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At 10.45am on 23 November 2024, Peter Anzani sadly died from a pulmonary embolism in Birmingham Heartlands Hospital. He had been admitted to hospital the day before and was receiving treatment for a community acquired pneumonia when he suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed due to a pulmonary embolism. Peter had previously suffered a number of falls at home in August and September 2021 and was subsequently diagnosed with suffering a spontaneous infection of the cervical vertebral canal which caused a complete spinal cord injury and left him tetraplegic. This made him more vulnerable to chest infections and pulmonary embolisms which he experienced in the years that followed. There is no evidence of any human intervention that rendered his death unnatural.  Based on information from the Deceased’s treating clinicians the medical cause of death was determined to be:  1a Pulmonary Embolism 1b 1c 1d II Pneumonia Spinal cord injury resulting in Tetraplegia Matters of concern To The Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Foundation Trust I considered evidence from a [REDACTED] who indicated at paragraphs 20-21 of his statement, “I did not see any record of his pulse, blood pressure or oxygen saturation. The normal practice is to complete these observations, and I would expect this to be done, especially with him presenting with chest issues. However, I am unable to comment why this was not recorded or confirm that these were carried out. (21) This is a learning point for the department, and I have taken steps to ensure this learning is taken forward by theTrust. I have alerted the Sister in charge of the Spinal Injuries Outpatients’ Department and requested that adequate measures are taken to ensure that all observations made are recorded in the outpatient forms…” It was unclear whether this was a single one-off event involving human error or indicative of a wider and systemic issue involving a lack of training. There was no evidence before the court that this “learning point” had been actioned or that any adequate steps had been taken to ensure proper and accurate recording of records by staff. There is a real risk of future deaths occurring where staff do not have adequate training and that patient records are not being properly completed. To NHS England / Department of Health and Social Care I heard evidence that The Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (“The Trust”) have been experiencing difficulties with patient waiting lists – due to both an increase in the quantity of patients being treated and staffing shortages – which has led to patients waiting longer than is reasonable or necessary for reviews and treatments. As part of the inquest, there was evidence that Peter Anzani himself had been waiting for nearly a year for a follow-up review, which should have been carried out after no more than 6 months. I heard evidence from representatives of the Trust that they have repeatedly requested additional funds for workforce development and expansion to assist with cutting patient waiting lists and waiting times. I understand that an initial Workplace Funding Review was submitted in 2023 but was rejected by NHS England due to a funding shortage. I understand that a further Workplace Funding Review was submitted in the Autumn of 2024, but in February/March of this year, NHS England indicated that the same would again be rejected under a “no growth policy”. Whilst naturally I am aware of the pressures on the public purse and on the NHS generally, it is concerning to hear that the Trust do not appear to be being adequately supported financially by NHS England, and do not currently appear to be able to address their workplace staffing issues without additional financial support (which does not appear to be forthcoming). It is obvious that where patients are waiting for longer than is reasonable or necessary for treatment or reviews, there is a real risk of deaths occurring. No patient should be waiting longer than absolutely necessary for treatment. In light of HM Government’s decision on 13 March 2025 to abolish NHS England and for its role to be subsumed within the Department of Health and Social Care, this report is being sent to both Agencies to consider, as it relates to issues of both a local and national significance.

Lorraine Parker’s death was the third within three months at Royal Berkshire Foundation Trust following surgery by the same consultant colorectal surgeon.   With the permission of both families, the coroner referred to two previous inquests – Mr MR (date of death 4 March 2024), and Mr ME (date of death 28 December 2023) – to focus on the trust’s death investigation processes, and how efficient they have been in terms of picking up issues following each of these deaths. The coroner instructed independent colorectal surgery experts to comment on the management, using two different experts for the three cases. The coroner made the following findings: In the case of Mr ME, a significant surgical error was made when a healthy part of the bowel was removed instead of the area with the cancer, resulting in a much more extensive operation and Mr ME dying around 5 weeks later. This was discussed in a morbidity and mortality meeting, which ends with the simple phrase “await coroner’s report”. A structured judgment review was carried out by a consultant colorectal colleague on 4 May 2024, over four months after the death. According to this review, all of the care given to Mr ME was either “good” or “excellent”. A further structured judgement review took place. It would appear that none of the colorectal surgeons was willing to carry this out, resulting in the need for a gastroenterologist to conduct a second review in July 2024, by which time the surgeon had already been suspended from major operative work. It is important to note that in a clinical governance meeting in February 2024 (ie before either of these structured judgement reviews) it was noted that there were “no learning points identified” in relation to Mr ME’s case. In the case of Mr MR, a structured judgement review took place conducted by a consultant surgical colleague. This report was poor and the coroner wrote to the Chief Medical Officer about it after the inquest. It has the look of the briefest of reviews and tick box exercises. Again, all of the management is referred to as “good”. Mr MR’s case was not discussed during the March 2024 morbidity and mortality meeting, despite the fact that a later death (Lorraine Parker’s, on 30 March 2024) was discussed then. Mr MR’s case did not go to a morbidity and mortality meeting discussion until May 2024. The reasons for this remain unclear. In Lorraine’s case, there was a morbidity and mortality meeting discussion in March 2024 (or perhaps shortly thereafter). The April clinical governance meeting minutes refer to Lorraine’s case and again state “no learning points”. None of these three cases has been the subject of a detailed PSIRF report. Matters of concern On the evidence from the three inquests referred to, the Royal Berkshire Hospital’s death investigation process is not working well. Evidence of delayed morbidity and mortality meetings with no clear system for ensuring that these discussions happen timeously. There is little (if any) record of areas of concern identified at meetings – whether at morbidity and mortality meetings or clinical governance meetings. There is delayed escalation of concerns. Structured judgement reviews are at best, poor, and at worst, defensive. Delayed or no scrutiny of cases being reported to the coroner because the cause of death is unnatural, given that medical examiners are not funded to scrutinise those cases. Opportunities for early learning are therefore being lost. Systems of collating and providing medical records and clinical governance records to the coroner (and presumably to others involved in death investigation) are unreliable. The coroner is concerned about whether the trust has done enough to deal with the concerns about this particular surgeon, not just in the Berkshire area, but more widely.

Samuel Brookes was discharged home from Russells Hall Hospital, Dudley, on the 8 April 2024 where he had been admitted following a fall and long lie at home. The hospital arranged his transportation without rearranging his required care of two carers, four times a day. Mr Brookes, who was immobile and lived alone, was transported to his bed where he could not reach his pendant alarm nor his mobile phone, which was in another room. Mr Brookes was left unattended for two weeks, until on the 22 April 2024 his grandson attended and found him unresponsive, wedged between his bed and the bedroom wall. An ambulance was called, sadly on arrival paramedics confirmed that Mr Brookes was deceased and his death was declared at 11:37 hours. The Coroner in his report highlighted the following matters of concern: The hospital arranged for Mr Brookes transportation home without rearranging the required care. There was no record or documentation or process to show or demonstrate that the care had been rearranged. The transport company were responsible for transportation only and were not required to notify either the hospital, or if known, the care company of Mr Brookes’ safe return. It proceeded on the basis or assumption that care would have restarted within 4 hours or sooner. Mr Brookes did not have his alarm pendant around his neck and nor was his mobile phone available (it was in another room). Accordingly when Mr Brookes got into difficulty he could not raise the alarm or call for help.

On 9 November 2019, a woman who was pregnant with Ida, attended the Royal Lancaster Infirmary Labour Ward in early labour. Ida was a normal child whose death was caused by a lack of oxygen during her delivery. This occurred due to the gross failure of the three midwives attending her to provide basic medical care to deliver Ida urgently when it was apparent she was in distress and contributed to by the lead midwife‘s wholly incompetent failure to provide basic neonatal resuscitation for Ida during the first 3 1/2 minutes of her life that further contributed to Ida’s brain damage. Ida died on 16 November 2019 at the Royal Preston Hospital neonatal intensive care unit. The inquest was one in which Article 2 was fully engaged as a result of the Trust’s clinical governance arrangements, inadequate investigations, a lack of transparency and openness, a failure to respond to a detailed complaint letter, a failure to comply with the Duty of Candour, disputing the findings of the Secretary of State for Health’s independent review panel (HSIB now MNSI), failing to notify external monitoring bodies and failing to comply with internal protocols. The Trust’s lack of compliance with clinical governance requirements in the investigation into Ida’s death had significant similarities with the criticisms made in 2015 of the Trust as set out in The Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation, otherwise known as the Kirkup Report. [REDACTED] who gave evidence at the inquest, expressed the view that there was a deep seated and endemic culture of defensiveness in respect of maternity incidents at the Trust. [REDACTED] also said that the investigation showed elements of failing to identify significant care issues, brevity, defensiveness and was conducted by unskilled investigators. Matters of Concern A: Culture of Candour [Trust, ICB and DHSC] 1. I am concerned that there is not a culture of candour within University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Trust) and the impact that this has on safety, learning and implementing required changes to prevent deaths. Urgent action is required by the Trust to meaningfully embed the Dury of Candour. 2. [REDACTED]’s evidence to the inquest was that a deep-seated and endemic culture within the Trust leads to denial and a failure to learn. [REDACTED]’s Investigation report was published in 2015, the Trust is ten years on and still issues and themes identified in 2015 were very much in issue in 2019 and still exist at the Trust as identified by Ida’s inquest. 3. The Trust’s approach to the inquest has been one of a lack of transparency and openness, failure to provide relevant information and a failure to identify with candour the defective clinical governance processes that have operated at the Trust from 2019 to present day. 4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust’s internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust’s Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida’s death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”. 5. Trust figures to the Board provided in 2025 stated that there were no complaints over 6 months old when the Trust at the time of the inquest have not responded to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]’s 1 June 2020 complaint. Together with the Trust’s failure to categorise Ida’s death as only “Moderate Harm” (see point 4 above) cause me also to have concern about the reliability of Trust’s data. B: Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance [Trust, ICB and DHSC] 6. I consider the clinical governance arrangements at the Trust require urgent review to ensure the appropriate personnel are in place, with the necessary training and skills to deliver robust clinical governance to ensure patient safety in maternity care. 7. As a result of the Trust’s deficient processes, the Trust did not undertake any examination of its own clinical governance processes, which were a principle area of concern and which was identified to the Trust five months before the inquest commenced. The Trust’s clinical governance arrangements were extracted piecemeal during the course of the inquest. The deficiencies included lack of version control and audit of documents, untrained staff, chaotic clinical governance arrangements, defensive attitudes and inappropriate self- congratulation. The clinicians’ reports to the inquest only answered the questions they were asked rather than trying to assist with a holistic view of the evidence, did not provide relevant information until it was extracted from the witness in testimony, that resulted in rolling disclosure of documents and additional witness evidence. This approach caused additional distress to the family who had to sit through an extended court hearing to address these issues 8. [REDACTED] is now Head of Compliance and Assurance at the Trust but that there has been no investigation into her role in respect of reneging on the Trust’s acceptance of the HSIB report at senior management level and with the family as was indicated by her approval of the July 2021 position statement. Similarly, [REDACTED] is now Head of Midwifery at the Trust and there has been no investigation in respect of her disputing the HSIB findings and submission of challenge to the HSIB report in Ida’s case. 9. All investigations conducted by the Trust to date in respect of Ida’s death have been unskilled, superficial, brief, failed to identify issues and left the family without answers and were all features identified by the 2015 Kirkup Report. In view of the continuing culture at the Trust, this cause a significant concern that issues of safety and safeguarding are not properly considered, transparently engaged with and then addressed formally in respect of a child fatality and serious injury by the Trust. 10. The Trust’s clinical governance capability has been the subject of repeated and often severe criticism in the Flynn Review 2009, Fielding Report 2010, Central Manchester Hospital Report 2011, Price Waterhouse Cooper 2012 and Kirkup Report 2015. [REDACTED] in his evidence to the inquest said that the Trust focus on process, which means that you can comply with the process requirements and still produce an inadequate investigation, rather than focussing on outcome, which measures the quality of the investigation and the patient experience. [REDACTED] noted that the Trusts culture impeded transparent and open investigation. I am told that the Trust now uses the PSIRF model and is to appoint 3 whole time equivalent Response Leads by 30 September 2025. However, I remain concerned that the Trust has not fully engaged with the duty of candour such that I am not satisfied that the work on PSIRF to date has truly addressed the issues in respect of Trust’s investigations. C. Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training [Trust and ICB] 11. The Band 5 midwife supporting [REDACTED] in Labour had not undertaken her required mandatory training and this fact had not been provided and was only revealed at the inquest as part of the evidence of the Head of Midwifery in March 2025. I was also concerned to learn that in 2025 non-completion of mandatory training was still an issue as [REDACTED] had not completed her mandatory training. 12. It concerns me that the Trust do not have robust systems in place to ensure that any midwife who has not completed her mandatory training is subject to immediate action to ensure that all mandatory training is completed and is in date. 13. There was no remedial training was put in place for either the midwives involved in Ida’s delivery and resuscitation or for the paediatric SHO after Ida’s death. This raises a significant concern that the Trust do not operate a system of remedial training when this inquest has identified remedial training was required for [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. D. Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling [Trust, ICB, DHSC, NHSE, [REDACTED]] 14. The Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as “moderate”, even after her death. This grading should have been adjusted to “severe” by the Trust before Ida was transferred to Royal Preston Hospital as the consultant paediatrician identified that she had sustained a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to fetal bradycardia. 15. The 2024 NHSE Learn from patient safety events (LFPSE) guidance that replaced the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) confirms that the recording and analysis of patient safety events that occur in healthcare support the NHS to improve learning from patient safety events to help make care safer. There is a significant risk that if reporting is graded on harm alone, clinical care that resulted in hypoxic brain damage during delivery and which was prevented by therapeutic cooling, will not adequately identify the problems that caused the harm during the delivery. 16. [REDACTED] confirmed that nationally there is inconsistency in categorisation of harm for babies who sustain a hypoxic injury due to fetal bradycardia in labour and who require cooling and clarification guidance would assist prevent further maternity deaths and ensure full and proper investigation of hypoxic injuries sustained in labour. E: Funding for MSNI [DHSC and [REDACTED], NHSE and ICB] 17. But for the HSIB investigation report into Ida’s death [REDACTED] admitted that Ida’s death due to failures by the Trust would never have come to light or resulted in an inquest. 18. The MSNI is now hosted by the CQC with funding secured for the next two years but no certainty as to ongoing funding after this date. These independent investigations by specialist skilled investigators into the most serious of events is an essential safeguard to the lives of mothers and unborn children. 19. Without an assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027 I am concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida’s will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths will go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths.

On 17 September 2024, Edwin Buckett, commenced an investigation into the death of Billie Wicks aged 16 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 6 March 2025. Billie had been brought to the Royal Free Hospital just before midnight the night before her death with an asthma attack.   A first presentation of asthma at the age of 16 years without any family history is unusual, and it was a busy night in the accident and emergency department. Billie was inappropriately discharged at approximately 3.30am without adequate repeat observations or senior clinical review, and so her asthma was not diagnosed or treated. If it had been, she probably would have survived. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: On the night Billie attended, the Royal Free emergency department was understaffed, and that it remains understaffed of doctors, nurses, and even a healthcare assistant who could take basic observations. Billie should have had observations every hour. If she had had these observations, the emergency registrar who discharged her would have recognised that she was not as well as he thought, and would have sought senior medical review. That senior medical review would have changed the course of her management and saved her life. The registrar who saw Billie the night before her death prescribed an antibiotic, but he was not in the habit of giving the first dose in the department and he did not on this occasion. This meant that Billie’s infection was not tackled as quickly as it could have been. This seems to indicate a training and potentially a guideline need. At the time of Billie’s presentation, the registrar was unaware of the possibility of adult onset asthma. This seems to indicate a training and potentially a guideline need. I heard that Billie was safety netted when she was discharged. Her parents were told to bring her back if they had any concerns. I have heard this safety netting advice being described many, many times in different inquests. What worries me about it in this context is that Billie’s parents had brought her to hospital because they were concerned. They were then reassured by hospital staff. It is therefore difficult to see how this particular advice could be a meaningful instruction. In reality, her parents’ initial concern was well placed and they had responded to it appropriately by bringing Billie to hospital. When Billie began to deteriorate again, her parents’ natural instinct had been blunted by their first visit to the hospital. Whilst I doubt that it would have made a difference in this case, I understand that blood pressure is not yet an observation included in the national paediatric early warning score (PEWS).

This is an Early Day Motion tabled in the House of Commons on 27 February 2025, which urges the Government to also create a national oversight mechanism to ensure that recommendations concerning deaths involving the State and corporate agencies are routinely monitored by an independent body to help enact learning and prevent future deaths. What is an Early Day Motion? Early Day Motions are motions submitted for debate in the House of Commons for which no day has been fixed, and as such very few are debated. They are used to put on record the views of individual MPs or to draw attention to specific events or campaigns. By attracting the signatures of other MPs, they can be used to demonstrate the level of parliamentary support for a particular cause or point of view. Early Day Motion 867: National oversight mechanism This Early Day Motion was sponsored by Carla Denyer MP. It reads as follows: That this House believes that the State owes it to bereaved families and victims to learn and implement lessons from deaths involving the State and corporate agencies; notes that the Grenfell Inquiry recognised a failure of the State to follow up on recommendations made by inquests and inquiries; acknowledges the Government’s commitment to a publicly available record of these recommendations as a step in the right direction; urges the Government to also create a national oversight mechanism to ensure that these recommendations are routinely monitored by an independent body to help enact learning and prevent future deaths; further notes that such a Mechanism would go beyond facilitating transparency and ensure accountability, which is desperately needed for bereaved families and for public confidence; and believes that for victims of large scale tragedies such as Hillsborough and Grenfell, as well as victims of individual state failings, the Government must ensure that lessons are learned from their deaths and the same mistakes are not repeated. Related reading Inquest - No More Deaths Campaign Patient Safety Learning - Mind the implementation gap: The persistence of avoidable harm in the NHS

On 16 February 2024, Pamela Anne Marking – who was unable to give a complete history due to cognitive issues – was admitted to the Emergency Department at East Surrey Hospital from her home address after unknowingly vomiting blood-stained fluid, with right sided and suprapubic abdominal tenderness. She was diagnosed as having had an epistaxis (nosebleed) by a Physician Associate  and discharged home later that afternoon without a medical review or direct medical supervision of the Physician Associate who had a lack of understanding of the significance of abdominal pain and vomiting and had undertaken an incomplete abdominal examination which would have been likely to have found a right femoral hernia. Mrs Marking re-presented to the Emergency Department two days later with grossly dilated small bowel obstruction due to an incarcerated right femoral hernia containing ischaemic bowel requiring emergency surgery later that evening. Despite maximal support Mrs Marking died at East Surrey hospital on 20th February 2024. The clinical management Mrs Marking had on her first admission and thereafter during the Rapid Sequence Induction materially contributed to her death. The medical cause of death given was: 1a Respiratory failure and Sepsis   1b Aspiration of feculent gastric contents at induction of anaesthesia 1c. Strangulated femoral hernia. Coroner's concerns 1. The term ‘Physician Associate’ is misleading to the public. Mrs Marking’s son was under the mistaken belief that the Physician Associate was a doctor by this title in circumstances where no steps were taken by the Emergency Department or the Physician Associate to explain or clearly differentiate their role from that of medically qualified practitioners. 2. Lack of public understanding of the role of Physician Associate. Witnesses from the Trust gave evidence that a Physician Associate was clinically equivalent to a Tier 2 resident doctor without evidence to support this belief. This blurring of roles without public knowledge and understanding of the role of a Physician Associate has the potential to devalue and undermine public confidence in the medical profession whilst allowing Physician Associates to potentially undertake roles outside of their competency thereby compromising patient safety. 3. The right of patients and family to seek a second opinion. The lack of public knowledge that a Physician Associate is not medically qualified has the potential to hinder requests by patients and their relatives who would wish to seek an opinion from a medical practitioner. It also raises issues of informed consent and protection of patient rights if the public are not aware or have not been properly informed that they are being treated by a Physician Associate rather than a medically qualified doctor. 4. Lack of national and local guidelines and regulation of the scope of practice for a Physician Associate. A diagnosis of epistaxis was made by the Physician Associate without appreciating the relevance of the vomiting and lower abdominal discomfort and in the absence of understanding the need to undertake palpation of the groins in an abdominal examination in a patient who was unable to give a proper clinical history because of short term memory loss. No evidence was presented that the management of Mrs Marking was subject to a reflective practice review. Given their limited training and in the absence of any national or local recognised hospital training for Physician Associates once appointed, this gives rise to a concern they are working outside of their capabilities. 5. Lack of guidelines for direct supervision and consideration of an appropriate level of autonomy for Physician Associates. Whilst there were discussions with the ‘supervising’ consultant the Physician Associate was effectively acting independently in the diagnosis, treatment, management and discharge of Mrs Marking without independent oversight by a medical practitioner. This gives rise to a concern that inadequate supervision or excessive delegation of undifferentiated patients in the Emergency Department to Physician Associates compromises patient safety. 6. Lack of ‘Updated’ National Guidelines for Rapid Sequence Induction (RSI) of Anaesthesia for emergency surgery. Mrs Marking required a rapid sequence induction to protect her airway from aspiration of bowel contents as a consequence of small bowel obstruction. The consultant anaesthetist gave evidence that the ‘traditional’ use of consecutive syringes of induction agent and muscle relaxant was obsolete, and it was common practice locally and nationally to routinely undertake a RSI with Total Intravenous Anaesthesia, in the absence of updated local or national guidelines to support this practice. 7. Lack of ‘Updated’ National Guidelines to support the use of TIVA for RSI. Other than empirically increasing the rate of infusion of TIVA agents (Propofol and Remifentanil) no evidence was forthcoming as to the target range required to ensure and confirm an adequate depth of anaesthesia for patients or the length of time required prior to and following the administration of a muscle relaxant (Rocuronium) to facilitate intubation. This is despite TIVA being known to provide a slower onset of anaesthesia and approximately 50% of all anaesthetic related deaths are due to aspiration (NAP 4). 8. Lack of ‘Updated’ Guidelines for use of Cricoid pressure and other measures to protect the airway in a RSI anaesthetic. Evidence was heard that as cricoid pressure was ineffective it was not routinely applied for a RSI intubation. After aspiration on Induction, the only suction device was attached to the nasogastric tube giving rise to a possible delay in timely suctioning of the feculent aspirate which was in excess of two litres after intubation was achieved.

Mr Thomas Henry Robin Kingston was a 45 year old man who was visiting his parents in Kemble Gloucestershire for the weekend. He had recently been experiencing anxiety, but had not expressed any suicidal ideation. On Sunday 25 February 2024 after lunch he began to unload his car, and prepared to return to London. Between approximately 1700-1800 hours he removed a shotgun from his vehicle which he had recently borrowed from his father for a shoot. He then accessed an annex attached to his parent’s property. Within a locked bathroom he self inflicted a gun shot to the head, and sustained injuries incompatible with life. He was subsequently found by his father. He was pronounced deceased at 1854 hours by attending police, who confirmed there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding his death. Intent remains unclear as the deceased was suffering from adverse effects of medications he had recently been prescribed. The medical cause of death was 1A Traumatic wound to head.                  Matters of Concern Whether there is adequate communication of the risks of suicide associated with the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) medications, and Whether the current guidance to persist with SSRI medication or switch to an alternative SSRI medication is appropriate when no benefit has been achieved and/ or especially when any adverse side effects are being experienced.