Search the hub

HSIB has made three safety recommendations as a result of this report - two to NHS England and NHS Improvement, and one to the Centre for Perioperative Care. NHS England and NHS Improvement It is recommended that NHS England and NHS Improvement revises the Never Events list to remove events, such as those presented in this national learning report, that do not have strong and systemic safety barriers. It is recommended that NHS England and NHS Improvement develops and commissions programmes of work to find strong and systemic safety barriers for specific incidents where barriers are felt to be possible but are not currently available. Centre for Perioperative Care It is recommended that the Centre for Perioperative Care reviews and revises the National Safety Standards for Invasive Procedures (NatSSIPs) policy to increase standardisation of safety critical steps that are common across all procedures.

Nasogastric (NG) tubes placed incorrectly, going undetected and delivering food, liquid or medication into the lungs is a well-recognised never event in the NHS. Despite safety alerts and various safety initiatives, the investigation identified that this type of never event continues to happen and that there are not strong ‘systemic’ barriers to prevent NG tubes being accidentally placed into the lungs. Data from national reporting systems shows that there were 14 incidents of misplaced NG tubes from April to September this year. The report acknowledges that measures carried out to tackle COVID-19 have also added to the challenges of inserting and confirming placement of NG tubes. The report concludes with five safety recommendations focusing on agreeing standards and specifications relating to procurement and design of devices, researching new technologies and standardising competency-based training for national implementation. The report also sets out eight safety observations and three safety actions taken by the Trust following Fabian’s case. Safety recommendations It is recommended that Health Education England coordinates the development and publication of a national standardised competency based training programme for nasogastric tube placement and confirmation by pH testing. The model may include simulation, observed practical assessment and ongoing competency assessment. The competency-based training programme would need to be defined, developed, and tested using a human factors approach prior to any widespread implementation. The competency based training programme will lead to a recognised accreditation which will be transferable across the NHS care providers in England. It is recommended that NHS England and NHS Improvement works with the Department of Health and Social Care and others, to identify the process by which the NHS can identify and commission necessary research to support improvements in patient safety. This would include research to confirm nasogastric tube placement. It is recommended that NHS Supply Chain and the British Standards Institution work together (engaging other system leaders as appropriate, such as the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and NHS England and NHS Improvement), to develop and publish an agreed standard to minimise the risks relating to human errors in the use of pH strips designed for testing human gastric aspirate at the bedside. The standard should consider product design, regulatory standards, procurement practices and human factors engineering to provide a consistent approach that can be embedded within NHS Supply Chain product specifications. It is recommended that NHS Supply Chain develops essential specifications to support the clinicallyled procurement of devices to include devices to confirm nasogastric tube placement, for example, pH testing strips. The essential specifications should set out a range of factors critical to inform the selection by NHS Supply Chain of a product including, but not limited to: clinical output requirements; design and ergonomics; human factors and intended use; and limitations on use and usability. Critically, these specifications should ideally be established in partnership across the healthcare system with clinicians, healthcare professionals and safety leads, while maximising best practice. It is recommended that the British Society of Gastrointestinal and Abdominal Radiologists, working with Health Education England and the Society and College of Radiographers, develops and publishes a national standardised competency-based training programme for X-ray interpretation to confirm nasogastric tube placement. The competency based training programme will include the referral process for X-ray to confirm nasogastric tube position and the subsequent reviewing, recording and communication of the clinical evaluation of the X-ray findings prior to initiation of feed. The standards must meet the Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations IR(ME)R requirements. The competency-based training programme will lead to a recognised accreditation for those qualified to clinically evaluate and record their findings, for example doctors, radiographers and advanced care practitioners. The accreditation certificate will be transferable across NHS care providers in England.

Thomas L. Rodziewicz and John E. Hipskind explore medical error prevention in their book and conclude that: All providers (nurses, pharmacists, and physicians) must accept the inherent issues in their roles as healthcare workers that contribute to error-prone environments. Effective communication related to medical errors may foster autonomy and ultimately improve patient safety. Error reporting better serves patients and providers by mitigating their effects. Even the best clinicians make mistakes, and every practitioner should be encouraged to provide peer support to their colleagues after an adverse event occurs. Medical errors and near misses should be reported when they are discovered. Healthcare professionals are usually the first to notice a change in a patient's condition that suggests an adverse event. A cultural approach in which personal accountability results in long-term increased reporting reduces errors.

During my many years of working in operating theatres, I observed that hydrogen peroxide was adopted by surgeons as a ritual for washing out wounds and deep cavities. An entire bottle of 200 ml hydrogen peroxide was mixed with 200 ml of normal saline. It seems this ritual was passed down from consultant to trainee and it then became a habit. In a recent post on the hub, I mentioned that women in 1920 were given Lysol as a disinfectant to preserve their feminity and maritial bliss! Lysol contains hydrogen peroxide, so women were daily irrigating their vaginas with a harmful solution of fizz, unaware of the hazards. I believe it is still being used to colour hair, remove blood stains, as a mouthwash gargle and also to whiten teeth. Then suddenly a breakthrough! In 2014, in my email inbox, a yellow sticker warning appeared from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) regarding the use of hydrogen peroxide in deep cavities. So why did the MHRA ban the use of hydrogen peroxide in deep cavities? Hydrogen peroxide is contraindicated for use in closed body cavities or on deep or large wounds due to the risk of gas embolism. Hydrogen peroxide breaks down rapidly to water and oxygen on contact with tissues. If this reaction occurs in an enclosed space, the large amount of oxygen produced can cause gas embolism.[1] There has been several case reports that have been published from around the world of life threatening or fatal gas embolism with use of hydrogen peroxide in surgery, of which five were from the UK. Most of the global reports describe cardiorespiratory collapse occurring within seconds to minutes of instillation of hydrogen peroxide as wound irrigation or when used to soak swabs for wound packing. This was sometimes accompanied by features associated with excess gas generation such as surgical emphysema, pneumocephalus, aspiration of gas from central venous lines, or the presence of gas bubbles on transoesophageal echocardiography. Non-fatal events were sometimes associated with permanent neurological damage such as neuro-vegetative state and hypoxic encephalopathy.[1] As the Practice Development Lead for the theatre department where I worked it was my role to pass on and act on the information received from the MHRA, so I discussed it with my very supportive theatre manager and then escalated to the theatre staff. But some consultants still ask for it today; it is always refused. So why do consultants request it when they are aware of the hazards? One theatre never event describes a syringe of hydrogen peroxide given to a consultant and injected into a joint instead of the required local anaesthetic![2] The patient survived but required care in the intensive care unit. As a scrub nurse practitioner this scares me. What about you? Would you now research this yellow sticker alert further, implement best practice and speak up, or would you just keep quiet and go "with the flow?" We all make mistakes, but learning from our errors will always be the ultimate key to improvement in healthcare and best practice and safety for our patients. References 1. Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency. Hydrogen peroxide: reminder of risk of gas embolism when used in surgery. 19 December 2014. 2. Chung J and Jeong M. Oxygen embolism caused by accidental subcutaneous injection of hydrogen peroxide during orthopedic surgery. A case report. Medicine (Baltimore) 2017; 96(43): e8342.

The patient was a 62-year-old man who underwent hip replacement surgery. During his surgery, incompatible prostheses made by different manufacturers were used. The error was identified when data from the procedure was recorded in the National Joint Registry several days later. The investigation centred on how the error occurred and what safety recommendations we could make to reduce the risk of a similar event happening again. The investigation focuses on hip replacement surgery but the findings are applicable to all orthopaedic joint replacements.

Some aspects of COVID-19 presentation and treatment present special challenges for safely confirming nasogastric tube position. The dense ground-glass x-ray images can make x-ray interpretation more difficult, and the increasing use of proning manoeuvres in conscious patients increases the risk of regurgitation of gastric contents into the oesophagus and aspiration into the lungs which will render pH checks less reliable This aide-memoire is not designed to replace existing, established, NHSI compliant practice of NG confirmation. If a critical care provider is in the fortunate situation of having nursing and medical staff who have all completed local competency-based training in nasogastric tube placement confirmation aligned to local policy, they would be able to continue more complex local policies. Such policies might include specific advice indicating which critical care patients could have pH checks for initial placement confirmation, and which require x-tray confirmation, and how second-line checks should be used if first-line checks are inconclusive. However, staff returning to practice, or redeployed to critical care environments, including in Nightingale hospitals, will be helped by reminders of established safety steps in a form that can be used for all critical care patients, rather than requiring different processes for different patients.

Vaginal swabs and surgical tampons (larger than tampons used by women during their menstrual cycle) are used to absorb bodily fluids in a number of procedures both in delivery suites and surgical theatres on maternity wards. They are intended to be removed once a procedure is complete. Retained vaginal swabs are classed as a ‘never event’. A never event is a serious incident that is entirely preventable. Data compiled by NHS England/Improvement shows that accidental retention of vaginal swabs is the most common in the ‘retained foreign objects’ category. The report sets out the case of Christine, a 30-year-old woman who had a surgical tampon inserted after the birth of her first child. It was left in and not discovered until five days after leaving hospital. Whilst being in immense pain throughout, Christine saw the community midwife and GP twice before going back to hospital where the swab was found. Safety recommendations HSIB made the following safety recommendation to NHS England and NHS Improvement as a result of this investigation. It is recommended that NHS England/Improvement carries out its intention to commission and publish an independent evaluation of its alternative design for swabs and tampons. The evaluation should also consider other solutions or technologies and include usability, cost/benefit analysis and the impact on reducing harm. NHS England and NHS Improvement response The Patient Safety team at NHS England and NHS Improvement is pleased to confirm that in line with its stated intention it had already commissioned a first stage independent evaluation of a proposed new design for swabs and tampons used in healthcare maternity services. Whilst it would not be feasible to commission an evaluation of other solutions or technologies that have not yet been well developed, further independent evaluation to compare this proposed design with other available solutions, and to evaluate potential cost benefit and impact analyses will be considered, conducted and published, should final prototypes prove possible to manufacture to the required specification and standards, and before any staged roll-out is considered. This response was received on 15 July 2020.