the system approaches. The person approach focuses on the errors of individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness. The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and tries to build defences to avert errors or mitigate their effects. High reliability organisations—which have less than their fair share of accidents—recognise that human variability is a force to harness in averting errors, but they work hard to focus that variability and are constantly preoccupied with the possibility of failure.
×