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Defensiveness is often implicated in systemic organisational failures to explain why early warning signs were ignored and organisational resilience was compromised. But how does an organisation become defensive? The authors of this study propose that defensiveness can arise as a response to contradictory work demands. The research focuses on UK hospital staff tasked with responding to criticism online (herein complaint handlers). It examines these responses to criticism using a mixed methods explanatory sequential design. Six defensive tactics were reliably identified: redirecting patients to other channels, evading issues, psychologising concerns, invalidating concerns as incomplete, closing the feedback episode, and individualising concerns with bespoke workarounds. These defensive tactics were generally associated with less organisational learning and were sometimes viewed as unhelpful. To explain these results, the authors introduce the complaint handler’s bind: staff are tasked with responding to complaints without a viable pathway for organisational learning and an implicit injunction against voicing this dilemma. This demand-control double bind unwittingly gives staff little alternative but to be defensive. Future research, the authors conclude, needs to conceptualise defensiveness as sometimes a symptom rather than a cause of problems in organisational learning.

The purpose of this study was to identify which, and to what extent, demographic and operational factors are indicative of likelihood for a new call handler or paramedic to remain in role within the first two years of employment at an ambulance trust using data held in the trust’s bespoke data warehouse. Several factors showed a significant contribution to the likelihood of remaining in post within an ambulance NHS Trust. Among the findings, short-term sick leave in the first two years of employment was associated with increased retention for paramedics. In addition, female call handlers were found to have increased retention and paramedic retention increased with time outside of ‘job cycle time’ (JCT) activities (ie, activities other than responding to calls). This study presents a method for extracting new insights from routinely collected operational data, identifying common drivers and specific predictors for retention among the ambulance NHS workforce. It emphasises the importance of workforce-centred retention strategies, highlighting the need for non-JCT time, which in turn would allow paramedics to have time to reflect and recuperate to avoid burnout and attrition. The study also suggests that a lack of sick leave might indicate a lack of trust and self-care culture, potentially leading to paramedic staff attrition. Our approach to retention analytics provides a new mechanism for trusts to monitor and respond to their attrition risks in a timely, proactive fashion.

Physicians in the USA are facing a number of changes and challenges in 2025 — with some good news about burnout rates, some bad news around aging physicians and some surprising shifts in the physician workforce makeup. This article highlights 10 things to know about the current state of the physician workforce.

As health systems continue to grapple with ongoing workforce challenges, healthcare leaders like Stacie Call, MSN, RN, CNO for Mercy Health – Loraine & Youngstown (Ohio), and her team have worked to cultivate a resilient and engaged workforce.  Becker’s Hospital Review connected with Ms Call to discuss how implementing strategies that prioritise strategic partnerships, a listening culture and innovation can help not only address existing staff demands but lay the groundwork for a future-ready and sustainable healthcare workforce. 

The General Medical Council (GMC) has submitted its response to Professor Gillian Leng’s independent review of the physician associate (PA) and anaesthesia associate (AA) professions in England. In its submission the regulator emphasised the importance of statutory regulation for PA and AAs because - as with any regulated healthcare profession - PAs and AAs undertake complex work that will pose some level of risk to the public, and regulation mitigates this risk. The submission also highlighted that, as the multi-professional regulator for doctors, PAs and AAs, the GMC is well placed to work with others across the health system to identify and address issues that concern all three professions. For example, the availability of supervisors and student training placements. The GMC also said that regulation is already beginning to raise standards of practice through ensuring that only those individuals with the right clinical knowledge and skills are entered onto the GMC’s registers.

On 9 November 2019, a woman who was pregnant with Ida, attended the Royal Lancaster Infirmary Labour Ward in early labour. Ida was a normal child whose death was caused by a lack of oxygen during her delivery. This occurred due to the gross failure of the three midwives attending her to provide basic medical care to deliver Ida urgently when it was apparent she was in distress and contributed to by the lead midwife‘s wholly incompetent failure to provide basic neonatal resuscitation for Ida during the first 3 1/2 minutes of her life that further contributed to Ida’s brain damage. Ida died on 16 November 2019 at the Royal Preston Hospital neonatal intensive care unit. The inquest was one in which Article 2 was fully engaged as a result of the Trust’s clinical governance arrangements, inadequate investigations, a lack of transparency and openness, a failure to respond to a detailed complaint letter, a failure to comply with the Duty of Candour, disputing the findings of the Secretary of State for Health’s independent review panel (HSIB now MNSI), failing to notify external monitoring bodies and failing to comply with internal protocols. The Trust’s lack of compliance with clinical governance requirements in the investigation into Ida’s death had significant similarities with the criticisms made in 2015 of the Trust as set out in The Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation, otherwise known as the Kirkup Report. [REDACTED] who gave evidence at the inquest, expressed the view that there was a deep seated and endemic culture of defensiveness in respect of maternity incidents at the Trust. [REDACTED] also said that the investigation showed elements of failing to identify significant care issues, brevity, defensiveness and was conducted by unskilled investigators. Matters of Concern A: Culture of Candour [Trust, ICB and DHSC] 1. I am concerned that there is not a culture of candour within University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Trust) and the impact that this has on safety, learning and implementing required changes to prevent deaths. Urgent action is required by the Trust to meaningfully embed the Dury of Candour. 2. [REDACTED]’s evidence to the inquest was that a deep-seated and endemic culture within the Trust leads to denial and a failure to learn. [REDACTED]’s Investigation report was published in 2015, the Trust is ten years on and still issues and themes identified in 2015 were very much in issue in 2019 and still exist at the Trust as identified by Ida’s inquest. 3. The Trust’s approach to the inquest has been one of a lack of transparency and openness, failure to provide relevant information and a failure to identify with candour the defective clinical governance processes that have operated at the Trust from 2019 to present day. 4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust’s internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust’s Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida’s death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”. 5. Trust figures to the Board provided in 2025 stated that there were no complaints over 6 months old when the Trust at the time of the inquest have not responded to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]’s 1 June 2020 complaint. Together with the Trust’s failure to categorise Ida’s death as only “Moderate Harm” (see point 4 above) cause me also to have concern about the reliability of Trust’s data. B: Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance [Trust, ICB and DHSC] 6. I consider the clinical governance arrangements at the Trust require urgent review to ensure the appropriate personnel are in place, with the necessary training and skills to deliver robust clinical governance to ensure patient safety in maternity care. 7. As a result of the Trust’s deficient processes, the Trust did not undertake any examination of its own clinical governance processes, which were a principle area of concern and which was identified to the Trust five months before the inquest commenced. The Trust’s clinical governance arrangements were extracted piecemeal during the course of the inquest. The deficiencies included lack of version control and audit of documents, untrained staff, chaotic clinical governance arrangements, defensive attitudes and inappropriate self- congratulation. The clinicians’ reports to the inquest only answered the questions they were asked rather than trying to assist with a holistic view of the evidence, did not provide relevant information until it was extracted from the witness in testimony, that resulted in rolling disclosure of documents and additional witness evidence. This approach caused additional distress to the family who had to sit through an extended court hearing to address these issues 8. [REDACTED] is now Head of Compliance and Assurance at the Trust but that there has been no investigation into her role in respect of reneging on the Trust’s acceptance of the HSIB report at senior management level and with the family as was indicated by her approval of the July 2021 position statement. Similarly, [REDACTED] is now Head of Midwifery at the Trust and there has been no investigation in respect of her disputing the HSIB findings and submission of challenge to the HSIB report in Ida’s case. 9. All investigations conducted by the Trust to date in respect of Ida’s death have been unskilled, superficial, brief, failed to identify issues and left the family without answers and were all features identified by the 2015 Kirkup Report. In view of the continuing culture at the Trust, this cause a significant concern that issues of safety and safeguarding are not properly considered, transparently engaged with and then addressed formally in respect of a child fatality and serious injury by the Trust. 10. The Trust’s clinical governance capability has been the subject of repeated and often severe criticism in the Flynn Review 2009, Fielding Report 2010, Central Manchester Hospital Report 2011, Price Waterhouse Cooper 2012 and Kirkup Report 2015. [REDACTED] in his evidence to the inquest said that the Trust focus on process, which means that you can comply with the process requirements and still produce an inadequate investigation, rather than focussing on outcome, which measures the quality of the investigation and the patient experience. [REDACTED] noted that the Trusts culture impeded transparent and open investigation. I am told that the Trust now uses the PSIRF model and is to appoint 3 whole time equivalent Response Leads by 30 September 2025. However, I remain concerned that the Trust has not fully engaged with the duty of candour such that I am not satisfied that the work on PSIRF to date has truly addressed the issues in respect of Trust’s investigations. C. Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training [Trust and ICB] 11. The Band 5 midwife supporting [REDACTED] in Labour had not undertaken her required mandatory training and this fact had not been provided and was only revealed at the inquest as part of the evidence of the Head of Midwifery in March 2025. I was also concerned to learn that in 2025 non-completion of mandatory training was still an issue as [REDACTED] had not completed her mandatory training. 12. It concerns me that the Trust do not have robust systems in place to ensure that any midwife who has not completed her mandatory training is subject to immediate action to ensure that all mandatory training is completed and is in date. 13. There was no remedial training was put in place for either the midwives involved in Ida’s delivery and resuscitation or for the paediatric SHO after Ida’s death. This raises a significant concern that the Trust do not operate a system of remedial training when this inquest has identified remedial training was required for [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. D. Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling [Trust, ICB, DHSC, NHSE, [REDACTED]] 14. The Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as “moderate”, even after her death. This grading should have been adjusted to “severe” by the Trust before Ida was transferred to Royal Preston Hospital as the consultant paediatrician identified that she had sustained a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to fetal bradycardia. 15. The 2024 NHSE Learn from patient safety events (LFPSE) guidance that replaced the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) confirms that the recording and analysis of patient safety events that occur in healthcare support the NHS to improve learning from patient safety events to help make care safer. There is a significant risk that if reporting is graded on harm alone, clinical care that resulted in hypoxic brain damage during delivery and which was prevented by therapeutic cooling, will not adequately identify the problems that caused the harm during the delivery. 16. [REDACTED] confirmed that nationally there is inconsistency in categorisation of harm for babies who sustain a hypoxic injury due to fetal bradycardia in labour and who require cooling and clarification guidance would assist prevent further maternity deaths and ensure full and proper investigation of hypoxic injuries sustained in labour. E: Funding for MSNI [DHSC and [REDACTED], NHSE and ICB] 17. But for the HSIB investigation report into Ida’s death [REDACTED] admitted that Ida’s death due to failures by the Trust would never have come to light or resulted in an inquest. 18. The MSNI is now hosted by the CQC with funding secured for the next two years but no certainty as to ongoing funding after this date. These independent investigations by specialist skilled investigators into the most serious of events is an essential safeguard to the lives of mothers and unborn children. 19. Without an assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027 I am concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida’s will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths will go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths.