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This article offers a socio‑legal analysis and reflection on the Robbie Powell case, drawing on official reports, legal judgments, investigations and subsequent policy reforms. It highlights an unequal fight for the truth. Reinforcing why Robbie’s Law must stand beside Hillsborough Law. When justice depends on a family’s social capital, not the facts, cases like Robbie Powell’s are sidelined—yet his fight for an individual Duty of Candour strengthens every truth‑and‑justice campaign, not least Hillsborough Law. The Robbie Powell case is the landmark case on Duty of Candour in the UK. It exposed major failings in public accountability and led to the call for a Robbie's Law. However, all too often the Robbie Powell case is ignored and/or misrepresented. The details of the case, which remains unresolved, are uncomfortable for the healthcare professionals, legal advisors and for the State. Authorities avoid it because it implicates individual clinicians, healthcare staff, healthcare leaders, expert witnesses and politicians. The family’s persistence is admirable but embarrassing for institutions. This article attached aims to set the record straight.

Following revelations in 2017 of the abuse of patients by staff at Muckamore Abbey Hospital, the Minister for Health in Northern Ireland ordered a public inquiry be held into that abuse and related matters. The Inquiry, chaired by Tom Kark KC, and heard from 235 witnesses, including a number of service users, and over 90 relatives of service users. It found that patients had been abused and systematically bullied by staff members at Muckamore Abbey Hospital whose job it was to look after them. The report includes 106 recommendations. The Inquiry heard extensive evidence concerning injuries sustained by patients, particularly bruises, unexplained marks and signs consistent with physical abuse. Some patients were verbal and were able to express that they had been assaulted by staff, but such direct evidence was very limited. Relatives reported being informed by staff that injuries were caused by self-harm, behavioural incidents or peer-on-peer violence. They were told their relative was clumsy or may have fallen in the night. Over time, many families lost confidence in these explanations, especially where injuries were located on areas of the body difficult to self-inflict or appeared repeatedly in similar patterns. Sometimes injuries were unexplained even when a patient was supposed to be under supervision. The Inquiry also heard evidence of physical abuse captured on CCTV, including forceful handling, dragging, pushing and inappropriate restraint. These incidents provided confirmation that unexplained injuries reported by families over many years could not be attributed solely to patient behaviour or peer-on-peer violence. The presence of injuries alongside incidents captured on CCTV demonstrated that earlier concerns had been justified and should have prompted urgent intervention. The Inquiry notes that families’ concerns were exacerbated by the lack of communication from staff at the hospital about when patients had been injured, and many complained of significant delays in injuries being reported to them. The Panel concluded that injuries such as bruises and marks were not isolated or incidental; they were visible indicators of systemic failure. Dealing with each incident individually resulted in the inability of the organisation to recognise patterns, escalate concerns and protect patients, and allowed physical abuse and neglect to continue unchecked, causing lasting harm to patients and profound distress to their families. Key themes Key patient safety issues highlighted in this report include: Information sharing and co-production Families described not being informed of their rights when relatives were detained under the Mental Health (NI) Order 1986. Many believed decisions were made without consultation, leaving them feeling excluded from their loved one’s care. The Inquiry repeatedly heard that families were informed of decisions rather than involved in making them. Families reported not being able to visit during early stages of admission, removing opportunities to share crucial information. Many families struggled to identify a consistent point of contact or key worker. Restrictive practices The Panel identified serious and persistent concerns regarding the frequency, rationale, recording and governance of restrictive practices over a prolonged period. Seclusion was a particular area of concern. Although policies on seclusion became increasingly prescriptive over time, including requirements for monitoring, the Inquiry heard evidence that implementation was inconsistent, sometimes inadequate and not effectively audited. The use of PRN medication as a form of restrictive practice was also problematic. Although guidance emphasised that PRN medication should only be used with a clear therapeutic rationale and as a last resort, families frequently described experiencing their relatives as sedated, disengaged or ‘zombified’. The Panel accepted that this was not necessarily an indication of overmedication by use of regularly prescribed drugs but may have reflected the use of PRN medication to control behaviour when other non-medical approaches had either not been available or not been attempted. Governance and oversight of restrictive practices were inadequate. Although data on restraint, seclusion and incidents was collected and reported internally, the Inquiry found limited evidence of effective senior management challenge, trend analysis or sustained action to reduce use. Complaints and concerns Evidence revealed widespread confusion, fear and mistrust among families, alongside systemic weaknesses in complaint handling, oversight and organisational learning. Many family members found the complaints system opaque and difficult to navigate, with little clarity about how complaints were investigated, how decisions were reached or what outcomes, if any, resulted. Many families reported finding out about injuries, assaults or significant incidents only during visits, or after long delays. Others described communications they perceived as defensive, dismissive or designed to protect the institution rather than investigate the facts. Some believed that staff were effectively ‘investigating themselves’, creating perceptions of bias and eroding confidence in outcomes. Even when complaints were upheld in part, families often felt responses lacked empathy, apology or accountability. Fear was a major barrier to complaint-raising. Witnesses described explicit or implicit warnings suggesting that complaining could affect their relative’s care or future admissions. Patients themselves were sometimes frightened to speak up. Governance and oversight arrangements were also found wanting. Although complaints data was presented in dashboards and discussed at Muckamore Abbey Hospital management meetings, there was limited evidence of robust analysis, challenge or sustained organisational learning. Previous concerns, previous investigations and warning signs The Panel concluded that Muckamore Abbey Hospital exhibited multiple, persistent and well-documented warning signs long before 2017: sustained understaffing; inadequate specialist supports; unsafe environments; escalating violence and restraint; frequent safeguarding referrals; family complaints; and a geographically and culturally closed institution. While individual allegations were often investigated, the system failed to connect the dots. No single mechanism brought together incident reporting, safeguarding intelligence, complaints and workforce pressures in a way that would have revealed the scale of risk Safeguarding The Panel found that safeguarding systems were fragmented and insufficiently integrated with the Trust’s wider clinical governance and risk management arrangements. Safeguarding investigations were structurally separated to preserve independence, but this separation limited organisational learning. Staff and ward management The Panel concluded that staffing challenges at Muckamore Abbey Hospital were long-standing, well-documented and increasingly severe, yet were never adequately resolved. These systemic workforce failures significantly increased patient vulnerability and contributed to the conditions in which abuse was able to occur and persist. Staffing shortages were persistent from at least 2009 onwards and worsened significantly after 2012, when recruitment freezes and temporary contracts became common due to the anticipated closure of Muckamore Abbey Hospital. The ratio of registered nurses to healthcare assistants was frequently below safe levels, and in some wards fewer than half of staff were registered nurses. Healthcare assistants, who provide the majority of direct patient care, had no specialist training requirements and relied heavily on informal learning. Supervision of healthcare assistants inconsistent, and clinical supervision arrangements fell far below what would be expected in a high-risk inpatient setting. This created a task-focused culture where staff prioritised basic physical care over personal and therapeutic engagement. Throughout this period, senior leadership and the Trust Board repeatedly reassured themselves and external bodies that staffing was safe, even as the regulator and whistleblowers raised escalating concerns. Leadership While extensive governance structures existed, they consistently failed to work to bring relevant information to the Board of Belfast Health and Social Care Trust, and to translate information into understanding of risks or into an active response. There was a resulting lack of insight by the Board into the difficulties faced at Muckamore Abbey Hospital. A central failure identified by the Inquiry was the Trust’s focus on governance processes rather than outcomes. Reports to the Board emphasised the existence of policies, action plans and committees but rarely demonstrated whether these arrangements were effective in protecting patients or improving care. Incident reporting, safeguarding referrals, complaints and staff intelligence were routinely aggregated at Trust level, masking significant variation at hospital level and thus obscuring sustained patterns of harm at Muckamore Abbey Hospital. Risks from Muckamore Abbey Hospital were often downgraded or removed as they ascended the risk register hierarchy, even when underlying conditions persisted or deteriorated. Risks affecting specific services were smoothed out through aggregation and failed to reach the Board as Principal Risks. Even after external regulators raised serious concerns, including the issuing by the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA) of Improvement Notices in 2019, the Board continued to accept assurances that care was safe, often disputing regulators’ findings without providing robust supporting data. Senior leaders failed to reconcile contradictory evidence from inspections, incidents, safeguarding reviews and staffing data. Crucially, the Board did not adequately address structural risk factors such as chronic staffing shortages, excessive use of untrained agency staff and inappropriate ward mixes. Reassurances provided by executive directors were not properly scrutinised for any underlying supporting data. External agencies inspection and oversight The Inquiry concluded that, although multiple agencies were involved with Muckamore Abbey Hospital over many years, none succeeded in identifying, preventing or stopping abuse before it was revealed, exposing significant limitations in the external oversight framework. Between 2009 and 2019, RQIA conducted over 100 inspections of Muckamore Abbey Hospital, initially at ward level and later using a whole-hospital approach. These inspections frequently identified problems such as staffing shortages, safeguarding weaknesses, excessive restrictive practices and governance failings. However, the inspection methodology relied heavily on documentation review and there was limited involvement with staff, patients and families, providing only a snapshot of practice. Inspectors acknowledged that staff behaviour changed when inspectors arrived on the wards and that therefore they were unlikely to observe ‘normal’ ward culture. Despite having statutory powers to do so, RQIA did not review CCTV footage at Muckamore Abbey Hospital, even after CCTV was viewed by the Trust and by Police Service of Northern Ireland and serious concerns were raised. Evidence to the Inquiry suggested that families repeatedly raised concerns through various routes but felt unheard, contributing to a loss of confidence in advocacy and oversight mechanisms. Overall, the Panel concluded that external inspection and oversight failed to operate as an effective safety net. Warning signs, including staffing instability, increased violence, high use of restrictive practices and repeated complaints, were visible and known but not interpreted as indicators of potential abuse. Oversight was reactive rather than preventive. The central lesson is that external regulation and investigation must extend beyond procedural compliance and episodic inspection. For services caring for highly vulnerable people, effective oversight requires proactive, risk-based approaches that: examine culture; triangulate multiple data sources, including where appropriate the use of CCTV; engage directly with families and, where possible, patients; and act decisively when conditions associated with abuse are present. Planning and funding of learning disability services Overall, the Inquiry found there was a failure to align policy, funding, workforce planning and accountability that prevented meaningful transformation of learning disability services. The absence of a coherent, long-term, system-wide approach contributed directly to sustained institutionalisation of individuals at Muckamore Abbey Hospital and to risks in care quality and safety. Redress There is no doubt that patients did suffer as a result of abuse within Muckamore Abbey Hospital but to try to assess the extent of such abuse in relation to individual patients or the nature of the harm caused was deemed as beyond the Inquiry’s capacity. In relation to direct redress, including the consideration of financial compensation, however, our recommendation would be that the Department of Health should set up a small working party to consult with patients, service user groups and individuals connected to those who have suffered abuse at Muckamore Abbey Hospital in relation to what form redress might properly take.

The Patient Safety Incident Response Framework became mandatory for all health services contracted under the NHS Standard Contract, including NHS-funded care delivered by independent healthcare providers, in April 2024. It replaced the Serious Incident (SI) framework. The change in approach to investigations under PSIRF has resulted in some practical challenges to the way in which information and organisational learning evidence is presented to the coroner for inquests. Chaired by Amelia Newbold, Risk Management Lead, this Shared Insights session discussed how the PSIRF and coronial processes can work more effectively together to ensure that coroners receive the information they need for inquests while preserving PSIRF's core principle of fostering a learning culture within healthcare. Bringing together perspectives from across the system, we explored some of the key challenges and, importantly, shared positive and practical examples of how a collaborative approach across both learning and coronial processes can ensure that relevant information is shared effectively.

Medical device makers have been rushing to add AI to their products. While proponents say the new technology will revolutionize medicine, regulators are receiving a rising number of claims of patient injuries. This Reuters Special Report investigates some of the hazards associated with AI-enabled medical devices, including errors in a navigation system integrated into a medical device used in ENT surgery, AI software used for prenatal ultrasound scans that misidentified fetal body parts and AI assisted heart monitors that failed to recognise abnormal rhythms.  Issues with the capacity of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review the flood of new AI-enabled medical devices are also raised, as well as concerns that the FDA's traditional approach to regulating medical devices may no longer be fit for purpose.

The law has always struggled to keep up with technological change. With AI, the pace of change is so rapid that this gap feels less like a step and more like a widening gulf.   A recent White Paper, produced through a collaboration between the MPS Foundation, York University’s Centre for Assuring Autonomy, and the Improvement Academy at the Bradford Institute for Health Research, highlights how clinicians could find themselves exposed when their decisions are influenced by AI recommender systems. Such systems analyse patient data and suggest personalised treatment plans, diagnoses or medications.  There are also concerns about who might be held liable in the event of a claim relating to AI scribes, automated documentation assistants, triage algorithms, and other forms of clinical decision support. These all share a common feature: they shape clinical reasoning, records, and workflows without taking autonomous responsibility for the outcomes. Under the current legislative framework, there is a risk that doctors could be held wholly liable if an AI suggestion turns out to be wrong and they have followed it. That’s because the existing product liability regime was never designed with AI in mind.   This paper from Medical Protection aims to set out the challenges we expect clinicians will face, and the action policymakers can take now to make sure AI delivers benefits without leaving doctors unfairly exposed. 

Coroners have an important patient safety role under Regulation 28 of the Coroner’s (Investigations) Regulations 2013. This creates a statutory duty for Coroners not just to decide how somebody came by their death but also, where appropriate, to report about that death with a view to preventing future deaths (PFD report). In certain cases you may wish to provide the Coroner with evidence to explain the outcome of any internal investigation and provide assurance that organisational learning has been, or is being, implemented. This guide from the law firm Browne Jacobson has been produced to assist with the preparation of that evidence, and supplements their previous 'inquest guide for witnesses' and 'guide to writing statements for an inquest'.

A guide from Browne Jacobson, a law firm, to support staff involved in a coroners' inquest. It covers: When does the Coroner hold an inquest? What is an inquest? The inquest hearing Court day checklist Giving oral evidence Giving evidence remotely Inquest conclusions Regulation 28 / Preventing Future Deaths Further guidance and resources

From 6 April 2026, Section 51 of the Mental Health Act 2025 has come into force, and if you are an independent provider of NHS-funded mental health inpatient services or s.117 aftercare services, this change directly affects you. Independent providers delivering these services are now definitively classified as "public authorities" for the purposes the Human Rights Act 1998. That means clearer legal obligations, greater scrutiny from the CQC, and direct exposure to human rights claims and judicial review challenges. Are your policies, governance frameworks and insurance arrangements ready? Read this brief from Bevan Brittan to understand what has changed, what it means for your organisation, and the steps you, and your commissioners, should be taking now.

This Health Services Safety Investigations Body (HSSIB) report is intended for healthcare organisations, policymakers and the public to help improve patient safety in relation to safety issues identified for people experiencing a mental health crisis who come into contact with urgent and emergency care services. This report focuses on the significant legal, policy and safety gap in the care of people in emergency departments (EDs) in mental health crisis. During consultation on this report, concerns were shared with HSSIB about the current challenges in relation to the resourcing and configuration of mental health services that exacerbate challenges faced in the ED. This is the first of two reports. In October 2025 HSSIB launched two investigations that explore the safety issues for people experiencing a mental health crisis who come into contact with urgent and emergency care services. This interim report was produced due to the early identification of a significant legal, policy and safety gap in the care of people in emergency departments (EDs) in mental health crisis. It is reported that around 3% of all ED attendances are mental health related. However, people experiencing mental health problems are twice as likely as other patients to remain in the ED for more than 12 hours. People in mental health crisis may need to be assessed for admission to a mental health hospital in line with the Mental Health Act 1983. Delays in these assessments being undertaken, and/or the lack of availability of mental health inpatient beds once a person has been recommended for admission, can lead to patients remaining in EDs for prolonged periods. Findings There is an absence of clear legal powers to lawfully prevent vulnerable individuals from leaving the ED while awaiting assessment or admission. This legal ambiguity exposes patients to increased risk of harm and/or being unlawfully deprived of their liberty, and places staff in a position of uncertainty when attempting to manage safety. For those requiring formal admission to a mental health hospital, an application under the Mental Health Act 1983 cannot be completed until a bed has been identified, which can take days. Staff and organisations reported they are often faced with choosing “the least harmful way to break the law” in order to try and keep patients safe. EDs are not designed to provide therapeutic mental health care and prolonged stays may worsen patients’ conditions and create challenges in maintaining a safe environment for everyone. HSSIB makes the following safety recommendations: HSSIB recommends that the Department of Health and Social Care urgently reviews the current legal framework and addresses the current legislative gaps in emergency care for people in mental health crisis and clarify the extension of legal powers for health professionals to hold someone in the emergency department. This will safeguard people who are currently arriving at the emergency department in a mental health crisis and the staff who care for them to support safe, consistent and legally compliant care. HSSIB recommends that the Care Quality Commission works with stakeholders to produce a position statement on existing legal powers, and the expectations for support for staff, for the care of people experiencing a mental health crisis in emergency departments (including mental health emergency departments and mental health crisis assessment services), who are not detained under a formal legal framework. This should include a review of current guidance and existing powers to help support safe, consistent, and legally compliant care in the absence of comprehensive legislation, while minimising harm and addressing the unique challenges of prolonged stays in the emergency department.