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Found 500 results
  1. News Article
    A five-year-old was left traumatised, bleeding and in severe pain after a physician associate wrongly prescribed her a vaginal pessary, according to a damning report by the health ombudsman. The parliamentary and health service ombudsman (PHSO) said there were “multiple failures” in the care of the girl, who saw a physician associate (PA) at a GP practice in the East Midlands after complaining of itching and vaginal discharge. The PA suspected thrush and recommended a vaginal pessary and cream. The five-year-old’s mother, who believed her daughter was being seen by a GP, questioned the treatment and the size of the pessary, but was reassured that it was appropriate. PAs do not have prescribing rights and their work must be supervised by a doctor who approves the prescription. But the ombudsman found there was no discussion between the PA and GP before the GP authorised the prescription, even though vaginal pessaries are not suitable for prepubescent children and the girl’s symptoms were consistent with vulvovaginitis, not thrush. There was also no questioning of the prescription by the pharmacy that dispensed it. The mother said that after inserting the pessary, her daughter began to bleed and scream in pain, while the cream burned the girl’s skin. She took her to see an out-of-hours doctor. However, the girl was so distressed and in pain that she asked the doctor not to examine her internally, causing the GP to raise concerns about possible sexual abuse and to contact safeguarding services. Although it was established the girl’s symptoms were caused by the pessary and cream, not sexual abuse, the mother said the experience was distressing, embarrassing and further added to her trauma. She said: “I had huge guilt for doing what the PA, who I thought was a GP, told me and feeling as if I had inflicted this trauma on my daughter. “But I trusted what [they] told me. How are we meant to trust healthcare professionals now?” Rebecca Hilsenrath, the chief executive of the parliamentary and health service ombudsman, said the “deeply troubling case” was all the more concerning because it could easily have been avoided. “The breakdown in communication meant the checks and balances designed to make sure patients are treated appropriately and kept safe were not followed.” Read full story Source: The Guardian, 5 June 2026
  2. News Article
    A health minister has acknowledged that restricted access to weight loss drugs on the NHS may be driving individuals to seek unregulated alternatives, as officials face urgent calls to investigate deaths linked to black market obesity jabs. Health officials were directly challenged by MPs on the Health and Social Committee regarding measures to curb illicit sales of anti-obesity treatments. A stark warning was issued to NHS and Department of Health officials: "People have already died as a result of this, and there is a chance that this could get worse." Conservative MP Gregory Stafford questioned whether current NHS access constraints were creating a patient safety risk, citing evidence that barriers were pushing patients to "unregulated and potentially unsafe sources." Professor Aidan Fowler, national director of patient safety for NHS England, informed MPs that discussions with the MHRA (Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency) frequently address risks around medicine safety, including black market issues, drawing parallels with cosmetic surgery. However, committee chairwoman Layla Moran delivered a harrowing account, stating: "I’ve met with families whose loved ones have tragically passed away because they did access on the black market, they then got sepsis and died, and the coroner report is still ongoing. “But the concern is it was the injection itself and its administration that caused the death, they don’t feel that the MHRA are on top of it, and I’m not sure that they will have heard today’s evidence and felt that you guys are either, and I really hope, minister, that when you go away and look at this that you bear in mind the fact people have already died as a result of this, and there is a chance that this could get worse." Read full story Source: The Independent, 3 June 2026
  3. News Article
    The national patient data watchdog has said it will investigate how Palantir staff came to have access to identifiable patient data in the federated data platform, despite previous assurances that this would not be the case. In a statement published yesterday afternoon by the National Data Guardian (NDG), Nicola Byrne said the watchdog would “seek clarification” over why it was not previously informed that external contractors would be able to view identifiable patient data. Reports emerged last month that staff from companies working on the FDP, including Palantir, would be granted “unlimited access” to identifiable patient data through the National Data Integration Tenant environment. This is where NHS organisations will submit raw data before identifying features are removed or pseudonymised. In this week’s statement, Dr Byrne said there has been “subsequent confirmation from the [FDP] programme team that some external contractor staff also have access to identifiable patient information”. The NDG is an independent adviser to the government and the health service and has no statutory investigatory or enforcement powers. The watchdog said: “We need to be confident that the positions presented to us are accurate, consistent, and clearly reflected in public-facing transparency materials. We have also emphasised the need for timely engagement with the NDG whenever significant programme decisions change in ways that may affect public trust, as in this case.” Read full story (paywalled) Source: HSJ, 4 June 2026
  4. Content Article
    Prioritising patient safety is a blog series from the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). PHSO's strategy is built around three priorities: driving public service improvement, improving the user experience, and raising awareness and trust. You’ll see all three reflected in this edition which.  shares news of an exciting new partnership with two medical schools in the north-west, and what it means for the future of the clinician-patient relationship  provides an update on Andy’s case, which was first mentioned in the Winter blog, including the positive changes the Trust has made  shares a new case involving an avoidable death and the constructive way the Trust responded to the findings. 
  5. News Article
    The midwife's notes were short and to the point. The three letters - "FOH" - that she had written on a whiteboard next to names of heavily pregnant women were not there to alert colleagues to women having a specific medical condition or requiring a certain type of care. Instead, they were an acronym for a three-word offensive statement signalling they wanted the women to leave the maternity unit run by Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust (NUH). The "F", a swear word. The "O", standing for "OFF". The "H", short for "HOME". The acronym was described in a 2018 resignation letter from another member of staff, now seen by BBC Panorama, raising concerns about attitudes within the unit. In the same letter, another midwife was reported to have advised colleagues to get pregnant women, who had arrived worried they were going into labour, to go home with the advice: "Don't be too kind, she'll keep coming back." The Nottingham trust is currently at the centre of the largest maternity inquiry in the history of the NHS - looking at care provided to about 2,500 families between 2012 and 2025. Led by senior midwife, Donna Ockenden, the inquiry is due to publish its findings on 24 June. "Nottingham thought that there was a Nottingham way, that they were some kind of superior NHS trust compared to others," Ockenden tells Panorama. Read full story Source: BBC News, 1 June 2026
  6. Content Article
    This Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) short paper shares insights from senior leaders at NHS trusts across England on how they handle complaints, what complaints reveal and how they use that learning to make improvements.  It draws on conversations with NHS trust leaders and covers themes including:  leadership and complaints culture  rising complaint volumes and the patient-clinician relationship  defensive culture and its impact on behaviour  the role of regulation in supporting improvement  prioritising patient experience  digital transformation and patient-centred design.  The findings highlight good practice and persistent challenges, with a shared message that patient experience must remain central to improvement in care and patient safety across the NHS. 
  7. Content Article
    Edition 13 of the After Action Review newsletter shares an example of a new application of the SEIPS tool. SEIPS was meant to help us review incidents. But what if it’s quietly changing how we think about safety every day? The use of the System Engineering Initiative in Patient Safety, mostly commonly known as SEIPS is now widely applied in the learning responses to healthcare incidents. What makes it really interesting is how it is now also working reduce risk proactively and influence how we think in healthcare.
  8. Content Article
    This Health Services Safety Investigation Body (HSSIB) report examines patient safety in relation to electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA). ePMA is software used to prescribe medication and create a record of the medication: that has been given, or due and not given to a patient. Most people admitted to hospital will receive medication, and most acute hospital trusts in England have ePMA functionality in at least part of their organisations. This report focuses on the procurement process used by acute hospital trusts to purchase new ePMA functionality and/or upgrade their existing ePMA functionality and how patient safety learning about ePMA is identified and shared across the healthcare system. It considers how legal, regulatory, standards and assurance functions apply in relation to ePMA safety. ePMA functionality has been shown to reduce some medication errors. However, the current national mechanisms (legislation, regulation, standards and assurance) for ensuring patient safety in relation to ePMA functionality may not adequately provide staff and healthcare organisations with the assurance that risk and hazard identification process are robust and/or share learning associated with the use of ePMA in an acute hospital setting. Findings There are no core national patient safety standards that inform either the design or procurement of ePMA. This can lead to unwarranted variation in functionality across and between ePMA, other electronic systems, and acute hospital trusts, which may pose challenges for staff when prescribing and administering medication. Current assurance mechanisms do not provide national oversight or enforcement of either manufacturer or healthcare provider compliance with legally mandated standards relating to digital clinical safety and interoperability of digital health technology. The safety risks associated with software such as ePMA are complex and may change rapidly. Legislation, regulation and standards may not keep up with the speed of technological change. Manufacturers must self-assess and report whether their ePMA is compliant with relevant standards for their products to be included on an NHS procurement framework. There is variation in the core safety standards identified by acute hospital trusts when procuring and contracting for ePMA functionality. This leads to trusts identifying safety requirements individually, with limited consistency in the approach taken across trusts. Reliance is placed on acute hospital trusts to determine whether ePMA manufacturers have interpreted the medical device regulations appropriately, and to assure themselves that the trust complies with relevant standards. Some trusts do not have the resources, skills and expertise to do this effectively. Digital safety and patient safety teams at local and national level may work in silos, with limited ability to share information or collaborate on ePMA-related decisions that impact on patient safety. There are challenges with identifying national safety learning relating to ePMA as this is not reliably captured, shared or identified through formal reporting routes. There is ongoing work to improve the NHS reporting system to capture digital-related patient safety incidents. There is a reliance on informal networks for sharing ePMA safety issues which means safety concerns may not always be shared with those who need to be aware. Some ePMA manufacturers, whose ePMA functionality is not registered as a medical device choose to apply equivalent governance and assurance measures as if it is a medical device. This is in addition to complying with the digital clinical safety standard (DCB0129). Acute hospital trusts face challenges prioritising and resourcing procurement decisions for ePMA functionality. This leads to challenges and patient safety issues when ePMA is implemented. Clinical safety officers (CSOs) may not be adequately resourced, meaning they have limited capacity to support in managing clinical risks associated with ePMA. There is variation in how the CSO responsibilities set out in the digital clinical standards are interpreted and implemented by trusts. NHS England is working on plans for a formal curriculum and potential accreditation to improve CSO skills and capabilities. HSSIB makes the following safety recommendations Safety recommendation R/2026/086: HSSIB recommends that the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency ensures that: routes for manufacturers and healthcare organisations to engage with them are clear and accessible it reviews and provides further guidance and clarification on when electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) software should be considered a medical device. This will support how ePMA software can be appropriately classified and regulated to improve patient safety. Safety recommendation R/2026/087: HSSIB recommends that NHS England/Department of Health and Social Care establishes a national framework for core electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) safety. This will provide a clear set of minimum patient safety requirements, helping to reduce unwarranted variation in the safety of ePMA functionality. Safety recommendation R/2026/088: HSSIB recommends that NHS England/Department of Health and Social Care develops an external assurance framework for information standards notices relating to electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA). This is to reduce unwarranted variation and improve patient safety through expert-led assurance processes. Safety recommendation R/2026/089: HSSIB recommends that NHS England/Department of Health and Social Care provides additional support to acute hospital trusts, in relation to: supporting healthcare providers to access digital clinical safety knowledge, capacity and capability integrating digital clinical safety and patient safety, including the associated terminology supporting robust assurance of whether electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) manufacturers comply with relevant standards in order to be considered for inclusion on an NHS procurement framework. This will support effective decision making and oversight by acute hospital trusts and reduce unwarranted variation in the understanding of, and approach to, adopting ePMA. Safety recommendation R/2026/090: HSSIB recommends that the Care Quality Commission reviews the sector-level assessment frameworks it is developing to include assurance of ongoing compliance with the digital clinical safety standard (DCB0160) for electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) software. This will help to ensure oversight of ePMA functionality to improve patient safety. HSSIB makes the following safety observations Safety observation O/2026/086: Commercial manufacturers can improve patient safety by applying the standards and expectations for a medical device when developing electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) functionality, to help provide further assurance to acute hospital trusts procuring or updating ePMA functionality. Safety observation O/2026/087: Commercial manufacturers and NHS organisations can improve patient safety by ensuring the sharing of safety learning about electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) functionality nationally via incident reporting systems and relevant safety forums. Safety observation O/2026/088: Commercial manufacturers and NHS organisations can improve patient safety by contributing to and engaging with ePRaSE (ePrescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation) processes to support ongoing improvement and optimisation of electronic prescribing and medicines administration (ePMA) functionality across the NHS.
  9. Content Article
    While traditional methods such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are well-established, they often reach their limits in clinical practice. This is due in particular to the subjectivity of fault identification. I would like to propose the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) as a complementary risk analysis method. HAZOP offers a structured, systematic approach to risk identification and assessment, particularly suited to analysing process risks and human factors. Unlike FMEA, HAZOP uses guide words (e.g. NO, MORE, LATE, LESS, OTHER THAN) to explicitly identify and analyse potential deviations from tasks and procedures.  A systematic approach to identifying and assessing clinical risks Despite the implementation of risk management systems, practice often falls short of expectations. This is due, among other factors, to the complexity of clinical processes, the dynamics of the work environment, and interprofessional interfaces, which make a holistic risk assessment difficult. Although traditional methods are widely used, they reach their limits in clinical practice: Subjectivity: When using traditional methods such as FMEA, which rely on the team’s spontaneous fault detection and experience, critical risks are easily overlooked as they are not recognised as ‘failure modes’. Monocausality: Traditional failure-mode-based approaches lead to a monocausal derivation of causes and effects. Human factors as ‘operator error’: Human errors are easily classified as ‘user problems’ without questioning the systemic causes (e.g. time pressure, unclear responsibilities, inadequate communication). Against this background, I propose the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) as a complementary risk analysis method. The HAZOP method was originally developed in the aviation industry and has established itself there as the gold standard for analysing risks in highly complex, safety-critical environments. HAZOP enables the approach required by ISO 31000 as a structured, step-by-step approach: Risk identification Risk analysis Risk evaluation Risk identification using guide words The method uses guide words as a heuristic to systematically identify potential process deviations as a starting point for the risk analysis. These guide words are adapted to clinical reality and enable a comprehensive risk analysis: Guide Word: Possible deviation. No: Failure to perform a task. More: Excessive performance of a task. Less: Inconsistent performance of a task. Late: Delayed performance of a task. Other than: Incorrect execution of a task. Using guide words as a starting point for risk identification also helps to involve those with little experience in risk management in the process. A list of guide words can and should be adapted to the specific requirements of the specialist department. Practical application: Example 'documentation of vital signs' Task: Recording and documenting vital signs in the intensive care unit. Guide word: Possible deviation No: Blood pressure is forgotten. Late: Documentation is delayed, delaying further diagnosis. Less: Not all vital signs are measured. Other than: A mix-up of patients in the documentation. Risk analysis The identified risks can be assessed using a two-dimensional risk matrix, like in other risk tools: Probability of occurrence (scale: ‘almost impossible’ to ‘almost certain’). Impact (scale: ‘no health consequences’ to ‘life-threatening consequences’). This commonly used and well-known assessment method enables measures to be prioritised and helps hospitals to proceed in a resource-efficient way. Risk evaluation and identification of measures Preventive and corrective measures are developed during interprofessional workshops, in which representatives from all relevant professional groups (doctors, nursing staff, administration, IT) work together to evaluate risks and propose solutions. Typical measures include: Process optimisations (e.g. standardisation of documentation procedures). Training to raise awareness of human factors. Technical adjustments (e.g. introduction of digital checklists). Clarification of responsibilities (e.g. through clear SOPs). Discussion The HAZOP method offers several key advantages that are particularly relevant to clinical patient safety: The use of guide words enables risks that are often overlooked to be systematically identified. This reduces subjectivity in error detection and enables more objective prioritisation of measures. The method allows for the analysis of human and organisational factors. This enables a holistic view of incident causes and supports hospitals in developing systemic solutions. HAZOP can be seamlessly integrated into the SEIPS 2.0 approach, which enables a coherent risk assessment that accounts for all relevant factors. The approach promotes collaboration among professionals from different disciplines. This strengthens the learning culture and helps to close governance gaps. Thanks to the structured approach and the use of guide words, risk analysis can be carried out more quickly and efficiently. Conclusion The HAZOP method, with its guide words, is a proven, systematic and evidence-based tool for improving clinical patient safety. It enables a comprehensive risk analysis that takes into account technical, procedural and human factors. Do you use the HAZOP method? We would love to hear from you if you're using HAZOP in a clinical setting so we can share real-life examples of its use. Email us at [email protected] or comment below (you need to be signed into the hub; sign up here, it is free and easy to do).
  10. News Article
    The NHS care watchdog has launched an inspection of a troubled trust after The Independent exposed delays in diagnosing and treating dozens of patients, including some with cancer. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) has sent inspectors to review care at the Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust in Greater Manchester, just days after The Independent revealed that there were serious concerns about the safety of its gynaecological services. The trust launched an audit of the care of hundreds of women at Salford Royal Hospital’s gynaecology department in 2024, prompted by concerns that the necessary follow-ups were not carried out. It found that dozens of patients, including cancer patients, all under the care of Dr Jim Wolfe, were harmed when their diagnosis and treatment were delayed as a result of “admin failures”. Whistleblowers from the hospital’s gynaecology service came forward to The Independent with further concerns, alleging that the trust’s leadership was ignoring safety issues. At the same time, an unpublished NHS England review of the service from 2024 warned that it had a “significant backlog” of more than 2,000 patient letters, including test results and referrals for treatment, that hadn’t been sent to GPs as required. This resulted in some patients’ treatment being delayed by at least five months. The report also warned that the service was “heavily” reliant on agency doctors, and that its ability to provide on-call doctors had been affected by “significant sickness absence and suspension” among its consultants. Read full story Source: The Independent, 26 May 2026
  11. Content Article
    The Health Services Safety Investigation Body (HSSIB) released a new briefing, in partnership with the NHS Race and Health Observatory (NHSRHO), to raise awareness and encourage positive change around bias and discrimination in patient safety investigations at all levels across the NHS. This briefing is informed by contributions from a national roundtable held in November 2025. This collaborative event brought together individuals with lived experience, patient advocates, clinicians and senior healthcare leaders. The briefing identified a series of recommendations, which include: embedding explicit consideration of racism within investigation standards improving expectations for family involvement strengthening leadership accountability for equity ensuring more consistent use of data to identify inequalities anti-racism to be a core component of patient safety investigations robust mechanisms to monitor implementation and impact.
  12. News Article
    The Care Quality Commission is investigating whether the trust where staff inappropriately viewed the records of Southport attack victims met its “duty of candour” after the provider was accused of a “cover up”, HSJ can reveal. The regulator is understood to be asking further questions to determine whether University Hospitals of Liverpool Group met its statutory transparency regulations when it decided not to tell the patients about the breach. It is understood the regulator’s fresh intervention was prompted by HSJ  revealing last week that 48 hospital staff had inappropriately accessed files of victims who had survived a stabbing at a children’s dance studio in Southport in 2024. UHLG decided not to inform victims of the breach the following year. The trust said this was because they were concerned it could retraumatise patients. But the patients responded furiously when HSJ revealed the trust had decided it would not inform impacted patients about the breach and accused the trust of an “attempted cover-up”. One of those impacted, Leanne Lucas, said discovering patients had not been told about the data breach was a “new low”. The Care Quality Commission was originally informed about the breach “at the time of the incident”. But the regulator took no action at this stage. However, since HSJ’s story last week, it has now emerged that the regulator is in fresh contact with the trust “to follow-up with regards to their review of the duty of candour”. Read full story (paywalled) Source: HSJ, 22 May 2026
  13. News Article
    The Care Quality Commission (CQC) has warned that government plans for it to absorb the national patient safety investigations body could leave it arguing against itself in the High Court. In evidence to the Commons health and social care committee, the regulator said merging in the Health Services Safety Investigations Branch – which carries out no-blame inquiries under a legally protected “safe space” – would create a “conflict of interest”. The regulatory arm of the Care Quality Comission could end up seeking access to the confidential investigation reports, while the investigation branch fights to keep them secret, it said. The CQC outlined “a scenario where the regulatory function would apply to the court for, and the investigatory arm defend against, admissibility of reports in legal proceedings” – in effect putting the watchdog on both sides of the same case. The government plans to abolish HSSIB and fold its functions into a “discrete” unit of the CQC – a recommendation made last year by NHS England chair Penny Dash to curb the “cluttered” safety landscape. The CQC also warned the merger would leave the investigatory arm holding information that the CQC board – although accountable for it – was unaware of and could not act on. Read full story (paywalled) Source: HSJ, 20 May 2026
  14. News Article
    Families affected by the Nottingham maternity scandal have urged the newly appointed health secretary to meet with them before a critical report is published next month. The major review of care at the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust, led by former midwife Donna Ockenden, encompasses nearly 2,500 families whose lives have been affected by the deaths or injuries of hundreds of babies. The inquiry is the largest in NHS history and has been ongoing for more than three years. In a letter sent on Thursday, the affected families stressed to James Murray, who took over from Wes Streeting last week, that listening to their experiences "must remain at the heart of this process". They wrote: “We believe it is vital that you hear directly from those affected before the review concludes, and we ask that you come to Nottingham to meet families, listen to our experiences, and understand the reality behind this report before the findings are shared with Parliament and the public.” Read full story Source: The Independent, 21 May 2026
  15. Content Article
    This Health Services Safety Investigation Body (HSSIB) report is the second in a series considering the self-administration of insulin by people with diabetes mellitus (diabetes) in community settings. Many people with diabetes manage and administer their own insulin, either by injection or using a combined monitor/pump device (a hybrid closed loop system). However, a disability or impairment may affect their ability to safely manage their own insulin if they are not supported. This can lead to short-term and long-term health problems, which can be life threatening. HSSIB identified incidents where a person with diabetes or their family/carer had administered insulin incorrectly (the patient safety issue of focus). In these incidents, a disability – such as a visual or memory problem – had influenced how someone had administered insulin. The investigation explored the following areas in relation to the patient safety issue: supporting the development of people’s competency – that is, their skills, experience, knowledge and ability – to manage insulin recognising and responding when people’s circumstances change, such as deterioration in a disability assessment of people’s mental capacity to make decisions in relation to insulin. Findings People with diabetes (who require insulin) are at risk of harm through the administration of insulin when pre-existing or new disabilities/impairments have not been recognised or adjusted for. People are not always empowered to become competent to manage their insulin, with assumptions made that a person is not competent to do so because of a disability/impairment. Supporting people to safely self-manage their health, including insulin, requires integrated working across community services. Where this is limited, such as due to resource challenges or limited collaboration, people are put at risk. Efforts to empower and enable people to self-manage insulin are affected by the competing demands on, and the capacity and accessibility of the community services that provide this type of support. Designated and protected resource aimed at supporting the development of insulin self-management skills have shown benefits for patient experience and have reduced demand on community services. There is no national competency framework for the management of insulin by patients and families that supports community services to identify and make reasonable adjustments for a disability/impairment. Administration of insulin by staff in care homes (delegated administration) may reduce demand on community teams but is limited by barriers to implementation, including high turnover of care home staff. Some people with type 2 diabetes may be prescribed insulin without first optimising other diabetes treatments and/or exploring preferences. This means a person may be exposed to the risks of insulin unnecessarily. There are people with diabetes (who require insulin) whose circumstances mean they are not monitored for changes in a disability/impairment, including via long-term condition reviews in general practice. People may not engage with healthcare services to enable the regular monitoring of their condition. Engagement is affected by the ability of services to meet patient needs but may also represent other situations that require a response, such as in relation to patient safeguarding. Electronic systems in general practice may not alert users when people have not requested repeat prescriptions of insulin, removing a potential opportunity to identify patients who need support. Diabetes technology, such as insulin pen devices, are not always designed in a way that supports people to administer insulin when they have a disability/impairment, such as visual impairment or problems with dexterity. There are concerns about the future competence of the healthcare workforce to support the increasing numbers of people with hybrid closed loop systems. Healthcare workers may not identify when a patient’s mental capacity to make decisions in relation to their insulin may be compromised, meaning a more in-depth assessment in line with the Mental Capacity Act (2005) may not occur. Limited education and practical support for application of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) by healthcare staff means its principles are sometimes misunderstood. Patients with diabetes (who require insulin) and who experience fluctuations in their mental capacity, are at risk of harm when services do not proactively plan for a time when the patient may lose the ability to manage their insulin safely. HSSIB makes the following safety recommendations HSSIB recommends that NHS England/Department of Health and Social Care provides guidance to integrated care boards and community providers setting out expectations for service models that empower and support people to manage and administer insulin in community settings. This is to support recognition of models that have safely, effectively and equitably engaged patients, their families and carers, including through the use of modern diabetes technology for self-management. HSSIB recommends that NHS England/Department of Health and Social Care develops a tool for use in community settings to support the assessment of competency of patients, their families and carers to manage and administer insulin and care for people with diabetes. This should include recognition of a person’s circumstances, the impact of disabilities and impairments, and potential adjustments to support administration where safe to do so. This is to support consistency in how competency is assessed for the safe management of insulin within the context of modern diabetes care. HSSIB makes the following safety observation National bodies can improve patient safety by providing clarity on expectations around 1) how staff recognise that a patient’s mental capacity may be compromised in relation to decisions about their self-management of insulin, and 2) the undertaking of a mental capacity assessment by the most appropriate person. This should include clarification on the practical application of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) to situations where a patient’s capacity may fluctuate and where sharing confidential information to support patient safety may be appropriate. HSSIB suggests safety learning for integrated care boards HSSIB investigations include safety learning for integrated care boards where this may help organisations think about how to respond to a patient safety issue that relates to integrated care across a geographical footprint. Informed by the findings in this report, the investigation proposes the following safety learning. HSSIB suggests that integrated care boards develop data-driven approaches to effectively identify the diversity of their populations’ characteristics and social circumstances, and use this data to support community providers to design services that empower and enable people to be involved in a patient’s care, including through supporting self-management of medications and conditions. HSSIB suggests that integrated care boards, through future planning for neighbourhood health services, include consideration of how patients who may be at greater risk of harm from insulin administration due to their specific circumstances – for example co-existing disabilities, social isolation or receiving home-delivered medications – are proactively monitored to identify changes in their circumstances. This may include using technology such as remote monitoring. Local-level learning HSSIB investigations include local-level learning where this may help providers/organisations respond to a patient safety issue at the local level. Informed by the findings in this report, the investigation shares the following local-level learning. How does your organisation create the conditions for staff to empower and enable patients, their families and carers – through a person-centred approach – to self-manage insulin where appropriate? How does your organisation proactively identify the varying needs of people with diabetes in its local population, and ensure these are met to enable their management of insulin? How does your organisation promote patient-centred care and facilitate self-care models that empower and enable patients, such as those with diabetes? Does your organisation allocate specific resources to support patients, families and carers to develop competency to self-manage insulin, and ensure those resources are protected to empower and enable people? How does your organisation ensure that staff supporting the development of a person’s competency have the required knowledge and skills to provide that training and education in relation to diabetes and insulin? How does your organisation support staff to identify and code a person’s disabilities/impairments that may influence their competency to self-manage insulin, and ensure these are considered and adjusted for when deciding whether a person is competent? Does your organisation have systems and processes to identify where patients have not requested their repeat medication prescription, or the frequency of the requests have changed, which may indicate changes in their circumstances? How does your organisation ensure long-term condition reviews reliably take place for patients who may be at a higher risk of deterioration due to their circumstances, for example those with multiple long-term conditions? How does your organisation identify and code patients – who may be more vulnerable to harm from insulin due to their circumstances – for increased monitoring? This may include patients who have their medications delivered to their home, who do not have family nearby, or who are housebound. Does your organisation provide practical training and guidance to support staff to consider the mental capacity of patients to make decisions around their insulin when there are concerns capacity may be compromised? Does your organisation provide practical guidance to staff to help identify when it is lawful, ethical and appropriate to share confidential information about a patient to mitigate risks to their safety, including with family members? Does your organisation have accessible routes via which staff can seek urgent support when they are concerned a patient’s mental capacity to make decisions about their self-care may be compromised, particularly in high-risk situations? How does your organisation support staff to develop ‘crisis plans’ for patients who self-manage insulin to protect their safety at a later point when their capacity to make decisions in relation to their care may change?
  16. Content Article
    The Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigation (MNSI) has reviewed 20 investigations into the cooling of term babies across England. The findings show that national guidance on continuous temperature monitoring during cooling was not followed in half of cases. Ensuring continuous temperature monitoring during newborn cooling is an important area of learning identified through our neonatal investigations. A review of 20 investigations found opportunities to strengthen practice in line with national guidance in half of cases. The new MNSI safety briefing draws on what we have learned through our investigations and aims to support the safe care of babies undergoing cooling in maternity and neonatal settings. The briefing shares our evidence and insight on this topic and provides prompts for maternity and neonatal providers to consider: Whether local guidance on cooling aligns with national guidance, including when to commence passive cooling and the use of rectal temperature probes. Whether staff have the training and equipment they need to initiate cooling safely and consistently.
  17. Content Article
    This Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigation (MNSI) safety spotlight shares what they found regarding nitrous oxide decommissioning and offers prompts to help providers keep staff informed and equipment checks consistent.
  18. Content Article
    In this blog, Ted Baker discusses a new paper by Health Services Safety Investigation Body (HSSIB) colleagues and highlights the call for a fundamental rethink of how the NHS views and prioritises patient safety. Ted argues that healthcare has long confused quality with safety, often treating safety as just one dimension alongside outcomes and patient experience. This framing has encouraged a false idea that trade‑offs are acceptable, particularly under pressure, even though safety and outcomes are interdependent and should never be weighed against one another. A new HSSIB research paper reviewing 118 national investigation reports, found that where trade‑offs occurred, safety almost always lost out to efficiency, timeliness or experience initiatives, and there were no examples where prioritising safety harmed other aspects of quality. This directly challenges claims that the NHS has focused too much on safety.
  19. Content Article
    This blog reflects on a patient safety concern arising from the death of my late best friend. It argues that discharge decisions should not rely too heavily on point-in-time observations, early warning scores or apparent mobility when serious unresolved pathology may still exist in the background. The aim is not to assign blame, but to highlight a wider safety learning point about the need to assess the full clinical picture when deciding whether a patient is safe to leave hospital. One of the most troubling lessons I have learned from healthcare harm is that a patient can appear “well enough” for discharge on paper while, in reality, still being at grave risk. My late best friend died after a final illness in which I believe the bigger clinical picture was not given enough weight. I have already been through the formal NHS complaints route and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Those processes did not uphold my concerns. But what remains with me, and what I believe has wider patient safety relevance, is the reasoning pattern that I think his case illustrates. My concern is not simply that the outcome was tragic. Poor outcomes alone do not prove poor care. My concern is that short-term signs of improvement appeared, in my view, to carry more weight than serious unresolved pathology in the background. This is the patient safety issue I want to highlight: discharge decisions can become too heavily influenced by a snapshot of how a patient looks on one day, rather than by the full trajectory and unresolved seriousness of their illness. A patient may have acceptable observations, a relatively low National Early Warning Score (NEWS), the ability to mobilise and an understandable wish to go home. But none of that necessarily means the underlying risk has gone away. That distinction matters. Observations tell us whether certain physiological measurements are abnormal at a particular moment. They do not, on their own, tell us whether infection has truly been brought under control, whether worrying imaging findings have been resolved, whether organ dysfunction is still evolving or whether a fragile improvement is likely to collapse after discharge. The danger, in my view, is that “safe for discharge” can slide into meaning “not obviously unstable right now.” Those are not the same thing. This case has left me with a lasting concern that healthcare systems may sometimes over-value point-in-time indicators of stability and under-value the wider pattern of serious disease. If that happens, discharge may be judged through too narrow a lens. The patient may look acceptable in the moment, but the unresolved pathology may still be severe enough to make discharge unsafe. This is not an argument against NEWS, against discharge or against trying to help people leave hospital promptly when it is appropriate. It is an argument for clinical reasoning that looks beyond the snapshot. When clinicians are considering discharge, especially in complex patients, I believe there should be a more explicit safety question: does this patient merely look stable today or is the overall clinical picture genuinely safe for discharge? That question requires more than observations. It requires attention to imaging, unresolved infection, organ function, co-morbidities, recent deterioration and the likely direction of travel once the patient leaves the ward. For families, the distinction can be life-changing. For patient safety, it may be system-changing. My hope in sharing this is not to assign blame, but to support learning. If one lesson can come from this death, I hope it is this: the bigger picture should never be overshadowed simply because a patient appears acceptable on observations on a particular day.
  20. Content Article
    A witness statement provides the Coroner with important evidence to consider as part of their investigation. It is important to ensure that all of the relevant information is included in your statement and that the statement is clear, thorough, truthful and accurate. This guide from the law firm Browne Jacobson gives you advice on writing the statement for an inquest.
  21. Content Article
    Coroners have an important patient safety role under Regulation 28 of the Coroner’s (Investigations) Regulations 2013. This creates a statutory duty for Coroners not just to decide how somebody came by their death but also, where appropriate, to report about that death with a view to preventing future deaths (PFD report). In certain cases you may wish to provide the Coroner with evidence to explain the outcome of any internal investigation and provide assurance that organisational learning has been, or is being, implemented. This guide from the law firm Browne Jacobson has been produced to assist with the preparation of that evidence, and supplements their previous 'inquest guide for witnesses' and 'guide to writing statements for an inquest'.
  22. Content Article
    A guide from Browne Jacobson, a law firm, to support staff involved in a coroners' inquest. It covers: When does the Coroner hold an inquest? What is an inquest? The inquest hearing Court day checklist Giving oral evidence Giving evidence remotely Inquest conclusions Regulation 28 / Preventing Future Deaths Further guidance and resources
  23. News Article
    A risk assessment should be carried out on Glasgow's entire Queen Elizabeth University Hospital campus, a leading safety expert has told BBC Scotland News. Andrew Poplett, who conducted safety reviews for the Scottish Hospitals Inquiry, said it was "incredibly difficult" to say whether the hospital was safe or unsafe for all patients. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde has admitted there were failings with the hospital when it opened and now accepts that some patient infections were probably linked to contaminated water. The board has said the whole hospital is now safe but families and lawyers for the public inquiry say they want to see further evidence to back this up. The Scottish Hospitals Inquiry was ordered in 2019 after a number of deaths and high levels of infection at the QEUH campus, which had opened just four years earlier. The inquiry drew to a close in January and Lord Brodie's final report is expected later this year. Engineer Andrew Poplett was the independent expert who wrote reports on water and ventilation, external for the inquiry. First Minister John Swinney and the health board have said Poplett's evidence supported the claim that both the QEUH and the Royal Hospital for Children, on the same site, were now safe. But in an exclusive interview with BBC Scotland News, Poplett said it was "incredibly difficult to give a black and white 'safe or unsafe' answer". He said this was because of the complexity of assessing risk when caring for vulnerable patients. Popplett said: "If you want to reassure the public that this building is safe, do a risk assessment. "You don't need to wait for a final report from the public inquiry." Read full story Source: BBC News, 12 May 2026
  24. News Article
    At least 40 children suffered harm – with over 20 cases classed as “moderate or severe” – due to delays while receiving care from a hospital’s audiology department, HSJ can reveal. Bedfordshire Hospitals Foundation Trust has identified 109 children who may be at risk of harm due to problems with their hearing aid management, and harm has been identified in at least 40 of them, including developmental delay. The findings were included in an interim “patient safety incident review” being carried out by the trust and supported by NHS England. The preliminary findings were published in papers for Luton’s health overview and scrutiny committee last month. The review follows a major national investigation into harm caused by audiology failings, culminating in the Kingdon review, published in November 2025, which found the NHS ignored warnings on testing failures for a decade. Bedford’s review is understood to form part of the national improvement programme for paediatric audiology services. It comes as the sector awaits the Department of Health and Social Care’s response to the Kingdon review, which British Association of Audiology President Claire Benton said she hoped would bring “additional support desperately needed for the system”. Read full story (paywalled) Source: HSJ, 12 May 2026
  25. Content Article
    In December 2022 Dylan Cope, a 9-year-old boy, died of sepsis after being discharged from hospital. A coroner found the boy's death “would have been avoided if he had not been erroneously discharged”, and said what happened "amounts to a gross failure of basic care”. In this blog, Dylan’s mum Corinne Cope draws on her lived experience to explain what accountability means to bereaved families and harmed patients.  For me, as a bereaved mother, accountability isn’t a theoretical concept - it’s deeply personal. And for harmed patient’s/bereaved families, it’s not what is said - it’s what changes, and whether anyone can see it. I think many people are working incredibly hard within investigations. But from a family perspective, the outcomes don’t always reflect that effort, particularly when learning isn’t visible, or when the process feels defensive or incomplete And we need to be clear about what accountability is, and what it isn’t. To any reasonable person, accountability isn’t blame or punishment. Ownership, explanation and demonstrable change What accountability means to harmed patient’s/bereaved families When harmed patients and bereaved families talk about accountability, we are not asking for the impossible. We’re asking for: a full, honest explanation of what happened and why clear ownership of actions, omissions, and decisions - and their consequences genuine reflection and sincere, timely apologies for both individual and organisational failures organisational responsibility for system failures, with prompt correction and visible evidence that meaningful, timely learning and reflection has taken place And that final point matters most. Because accountability is not what is said - it’s the change that matters. Where the system is failing From a family perspective, accountability often feels delayed, filtered, or out of view. Learning is described…but not always demonstrated. Apologies are offered…but often without ownership. And too often, the harmed/bereaved find themselves driving the process. In my own experience, after Dylan’s death, I didn’t just seek answers; I found myself proposing a sepsis awareness campaign. I also found myself working to improve how investigations are carried out; encouraging organisations to respond differently to preventable harm or death, and to say: “We do not always get things right, we are truly heartbroken that this tragedy happened under our watch; and here is what we are doing to improve.” Something practical. Something needed. But that learning wasn’t led by the organisation…much of it was driven by me. And that is a huge part of the problem from my perspective. Harmed patients and bereaved families should not have to investigate, push, or drive safety improvements in response to harm or death. When they do, it doesn’t feel like accountability, it can feel like a continuation of the harm. And when similar failures happen again, with little visible change, that becomes very difficult to reconcile. Apology and honesty I also want to say something about apology, followed by a lived example. A sincere, timely apology is not a legal risk - it is a professional and human responsibility. Too often, what families receive is not an apology for what went wrong, but a general expression of sympathy…“I’m sorry for your loss.” Condolences are not the same as acknowledging failures in care. While well-intentioned, they do not meet the expectations of candour, and for many families, they fail to acknowledge responsibility or the reality of what went wrong. Individual errors can and do occur alongside wider system failures and both must be explored with equal rigour, because understanding one without the other limits learning and risks repeating the same harm. A just culture doesn’t exclude holding individuals to account where there is evidence of serious or gross negligence. From a harmed/bereaved perspective, there is a concern that in practice, ‘no blame’ can sometimes become ‘no accountability’. Honesty and reflection matter very deeply. But in my experience, those elements can sometimes be delayed or filtered out. And I wonder whether apology is sometimes still viewed through the lens of blame rather than responsibility. And that raises an important question… Is the system, at times, protecting itself at the expense of truth and learning? Humanity filtered I want to give a brief example. There was suboptimal treatment identified in Dylan’s hospital readmission. A healthcare professional involved in Dylan’s care wrote in an early statement draft that they “wished” they had stayed with him. I only saw that years later. That single sentence - an honest expression of reflection - meant a great deal. But it was removed from the final version. In my experience, the very things that support accountability - reflection, honesty, humanity - were either delayed or filtered. And when investigations feel defensive, opaque, or incomplete, the impact is not neutral…it causes secondary harm. It erodes trust. And it drives families to seek answers elsewhere. Final thoughts Accountability requires action. Because learning without visible ownership…can feel hollow. And accountability without learning achieves very little. And crucially: families should not have to drive that change themselves. If nothing visibly changes, and families are left to fight for answers or without a timely and sincere apology, then from a family perspective, it isn’t accountability. It’s just process, that is deeply insulting and guaranteed to compound harm. Related content Investigating harm with humanity - practical guidance for NHS investigators, clinical teams and legal representatives (by Corinne Cope) Destructive investigations: our experience of the investigation into our son's death Seeking better sepsis awareness in Wales (a film by Corinne and Laurence Cope) Dylan's Story (Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust)
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