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In this blog, Dr Faisal Saeed talks about the patient-provider power imbalance using an AI generated image of two chairs to illustrate his points.  When Vincent Van Gogh painted the empty chairs, it was his purpose to distinguish the two chairs; his and that of Gaugin’s. Van Gogh’s chair is painted to be less mystical; straight backed and with no armrests, made of plain unpolished wood. Gauguin's chair was a more ornate and luxurious piece of furniture, with a high back and a carved seat. The chairs were a reflection of the two artist’s personalities and their relationship with each other. While visiting the Van Gogh Alive festival in Adelaide, these paintings of Van Gogh’s chairs stood out at me because I have always found it uncomfortable when I had to point to a simple chair (a backless stool or a plastic chair without armrests) to sit down for my patient, while I was sitting in an imposing high back black leather executive chair with padded armrests, lumbar support, back and head rest adjustment and a swivel base. The image below is an AI generated image. I used the prompt: “painting of a doctor's chair and a patient's chair in a consultation room, painted in the style of Van Gogh”. Guess which chair is the patient’s chair? The concept is so ingrained in society that even generative AI and natural language processing models take it for granted that the patient should be seated in the smaller chair. Since early history, elaborate chairs have been used as a symbol of power by the higher strata of the society – kings, priests and the like – and the simpler backless version of the chair, the stool, is used primarily by the lower strata. Authority, domination and power is what come ultimately to mind when one thinks of chairs (Danto, 1987). The design and the use of the chair is deliberate and the the symbolism is still evident today. It is no accident that the high-ranking officials are given the best and expensive chairs positioned at the front, while others sit in less conspicuous or cheaper ones. It is designed to show power and status. Given the power imbalance between the doctor and the patient, with the seemingly powerful situation the doctor is given in the relationship due to the deference to expertise, the simple chair the patient sits on only acts to reinforce the power imbalance. As it is, several barriers exist that make patients hard to speak up, even where patients are well-informed and well educated. Many patients feel they can’t participate in shared decision-making, and the power imbalances are a key barrier even if patients have the knowledge (Joseph-Williams, 2014). Because patients must have equal power in the relationship as a partner in care, it is time we do not make this distinction in the design of the clinical environment. The patient is an equal partner in the therapeutic relationship and is very much an expert in the lived experience of their illness. We cannot imagine two leaders of a company being shown two very different types of chairs – one simple and one expensive – when seated to discuss and finalise on an agreement. Why must it be any different for the doctor and the patient?

It was recently reported that NHS Finance Directors were ‘incensed’ that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body (HSSIB) should think that they could be working more closely with patient safety chiefs. Whereas medical staff and clinicians represent the sharp end of healthcare delivery, the administrative functions, including finance, are the blunt end. Removed in space and time from the action, it can be hard to see how their behaviour can directly influence workplace outcomes. To understand the issue, Norman MacLeod reflects on how systems behave and the decision-making hierarchy within healthcare organisations. Most discussion of ‘systems’ revolves around assemblages of artefacts: tools, processes, people and spaces. However, the late Jens Rasmussen described a system as a set of nested decision-making processes.[1] Leveson, at MIT, adds that systems are hierarchical, with control being exercised by higher tiers over the lower levels. She adds that control is exercised through communication and feedback.[2] From this perspective, a ‘system’ comprises actors engaged in different types of decision making. The hierarchy of decision making At the lowest level, we have the individual in the workplace. At any moment, our behaviour is directed at a specific goal and our probability of success is shaped by such factors as stress and fatigue, competence, expertise and motivation. Control is represented by direct action and feedback is in the form of observed outcomes. Because of the complexity of work, individuals form teams to get work done and this is the next level in the system. Teams make decisions about allocation of work, priorities, coordinating effort, problem solving. When an individual joins a team they surrender a degree of autonomy: you are no longer a free agent. Control is exercised through briefings, instructions and procedures, and feedback is manifested in behaviour meeting expectations, through raising queries, declaring problems, etc. Teams can be both real and virtual. Real teams are typically those assigned to a task, working in close proximity. Virtual teams comprise agents that collaborate for a specific purpose and are usually remotely located. Virtual teams often work asynchronously: a request is submitted and the response follows after a lag. Virtual teams require additional skills as they typically involve working across organisational boundaries. Individuals and teams are where direct action occurs. The next level in the system is the organisation. At this level, decisions are made in relation to the specific goals the organisation has been set up to achieve and cover configuring assets, allocating resources, command and control. The organisation exercises control over teams and individuals through contracts of employment, codes of conduct, policies, etc. Feedback is typically through audit and compliance, event reporting, tracking of resource utilisation. Of course, the ‘organisation’ is also made up of individuals and teams: the model is recursive. What differentiates each level is the nature of the decisions it makes. The next, and possibly, highest level in the hierarchy are those entities that facilitate the functioning of the system but do not, in themselves, get directly involved. Here we see government departments, regulatory bodies, accrediting bodies. Actors at this level set strategic goals, allocate resources at the macro level and grant permissions. The components outlined here all exist in a broader environment. By convention, the environment describes attributes that exert influence on the actors in the system but is not influenced, in turn, by those actors. For example, the public health profile in a geographic area will shape the strategic goals set for the organisation and will influence the healthcare capabilities that need to be provided in that area. However, the action of an individual healthcare organisation will not necessarily shape the public health profile of its hinterland. Emergence and cross-scale effect So, where do finance directors fit into all of this? Obviously, as actors at the level of the organisation their decisions relate to the allocation of financial resource. As such, they shape decision making by others in the system responsible for spending on specific functions. But we now need to look at some other properties of systems: emergence and cross-scale effect. Emergence describes behaviours that cannot be explained simply based on the functioning of the parts of the system. Cross-scale effects captures how actions at one level in the system can have unintended consequences at another level. If we start with emergence, ‘safety’ is an emergent property at the level of the individual. Only individuals can act in a manner that bolsters safety or, conversely, it is the actions of individuals that create unsafe states. ‘Culture’ is an emergent property at the level of the team, while at the level of the organisation we see morale as a key emergent. Patient safety activities compete for resources in a landscape where other demands can be seen to have a more direct influence on outcomes. In financial terms, patient safety can be seen as a discretionary spend. This attitude to a legitimate demand can shape morale. Cross-scale effects are akin to Reason’s Latent Factors.[3] Their presence is often only revealed when something goes wrong. We can see cross-scale effects at work in the case of staff recruitment. For example, to save money posts are often ‘gapped’: a post is not advertised until after the incumbent has left. While the post remains unfilled, the burden of work is borne by others or simply not done. Where workload is increased, outcomes can include increased fatigue, staff turnover, sickness/absence or risk of error. So, a simple, rational decision at one level can have multiple consequences elsewhere. The example given here – gapping posts – is typically a response to financial constraints. My intention here is not to portray finance directors as villains: they simply have their hands on some powerful levers of control. But their protestations do possibly support the need for a more sophisticated attempt to understand how systems work. References Rasmussen J, Svedung I. Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society. Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Karlstad, Sweden; 2000. Leveson N. Engineering a Safer World. MIT Press; 2012. Reason J. Human Error. Cambridge University Press; 1991. Other blogs from Norman MacLeod: What is a ‘safety management system’? Error isn’t a problem – the problem is the word ‘error’

In this blog, Steve Turner reflects on why genuine patient safety whistleblowers are so frequently ignored, side-lined or victimised. Why staff don't speak out, why measures to change this have not worked and, in some cases, have exacerbated the problems. Steve concludes with optimism that new legislation going through Parliament offers a way forward from which everyone will benefit. The scale of the problem The hidden costs of stigmatisation of healthcare whistleblowers are immense. System-wide problems in this area of healthcare are reinforced by a lack of transparency and the failure of accountability. The consequences of this failure have been investigated many times over the years. A seminal case was that of the Bristol heart surgery scandal in the 1990s. This was brought to light by the anaesthetist Steve Bolsin and led to the implementation of a system of clinical governance.[1] This advance in measures to deliver quality, consistent and safe care remains as relevant today as it ever was. More recently, the investigation into the failings at mid Staffordshire[2] highlighted how a ‘good news’ only culture, where reputation management was placed above patient safety, is failing patients. Critically for me the shocking fact is that where staff who blow the whistle can't, or don't, speak out, are ignored or silenced, the onus to expose wrongdoing falls on patients and their relatives. This involves great personal cost. The onus to expose wrongdoing falls on patients and their relatives. This involves great personal cost. This shameful thread of patient-led whistleblowing goes back a long way and has not stopped. Examples where patients, carers or relatives have had to take the lead and blow the whistle include the death of Robbie Powell,[3] Elizabeth Dixon,[4] Oliver McGowan,[5] Claire Roberts and those who died in the Belfast Hyponatraemia scandal,[6] the Gosport War Memorial Hospital scandal,[7] and the investigation into maternity services in East Kent.[8] These patient safety scandals show no sign of abating despite the report on the failings at mid Staffordshire[2] and Sir Robert Francis’ major review into whistleblowing in the NHS.[9] This is reinforced by the 2023 Bewick Review,[10] which is the first of three planned reviews into University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust. This review was commissioned following repeated serious concerns relating to patient safety, leadership, culture and governance, which were initially downplayed or ignored. The full story behind these failings and their significance has yet to fully come to light. Patients have to blow the whistle on unsafe care A stream of healthcare scandals (too many to mention all of them here) have been exposed by members of the public. Key examples include the case of Robbie Powell who died of untreated Addison's disease in 1990.[3] Thanks to the tenacity of Robbie’s father (Will Powell) this led to the clarification of the absence of an individual legal Duty of Candour for healthcare professionals.[11] Despite numerous reports and failed investigations, including one of which put forward 35 suggested criminal charges, the Robbie Powell case remains open with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). In addition, the former Welsh Ombudsman and the English Ombudsman are both calling for a public inquiry into the case.[12] Another case concerns those who died at Gosport War Memorial Hospital in the 1990s who were prescribed opioid medicines that were not indicated for their condition. This led to an Independent Review Panel,[7] which took four years and cost £14 million. The Panel found that 456 deaths in the 1990s had "followed inappropriate administration of opioid drugs". In 2019, Assistant Chief Constable Nick Downing, head of the Serious Crime Directorate for Kent and Essex Police, announced that a new criminal investigation into the deaths was to take place and the campaign for justice continues. Other serious issues include premature deaths of people with learning disabilities and autism,[13] which led to the implementation of the learning from deaths programme. On average, the life expectancy of women with a learning disability is 18 years shorter than for women in the general population. The life expectancy of men with a learning disability is 14 years shorter than for men in the general population.[14] There are numerous individual cases that support this finding, many of which were first highlighted by parents, informal carers or relatives. In 2014, the Department of Health and Social Care published a report that found that almost two-fifths of people with learning disabilities died from causes "amenable to good quality healthcare."[15] In 2022, a report by Dr Bill Kirkup into deaths in East Kent NHS maternity services[8] confirmed that the "onus was on patients to raise concerns" because the culture of fear prevented whistleblowers from speaking out. “In every case staff were aware of serious mistakes or wrongdoing but they were unaware of how to raise concerns because those who tried were subjected to peer pressure to be silent and everyone was afraid of the [personal] consequences.” These consequences were exemplified by the experience of the nursing director who was told that speaking up would harm her career. Another significant report is that into the life and death of Elizabeth Dixon,[4] which contains recommendations that apply across the board: "…6. Clinical error, openly disclosed, investigated and learned from, must not be subject to blame. Conversely, there should be zero tolerance of cover up, deception and fabrication in any health care setting, not least in the aftermath of error. (NHSE, GMC, NMC, MoJ) 7. There should be a clear mechanism to hold individuals to account for giving false information or concealing information relating to public services, and for failing to assist investigations. The Public Authority (Accountability) Bill drawn up in the aftermath of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and Inquests sets out a commendable framework to put this in legislation… It should be re-examined. (MoJ) 8. The existing haphazard system of generating clinical expert witnesses is not fit for purpose. It should be reviewed, taking onto account the clear need for transparent, formalised systems and clinical governance. (DHSC, MoJ)…" The amount of evidence and the number of reports that were initiated thanks to the tenacity and courage of patients, relatives, carers and parents, is truly shocking. How can we change this? How many more reports do we need? The only thing we can say with confidence is that lessons have not been learned. Why don’t staff speak out? I was recently asked ‘why don't staff speak out?’ There's very little rigorous research on whistleblowing in health and social care, so I can only offer my personal views on this apparent absence of ethical behaviour. I believe this quote from Margaret Heffernan (Professor of Practice at the University of Bath School of Management) goes some way to explaining this: “I have never encountered an organisation as vicious in its treatment of whistleblowers as the NHS".[16] If anyone has any doubts there are a string of high-profile cases to support it, including the cases of Steve Bolsin, Raj Mattu, Kim Holt, Peter Duffy and Chris Day. When I was asked why staff stay silent my first thought was to say that those who would speak out have all left. Of course, this can't be the full story. So, what are the other reasons? One possible reason is that people who are promoted to highly paid jobs attain these positions because they ‘toe the line’. Organisational psychologists talk about the role of enablers and ‘flying monkeys’ in maintaining this culture. A flying monkey is a psychology term that refers to an enabler of a narcissistic person, a henchman so to speak. Many staff keep their heads down and don't look too hard at what's going on around them. Some commentators see this as a behaviour that is supported by the promotion of toxic positivity. What I mean by this is a culture of talking-up successes, however small, completely ignoring failure, and therefore missing the learning that comes from failure. The widely used phrase ‘rock the boat but stay in it'[17] springs to mind here, especially the empty references to ‘radicals’ and ‘change agents’. This forms part of learning materials that are often accompanied by reams of management jargon and pseudo-science. This leads to a morally bankrupt approach where ‘all is well’ (‘nothing to see here’) and toxic positivity prevails. The belief that no matter how bad a situation is, people should maintain a positive mindset, move on and not mention it, is a way of working that is directly contradicted in these wise words by the late Professor Aidan Halligan: "Run toward problems, especially on a bad day." My views may sound very harsh, especially coming from someone like me who left direct employment with the NHS in 2008. It's important to point out that I believe the vast majority of NHS staff, at all levels from clerical staff and porters to senior managers and chief executives, do their best to work around the bullying and toxicity to deliver safe care for patients. Doing their best despite the prevailing culture rather than being supported by it. Sometimes biding their time and subtly subverting directives that are not in patients’ best interests. For clinicians, the threat of being referred inappropriately to a professional body is ever present,[18] and an environment where the pressure of work is extreme, exhausting and unstainable are also major factors. For many, the prevailing culture also means that the careers of highly skilled accountable, ethical and caring staff are held back through denial of learning opportunities and promotion, and informal blacklisting which is commonplace. There's an army of people ready for change, a huge informal network of highly motivated caring people, which is why I'm optimistic about the future. Why have ‘speaking up’ reforms failed? These are my personal views based on my experience and that of my colleagues. Since Sir Robert Francis’ whistleblowing report[9] there have been several changes designed to improve the situation. These include Freedom to Speak up Guardians (FTSU), the introduction of an institutional Duty of Candour, the ‘Fit and Proper Persons Test'[14] for Board members and the NHS Whistleblower Support Scheme. In addition, the Health and Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) was set up in 2017 and a National Patient Safety Commissioner was appointed in 2022. Given all the above, why has there not been a reduction in high-profile healthcare failings? In my view there are several reasons. Many believe, as I do, that the approach of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to whistleblowing is part of the problem. We often learn from investigation reports that the CQC (and other regulators) had been listing problems in their reports for years and yet no meaningful action has been taken. ‘Regulatory capture’ is a serious problem, which is when regulators are adversely influenced by the people they are inspecting. This is often linked to the revolving door of staff who move from health and care employment to the regulators, and informal links which amount to cronyism. This behaviour is something that commentators have noted and which I have experienced myself.[20]. Patients suffer as a result. The introduction of the National Guardian Office and Freedom to Speak Up Guardians in each NHS trust is also problematic. This initiative has an inbuilt conflict of interest, as the Guardians are employed by the trusts themselves. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Whistleblowing (APPG) has heard from whistleblowers who have been failed by local Guardians, sharing their experiences that have included the disclosure of their identity to hospital management and boards, which resulted in retaliation. The APPG has also heard from local Guardians who were not supported and themselves the target of retaliation after supporting whistleblowers.[21] In addition, something which I find shocking is that the National Guardian Office appears to studiously avoid the word ‘whistleblowing’ in its material and outputs wherever possible. This adds to the stigma around healthcare whistleblowers and is inexcusable. Another lesser-known initiative is the NHS Speaking Up Support Scheme[22] (originally titled the Whistleblower Support Scheme). There is not much information available on this scheme in the public domain. I became aware of the scheme when I was asked if I wanted to apply. Later I signposted several people to the scheme. I learned that although the scheme has benefited some people, for others it appears to have made their situation worse. Through a freedom of information request, and thanks to the intervention of my MP, I have managed to obtain a redacted copy of the evaluation of the pilot scheme which supports the view of mixed results.[23] Having read this report, it is unclear to me why it hasn’t been published and why it was redacted. Particularly as I think (I can’t be sure of course) that one of the redactions is a comment I made. A comment I wanted to be shared. As for the other post-Francis review initiatives, the Kark Review in 2018 on the Fit and Proper Person Test (FPPT) is unequivocal in its findings: "Essentially it [FPPT] does not ensure directors are fit and proper for the post they hold, and it does not stop the unfit or misbehaved from moving around the system."[24] In addition, the statutory current Duty of Candour[25] seems, at times, to be little more than a tick box, with the responsibility for talking to patients often left to the most junior staff. A Duty of Candour is about simply telling the truth and is everyone’s responsibility, not a task to be delegated. The need for a legal duty of candour on individuals has been highlighted by Robbie Powell’s father Will Powell and links to proposals for a Hillsborough Law. The HSIB and the National Patient Safety Commissioner initiatives have some built in limitations to what can be achieved. The HSIB’s remit does not include investigation of systemic problems. This limits the areas that they can cover. As for the National Patient Safety Commissioner, this is a new role which is very promising. Unfortunately, the scope of this role is limited, with the remit covering only medicines and medical devices. This means that these two initiatives are not able to tackle the systemic organisational cultural issues that are at the root of major patient safety failings. One thing that stands out here is that none of the above measures specifically tackle the stigma around whistleblowing in healthcare. In fact, some reinforce the stigma. A way forward Much has been written about healthcare whistleblowing and measures that have been implemented to promote positive change. Despite these, the victimisation of healthcare whistleblowers and the stigmatisation around whistleblowing in health and in social care has not abated. The measures introduced have so far achieved very little. In some instances, I believe, they have made the problem worse. The Protection for Whistleblowing Bill,[26] which passed its second reading in December 2022, proposes the repeal of the current Public Interest Disclosure Act,[27] replacing it with an Office of the Whistleblower. This would prevent concerns of genuine healthcare whistleblowers becoming buried under an employment issue, and their original patient safety concerns being side-lined. The Public Interest Disclosure Act is expensive, limited in scope and beyond the reach of most whistleblowers. It is also overly complex, with cases currently waiting for over 2 years to be heard. Employers game the system to run whistleblowers out of funds. Fewer than 12% of cases that go to the Employment Tribunal win. It does not protect patients and is not accessible to members of the public who blow the whistle. Currently there is no statutory provision to investigate or address the wrongdoing highlighted by whistleblowers. Many whistleblowers have been denied any protection because they are not workers. An Office of the Whistleblower would change this and help us identify the root causes of systemic patient safety failings.[26] I urge everyone with an interest in this subject to read the bill and watch the video of Baroness Kramer introducing the second reading of the Bill.[28] For the first time in years, I am optimistic. References Department of Health. The report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: learning from Bristol (Cm5207(II)); 2001. Department of Health. Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry; 2013. Hartles S. Robbie Powell: Time for Truth, Justice and Accountability. Open University Harm & Evidence Research Collaborative; 2021. Kirkup B. Independent report. The life and death of Elizabeth Dixon: a catalyst for change; 2020. Ritchie F. Independent Review into Thomas Oliver McGowan’s LeDeR Process Phase two; 2020. Department of Health, Northern Ireland. Report of the inquiry into hyponatraemia related deaths; 2018. Gosport Independent Review Panel Report. The Panel Report - 20th June 2018. Dr Kirkup B. Reading the signals: maternity and neonatal services in East Kent – the report of the independent investigation; 2022. Francis R. Report on the Freedom to Speak Up review; 2015. Bewick M, et al. University Hospitals Birmingham NHS FT (UHB) Phase 1 Review by I4QU. Clinical Safety. iQ4U Consultants; 2023. Action against Medical Accidents. Robbie’s Law. The European Court Ruling in full: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22002-6998%22]}. Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Radio Ombudsman: Will Powell’s 32-year quest for justice for son Robbie; 2022. NHS England. About LeDeR; 2023. NHS Digital. Health and Care of People with Learning Disabilities, Experimental Statistics: 2018 to 2019 [PAS]; 2020. Department of Health and Social care. Premature Deaths of People with Learning Disabilities: Progress Update; 2014. Heffernan M. I have never encountered an organisation as vicious in its treatment of whistleblowers as the NHS. BMJ Talk Medicine Podcast; 2020. Bevan H. Rocking the boat and staying in it: how to be a great change agent. Slide set; 2016. Grossman D, Clare S. Birmingham hospital culture worrying - health secretary. BBC Newsnight; 2023. Care Quality Commission. Fit and proper persons: directors; 2022.   Clegg A. How cronyism corrodes workplace relations and trust. Financial Times; 2022. WhistleblowersUK, Meeting with Dr Bill Kirkup CBE and the APPG for Whistleblowing: blog; 2022. NHS England. Speaking up support scheme; 2022. Greenop D. NHSI Whistleblowers Support Scheme pilot. Final Evaluation (redacted); 2019. Obtained in 2022 following a Freedom of Information Request. Kark K, Russel J. A review of the Fit and Proper Person Test. Commissioned by the Minister of State for Health; 2018. Care Quality Commission. Regulation 20. Duty of Candour; 2023. UK Parliament. Protection for Whistleblowing Bill [HL]; 2023. UK Government. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 [PIDA]. Baroness Kramer. Protection for Whistleblowing Bill, 2nd Reading, Baroness Kramer 2022. Video recording of the House of Lords introduction.

This discussion paper, published in The Journal of Patient Safety and Risk Management, explores some of the opportunities which healthcare organisations could embrace to positively influence the effects of power and hierarchy on staff safety. The author concludes: "This exploration into how power and hierarchy influence both staff and patient safety has identified and briefly explored some of the tensions created by misplaced brand loyalty inherent within healthcare institutions, and the legacy of harms resulting." See also Helen Elliott-Mainwaring's poster on the research (also available to download from the attachment below):