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Developing the FRAS In January 2017, I read a tragic story in Outpatient Surgery involving an elderly patient in the US who suffered multiple burns following the use of chlorohexidine bottled alcoholic prep. I'd also read that in the US there are over 600 surgical fires every year. As the Practice Development Lead for my theatre department at the time, I decided to design a Fire Risk Assessment Score (FRAS). I discussed the FRAS with my manager and my suggestion to add the FRAS to the 'Time Out' of our WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. To further develop my ideas, I attended one of the Association for Perioperative Practice (AFPP) study days. All the delegates were asked to discuss and write a plan to make an immediate change in practice on return to their theatre department. I planned the FRAS. My manager who had originally agreed to my idea in January left in March, but I persevered with the idea and in July 2017 I made copies of the FRAS, discussed the score with senior staff, laminated the copies and placed one in each theatre. It was used as part of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist Time Out. One month later I moved on and started bank shifts as a scrub practitioner in theatres. Fast forward 3 years Imagine my delight on a bank shift in August 2020 to see the FRAS as part of the patient profile on the hospital computer system – which meant it was in all six hospitals! So have fires decreased in theatres? Research shows that fires are still occurring in some UK theatres, and around the world, where a score is not part of the 'Time Out'; where bottled alcoholic prep is still used and not allowed to dry for 3 minutes before draping; and where lighted cables are sometimes allowed to rest on paper drapes. All perioperative staff need to have an awareness of surgical fires – where each flammable item used for the procedure is counted as 1 risk, and the score highlighted to the team and also documented before the start of the surgery. In doing this we can be reassured that we have taken all the necessary fire safety precautions for patients in our care, for the perioperative surgical team and also the preservation and the reputation of the hospital. Further reading The FRAS tool Kathy implemented Yardley IE, Donaldson LJ. Surgical fires, a clear and present danger. The Surgeon 2010; 8(2):87-92. Alani H et al. Prevention of surgical fires in facial plastic surgery. Australas J Plast Surg 2019; 28:40-9. Vogel L. Surgical fires: nightmarish “never events” persist. CMAJ 2018;190(4): E120. Cowles Jr CE, Culp Jr WC. Prevention of and response to surgical fires. BJA 2019; 8:261-266.

It's been a busy few months to say the least. Preparing for the pandemic, sourcing correct personal protective equipment (PPE), redeploying staff, acquiring new staff, making ventilators, redesigning how we work around the constraints, writing new policies, new guidance, surge plans, and then the complex part… caring for patients. If I am honest, when this all started it felt exciting. Adrenaline was high, motivation was high, we felt somewhat ready. There was a sense of real comradeship. It felt like we were all working for one purpose; to safely care for any patient that presented to us in hospital. We were a little behind London by about 2–3 weeks, so we could watch from afar on how they were coping, what they were seeing and adapting our plans as they changed theirs. Communication through the ITU networks was crucial. Clinical work has been difficult at times. The initial confusion on what the right PPE to wear for each area added to the stress of hearing that our colleagues in other places were dying through lack of PPE. The early days for me were emotionally draining. However, this new way of dressing and level of precaution is now a way of life for us. I have come to terms that I am working in a high-risk area and I may become unwell, but following guidance and being fastidious with donning and doffing helps with ‘controlling’ my anxieties in catching the virus. Some parts of the hospital remained quiet. Staff had been redeployed, elective surgery cancelled and the flow of patients in the emergency department (ED) almost stopped. I remember walking through ED and thinking: where are the people who have had strokes? Have people stopped having heart attacks? Are perforated bowels not happening anymore? The corridor in ED is usually full. Ambulances queuing up outside, but for a good few weeks the ambulance bays were deserted. The news says over and over again "we must not overwhelm the NHS". I always have a chuckle to myself as the NHS has been overwhelmed for years, and each year it gets more overwhelmed but little is done to prevent winter surges, although it's not just winter. The surge is like a huge tidal wave that we almost meet the crest of, but never get there, and emerge out the other side. I sit in the early morning ITU meeting. We discuss any problems overnight, clinical issues, staffing and beds. We have seen a steady decline in the number of ITU patients with COVID over the last week or so. The number of beds free for COVID patients were plentiful. We have enough ventilators and staff for them. This is encouraging news. I take a sigh, thinking we may have overcome the peak. In the next breath, the consultant states that we don’t have any non COVID ITU beds. We have already spread over four different areas and are utilising over 50 staff to man these beds (usually we have 25 staff). So that’s where the perforated bowels, heart attacks and strokes are. The patients we are caring for had stayed at home too long. So long, that they now have poorer outcomes and complications from their initial complaint. These patients are sick. Some of the nurses who are looking after them are redeployed from other areas; these nurses have ITU experience, but have moved to other roles within the hospital. This wasn’t what they had signed up for. They were signed up for the surge of COVID positive patients. I’m not sure how they feel about this. As the hospital is ‘quiet’ and surgical beds are left empty, there is a mention of starting some elective surgery. This would be great. It would improve patient outcomes, patients wouldn’t have to wait too long, so long that they might die as a consequence. However, we don’t have the capacity. We have no high dependency/ITU beds or nurses to recover them. We would also have to give back the nurses and the doctors we have borrowed from the surgical wards and outpatients to staff ‘work as normal’, depleting our staff numbers further. Add to the fact that lockdown has been lifted ever so slightly, the public are confused, I’m confused. With confusion will come complacency, with complacency will come transmission of the virus and we will end up with a second peak. If we end up with a second peak on top of an already stretched ITU and reduced staffing due to the secondary impact on non COVID care, the NHS will be overwhelmed. This time we will topple off that tidal wave. It’s a viscious cycle that I’m not sure how we can reverse. My plea, however, is to ensure we transition out of this weird world we have found ourselves in together. We usually look for guidance from NHS England/Improvement, but no one knows how best to do this. The people who will figure this out is you. If your Trust is doing something that is working to get out of this difficult situation, please tell others. We are all riding the same storm but in different boats. I would say that I am looking forward to ‘business as usual’ – but I can’t bare that expression. Now would be a great time to redesign our services to meet demand, to involve patients and families in the redesign – to suit their needs. We have closer relationships now with community care, social care and primary care, we have an engaged public all wanting to play their part. Surely now is the time we can plan for what the future could look like together? The Government has announced that Ministers are to set up a ‘dedicated team’ to aid NHS recovery. We need to ensure that patient and staff safety is a core purpose of that team’s remit and the redesign of health and social care. Would you be interested in being on our panel for our next Patient Safety Learning webinar on transitioning into the new normal? If so, please leave a comment below.

The Committee identified the following health-related objectives of the lockdown withdrawal strategy: 1. Reduce spread of the COVID-19 virus. 2. Minimise loss of healthcare professionals and maximise their safety and availability to continue the work. 3. Increase case management capacity in existing hospitals and new hospitals. 4. Increase testing to eliminate community spread. 5. Ensure access to normal healthcare requirements of the population. 6. Maintain normal healthcare capacity during the coronavirus period. 7. Maintain public health initiatives (vaccinations, food/nutrition of children and pregnant/feeding mothers.

Key points Incubation period = maximum 14 days. Symptomatic individuals stay in self isolation for 7 days from becoming ill (having symptoms). Day 1 is first day of symptoms. Household members who remain well stay in self isolation for 14 days due to maximum incubation period, calculated from day 1 of first symptomatic person. Household members do not need to restart the clock if other members become symptomatic during the 14 days self-isolation.

In summary, this highlights the importance of working in an open, honest and transparent way where patients, victims and their families are put at the centre of the process, and focuses attention on the identification and implementation of improvements that will reduce the likelihood of recurrence, rather than simply the completion of a series of tasks.

The Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (YCFF) is a tool which has an evidence base for optimising learning and addressing causes of patient safety incidents by helping clinicians, risk managers and patient safety officers identify contributory factors of PSIs. Incidents that occur in a hospital setting have been well studied and all contributory factors have been mapped. Based on this research, a team of practicing clinicians with human factors experts has adapted the evidence to a two page framework. The YCFF includes all sixteen domains of the evidence-based domains. The document suggests questions that you might want to ask of those involved in the incident. The underlying aim of this tool is not to ignore individual accountability for unsafe care, but to try to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the factors that cause incidents.

This policy covers how Dorset Healthcare (DHC) University NHS Foundation Trust responds to patient deaths in care generally, not just those amounting to 'serious incidents', which will continue to be dealt with under the existing NHS Improvement’s 2015 'Serious Incident Framework'.

High level findings There is an opportune ‘policy window’ for change in patient safety. The burden of unsafe care is clear and evidence-based both locally and globally. Momentum towards safer care is building at local, national and international levels. Culture is equal to policy and public momentum in order for safety innovations to land, take root and flourish. In order for safety opportunities to materialise, they require a concerted effort towards collaboration, innovation and education. Agreed actions Create national learning systems. Ensure meaningful collection and responses to patient feedback. Develop curricula for patient safety including curricula for investigations. Develop local and global portals for sharing ideas and best practice. Design systems to prevent harm with aligned priorities. Collect data about impact and evaluation. Harness existing digital innovations to improve patient safety. Wilton Park is an Executive Agency of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.