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Content Article
Patient safety starts with knowing who is in the room
Patient Safety Learning posted an article in Surgery
In operating theatres and other high pressure clinical environments, clear identification shouldn’t be a nice ‘extra’, it is a patient safety need. When staff cannot quickly recognise names and roles, communication becomes harder, escalation can be delayed and patients are left unsure who is caring for them. Reviews of patient safety repeatedly show that poor teamwork and unclear roles can contribute to avoidable harm. Danielle Checketts, Managing Director of Eco Ninjas, discusses why being able to identify staff by their names and roles is so important not only for the staff themselves but also patients. She explains how a simple idea, reusable hats with detachable name badges that can be removed before laundering, can support safety and teamwork. In theatre, everyone can look the same. Masks, gowns, visors and lead aprons often cover name badges, while lanyards are easily hidden or turned around. Theatre teams include surgeons, anaesthetists, students, agency staff and industry representatives, yet patients and colleagues are still expected to know who is who. When names, roles and seniority are unclear, questions may go to the wrong person, and valuable seconds can be lost. Even when introductions are made during the WHO surgical safety checklist,[1] names and roles can quickly be forgotten once a procedure is underway. In an emergency, it must be immediately clear who is who. This lack of clarity can lead to: Miscommunication at critical moments. Delays in escalation. Reduced patient confidence and psychological safety. Errors due to misunderstood roles or instructions. This isn’t just theoretical. Liz Fitzhugh, net zero lead and former theatre manager at University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire (UHCW), put it simply: “If a patient arrests and someone asks for the crash trolley, either everyone goes or no one goes.” In critical moments, teams need to be immediately identifiable so they can act without hesitation. Liz’s team at UHCW were among the first to introduce name and role theatre caps in 2019. It feels fitting that she was also the person who once asked me to write my name on my disposable cap with a marker pen, quietly sparking the idea that grew into this work. For years, poor identification in theatre has become accepted and been treated as normal. But it shouldn’t be. Patients want to know who is caring for them, and staff work more safely when names and roles are clearly visible. That is why the ‘theatre cap challenge’ gained momentum internationally, highlighting a simple idea: if the hat remains visible when wearing sterile attire, it can help make names and roles visible too. Patient perspectives: what matters most Patients consistently say they want to know who is in the room, who is leading their care and who they can turn to for reassurance. Feedback from surgical and maternity care journeys, including caesarean births, shows that visible names and roles help people feel safer, calmer and better able to engage in what is happening around them. Patients describe feeling more reassured when: Staff introduce themselves clearly. Visible names and roles help patients and colleagues remember who is who after introductions, rather than relying on memory alone. There is consistency in communication throughout their care. When identification is unclear, patients can feel anxious and excluded at the point they are most vulnerable. Visible names and roles do more than support courtesy, they strengthen communication, teamwork and reassurance for patients and families. Infection prevention, hygiene and practical constraints Efforts to improve identification must also align with infection prevention standards. Theatre attire cannot simply be adapted without considering contamination risk, laundering processes and the wider pressure to reduce reliance on single use items. The challenge with current approaches The current embroidered theatre caps improve visibility of names and roles, but they are difficult to manage at scale and fail to support consistent identification for all staff. Students, visitors and temporary staff are often excluded, and new starters can wait months before receiving one. They also create ongoing operational challenges, including time-consuming bespoke ordering, poor fit, loss and replacement costs, outdated roles, and complications with laundering. As Alan Dickens, Theatre Manager at MMUH Birmingham, explains: “Bespoke embroidered caps are hard to manage over time. When staff leave or change roles, the hats issued to them often leave with them or need replacing. This creates ongoing cost for the trust and delays in maintaining accurate identification.” Emerging responses across the NHS Several NHS organisations are now testing a more practical approach: reusable hats with detachable name badges that can be removed before laundering. This keeps identification visible while fitting more easily into real hospital systems. In Somerset, a pilot at Musgrove Park showed how a simple change can support safety and teamwork. Mr Andy Stevenson, orthopaedic consultant at Somerset NHS Foundation Trust, said: “In theatre, there can be a really high turnover of colleagues at times, with new people coming and going all the time. This can make it really difficult to know who is who, let alone what jobs they have. Some days, it will be the first time working with half the people in the room. The badge hats have helped to positively transform communication and safety.” A similar message has come from maternity services. Kathryn Harrison, delivery suite manager at Great Western Hospital, said: “Despite staff introducing themselves in the morning, remembering everyone’s name and role throughout the day is challenging, especially when more than 12 people can be in the room at any one time. The badge hats reinforce this critical stage in safe surgery, improve teamwork and communication, and help break down hierarchical barriers. They can be worn by all staff, students, birthing partners and even the patients wear them on our unit”. Building the evidence base There is growing research interest in identification in healthcare.[2][3][4] We have started to work with medical schools on exploring the impact on training environments, role visibility and communication. This is helping to strengthen the evidence base for scalable, system-wide approaches. Students can be included simply using a badge with their name and role alongside a standard fitted hat. Towards integrated, system-based solutions The challenges across current approaches show the need for solutions that fit existing NHS processes, including laundering and distribution, while also identifying temporary staff, visitors and students. The most effective solutions will improve safety without creating new inefficiencies. A call to action Clear identification in healthcare is not optional. It is a practical safety intervention. When people can immediately see names and roles, communication improves, hierarchy softens, patients feel more reassured and teams are better able to act quickly when it matters most. If the NHS is serious about reducing avoidable harm, improving teamwork and strengthening patient experience, visible identification should be part of the solution. Wearing a detachable badge on a reusable theatre cap sounds very simple but this is a small change that can make a very big difference to the safety of patients. References World Health Organization. WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. Kouba LP, Fabi A, Bayer S, et al. Labeled surgical caps improve perioperative patient safety and interprofessional communication in the operating room: a scoping reviewe. Patient Saf Surg, 2026; 20:(9). Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (LUHFT) and Warwick Med. Case study – Switching to Reusable Theatre Caps. NHS England. Douglas N, Demeduik S, Conlan K. Surgical caps displaying team members' names and roles improve effective communication in the operating room: a pilot study. Patient Saf Surg 2021;15:27. doi: 10.1186/s13037-021-00301-w.- Posted
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- Surgeon
- Operating theatre / recovery
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Content Article
How the UK intends to rebuild readiness for future pandemics through a whole-of-government approach that prioritises the needs of the most vulnerable. The UK’s readiness for future pandemics is being overhauled through the publication of a new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, backed by around £1 billion of investment in health protection measures including enhancing our access to essential vaccines and therapeutics, improving our pandemic surveillance systems and expanding our ability to roll out testing to the whole population. Published by the Department for Health and Social Care today, the strategy outlines concrete action already taken across government to embed lessons from Covid-19: PPE stockpiles will continue to be replenished with a variety of products and sizes. Departmental pandemic response plans will be reviewed to ensure government services and critical national infrastructure can be maintained effectively in a pandemic. An ‘All Pandemic Hazards Bill’ will be drafted to ensure the government has legislative options ready to review and introduce as necessary in response to a range of pathogens. This will sit alongside a suite of prepared options for community protection measures to support swift decision-making and prioritisation to keep people safe. UKHSA will build a new set of services to manage large scale testing, contact tracing and other scaled public health response measures’. Chemicals and equipment stockpiles needed for testing will be built up further to protect against supply risks that could develop in the early stages of a pandemic. Data requirements to support decision-making will be reviewed to ensure information needed in a pandemic response is available, transparent, and can be shared quickly between organisations and with the public.- Posted
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- Pandemic
- Infection control
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Content Article
The Covid-19 Inquiry published its third report and recommendations following its investigation into ‘the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare systems of the United Kingdom’ on Thursday 19 March 2026. It examines the governmental and societal response to Covid-19 as well as dissecting the impact that the pandemic had on healthcare systems, patients and healthcare workers. Recommendations There are many lessons to be learned from the experiences of the UK’s healthcare systems during the Covid-19 pandemic and many areas for improvement. The Inquiry has made 10 recommendations and considers them all to be necessary to prevent healthcare systems being overwhelmed in the next pandemic: Recommendation 1: Ensure that decision-making on infection prevention and control is underpinned by clear structures and a cautious approach to transmission risk The UK government must ensure that there is a body (equivalent to the UK Infection Prevention and Control Cell) in place ready to be convened at the outset of any future pandemic, to consider and draft infection prevention and control guidance for healthcare settings. This body must: have clear lines of responsibility and a clear, pre-defined role and remit during a pandemic have multidisciplinary membership, including experts in the science of viral transmission as well as those with clinical expertise ensure that its guidance accounts for the risk of all plausible routes of transmission until sufficient evidence emerges to rule out specific routes ensure that guidance clearly explains the underlying rationale for the precautions recommended. Separately, the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS National Services Scotland, Public Health Wales and the Public Health Agency (Northern Ireland) should review the national infection prevention and control manuals and any future guidance to ensure that the approach to identifying risk of transmission is not confined solely to specific procedures. Emphasis should be placed on a combination of risk factors, such as rates of transmissibility, environment, setting and procedure. Recommendation 2: Guidance for visiting restrictions The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should publish guidance for the implementation of visiting restrictions in hospitals in the event of a future pandemic. The guidance should identify the circumstances in which visiting restrictions should be introduced, escalated, decreased and removed alongside the measures and exemptions at each level. The guidance should be led by the following core principles: Measures applied should be the least restrictive possible, both in terms of severity and the length of time for which they apply. Restrictions should be decided upon and applied at the most local level possible. Unless restrictions are applied at a specified level, trusts and health boards should take decisions on the severity of restrictions based on local risk assessments. Communications with the public must clearly explain the measures in place and the reasons why restrictions apply. The guidance should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4) Recommendation 3: Better preparation for fit-testing The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with employers, including health boards and trusts, to review the availability of qualified fit testers and take steps to increase the number of fit testers accordingly. Availability should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). The Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland should update their guidance to employers to emphasise the need to ensure that sufficient fit-testing capacity is available. Recommendation 4: Improve data systems to identify individuals at high risk during a pandemic The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive must ensure that health data and digital systems have the capability to identify individuals at high risk of morbidity or mortality from a pandemic disease quickly and accurately in a future pandemic. This should include action to improve health data systems and patient record-keeping by: improving patient data by enabling more granular diagnostic coding ensuring that care records are compatible across primary and secondary care enabling secure data-sharing and linkage across multiple health datasets and systems for identifying individuals at high risk. Recommendation 5: Prepare to scale up urgent and emergency care capacity The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, in conjunction with organisations responsible for delivering services, should plan for surge capacity in urgent and emergency care during a pandemic. Plans must ensure that there is sufficient workforce capacity and the ability to surge, including the number and type of staff required, recruitment and training provision. This should be completed as part of the whole-system civil emergency strategy recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). Plans should be published and subject to review every three years. Recommendation 6: Prepare for and test the ability to scale up hospital capacity The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with trusts and health boards to ensure that pandemic plans include practical steps to rapidly scale up hospital capacity to treat acutely unwell patients. This should include critical care services that can deliver multiple levels and types of organ support. It should also cover necessary equipment, supplies, space and staff, including redeployment and training. All trusts and health boards must keep an easily accessible, up-to-date record of the information needed to implement these plans in the hospital sites they operate. This should include technical aspects of critical care expansion such as power, ventilation, oxygen and waste management systems. Plans for expanding capacity should be published, subject to review every three years and tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6). Recommendation 7: A framework to guide the allocation of intensive care resources in the extreme event of saturation The UK government and devolved administrations should publish a UK-wide framework setting out ethical and operational principles to guide the allocation of adult intensive care resources in the extreme event that they are saturated during a pandemic. That framework must: be informed by comprehensive engagement with the public and developed in conjunction with professionals across healthcare, law and ethics, as well as with regulators of healthcare professionals set out clearly established triggers for its use, based at least in part on a UK-wide system that measures critical care capacity strain and facilitates mutual aid (such as the CRITCON tool used in England) establish clinicians’ legal and professional duties in applying the framework, which should be clearly explained to clinicians through guidance be regularly reviewed with reference to contemporary patient data during a pandemic, and any future use of it must be evaluated and reported on publicly. A plan and timeline for completing this work should be published within six months of this Report. Application of the framework should be tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6). Recommendation 8: Systematically recording and publishing healthcare worker deaths The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with their respective public health agencies and healthcare employers to develop nation-specific mechanisms to collect, analyse and publish data systematically on the deaths of healthcare workers in the event of a pandemic outbreak. The UK Statistics Authority should work with data providers to ensure that the data are comparable across the four nations of the UK. Recommendation 9: A standardised process for advance care planning across the UK The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with trusts and health boards, should establish and promote one standardised process across the UK (such as ReSPECT, the Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and Treatment) for clinicians to ascertain and record their patients’ wishes and preferences for future care and treatment in order to inform individualised decision-making, including Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) notices. Recommendation 10: Psychological and emotional support for healthcare workers The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with healthcare employers and professional bodies, should put in place plans to deliver effective support for healthcare workers at scale from the outset of a pandemic. Plans should cover the nature and level of support that will be provided during and after a pandemic. All four governments should develop a programme of peer support visits that can, from the outset of a pandemic, be targeted towards areas of acute hospitals under considerable strain. The purpose of the visits should be to support front-line staff, collect insights on the pressures that healthcare workers are facing and understand what further support they might need. See also: UK Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom Covid-19 Inquiry: Module 2, 2A, 2B, 2C Report – Core decision-making and political governance- Posted
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- Investigation
- Pandemic
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Content Article
With the UK Covid-19 Inquiry due to publish its report into the impact of the pandemic on healthcare systems this week, CATA (the Covid Airborne Transmission Alliance) has submitted its own reports to the Inquiry. These cover investigations that CATA carried out independently, based on Freedom of Information requests and other sources of information (see CATA's press release that explains the background to this initiative). David Osborn, a member of CATA's Executive Team, gave a brief overview of these reports in a presentation to the SHBN (the Safer Healthcare Biosafety Network). David Osborn SHBN Meeting 130326.mp4 David's presentation can also be downloaded from the PDF attachment below: 2026-03-13 SHBN Meeting.pdf CATA has released copies of their reports into the public domain although, due to Inquiry confidentiality rules, some material has had to be redacted. Links to CATA’s two reports: Changes in the Management of COVID-19 (March 2020) Independent Investigation into the conduct of the IPC Cell- Posted
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- Investigation
- PPE (personal Protective Equipment)
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Content Article
David is a health and safety consultant and member of the Covid Airborne Transmission Alliance (CATA). The Safer Healthcare Biosafety Network (SHBN) is an independent forum focused on improving healthcare worker and patient safety. It is made up of clinicians, professional associations, trades unions and employers, patient organisations, industry, and government agencies with the shared objective to prevent occupational and patient safety incidents and improve occupational health and safety and patient safety in healthcare. It includes representatives from the UK-Health Security Agency, NHS, Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Care Quality Commission (CQC), Public Health, Royal College of Nursing (RCN), British Medical Association (BMA) and many others. You can watch the recording of David’s presentation to the Network below. This took place the day after Baroness Hallett published her report for module 2 of the UK COVID-19 Inquiry. David was speaking on behalf of CATA, the COVID Airborne Transmission Alliance, a core participant in module 3 (impact on healthcare). Summary of presentation David reminded the Network that Baroness Hallett, in her module 1 report (July 2024), had already confirmed that the primary routes of transmission for coronaviruses (including SARS-CoV-2) are “airborne and respiratory”. This was based on expert evidence presented to the Inquiry. David felt it was discourteous to Baroness Hallett for anybody to claim that COVID-19 is not an airborne disease, yet that is exactly what ministers (Andrew Gwynne and his successor Ashley Dalton) have been repeatedly saying in their correspondence with CATA. In her module 2 report, Baroness Hallett mentioned that “policy makers paid insufficient attention to … airborne transmission”. She went on to commend Professor Cath Noakes for the evidence she provided, praising her for raising her concerns and highlighted a comment that there could have been “significant public concern” (i.e. panic) if the disease was declared to be airborne. David shared evidence of this in the form of a WhatsApp message from Matt Hancock sharing concerns that if mainstream media published stories about the advisability of wearing masks, there would be a “loo roll type rush” on them. The Inquiry report had included comments that Professor Sir Jonathan Van Tam had made to the Inquiry during his oral evidence that “If we knew then what we know now, there may have been less emphasis on contact transmission and more emphasis on airborne transmission and ventilation”. David rejected this statement outright, maintaining that, right from the start of the pandemic, it was known to be airborne. He presented proof of this via a statement by the the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to its inspectors in April 2020 confirming that the risk of aerosol transmission was at its greatest within a metre of the infectious person—exactly the setting where most care is given to patients. CATA UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry and related issues_21 Nov2025_small.mp4 -
News Article
Face masks ‘inadequate’ and should be swapped for respirators, WHO is advised
Mark Hughes posted a news article in News
Surgical face masks provide inadequate protection against flu-like illnesses including Covid, and should be replaced by respirator-level masks – worn every time doctors and nurses are face to face with a patient, according to a group of experts urging changes to World Health Organization guidelines. There is “no rational justification remaining for prioritising or using” the surgical masks that are ubiquitous in hospitals and clinics globally, given their “inadequate protection against airborne pathogens”, they said in a letter to WHO chief Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. “There is even less justification for allowing healthcare workers to wear no face covering at all,” they said. At the height of the Covid pandemic an estimated 129bn disposable face masks were being used around the world every month, by the public and healthcare workers, with surgical masks the most widely available and recommended by most health authorities. Respirators designed to filter tiny particles – such as masks meeting FFP2/3 standards in the UK or N95 in the US – should instead be standard practice for medical interactions, they said. Read full article. Source: The Guardian, 9 January 2026 Related reading Open Letter to WHO: A Call for the Universal use of Respirators in Healthcare (7 January 2025)- Posted
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- PPE (personal Protective Equipment)
- Pandemic
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Content Article
This open letter to the World Health Organization (WHO), signed and endorsed by a group of global health experts, makes the case that surgical masks provide inadequate protection against airborne pathogens. It calls on the WHO to take a lead in establishing respirators as the universal default for all healthcare encounters. The letter includes a seven-step plan outlining how the WHO should implement this change. The signatories urge the WHO to act now to address the threat of airborne transmission, and take the following steps: Update IPC Guidelines to recommend respirators (e.g., N95, FFP2/3, elastomeric) in all healthcare settings — not just during outbreaks or high-risk procedures, but as a baseline occupational safety standard. The Guidelines could recommend locally-determined off-ramps based on precautionary interpretations of current local and establishment-specific conditions. Revisit prior statements about how SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted, and unambiguously inform the public that it spreads via airborne respiratory particles (a term subsuming both “aerosols” as well as “droplets”). Restoring public trust begins with transparency and accountability. To close the knowledge gap, provide comprehensive training and education on risk reduction for airborne hazards. Leverage WHO’s partnerships and procurement infrastructure to support equitable access to certified respirators globally — particularly for healthcare systems in low- and middle-income countries. Over time, surgical masks should be produced in progressively smaller quantities, as safer, more effective respirators have been and remain readily available. Launch global campaigns normalizing the use of respirators as a basic tool of infection prevention — not as emergency gear, but as modern personal protective equipment. Integrate universal respiratory protection into pandemic preparedness frameworks, including the forthcoming WHO Pandemic Accord. Respirators must no longer be treated as optional, nor as luxury items. Convene multidisciplinary experts, including industrial hygienists, aerosol scientists, social scientists, healthcare workers, disease transmission modelers, and patient advocates, as well as infectious disease modelers, to advise on implementation and adherence. Clearly, publicly, and regularly reinforce the message that while WHO had stopped referring to SARS-CoV-2 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in 2023, the pandemic is still ongoing. This will make countries accountable for mitigating the ongoing risks or covering the ongoing costs of inaction.- Posted
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- PPE (personal Protective Equipment)
- Infection control
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Content Article
This is the recording of a webinar hosted by the Safety for All Campaign discussing the latest advancements in personal protective equipment (PPE) standards within surgical settings. The session featured presentations by Dr Ali Mehdi and Edward Curtin, who provided in-depth analyses of current PPE protocols and their implications for perioperative safety. Their insights sparked a dynamic discussion among participants, addressing topics such as the integration of innovative PPE technologies, adherence to evolving safety regulations, and strategies for mitigating risks to both healthcare professionals and patients.- Posted
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- Staff safety
- PPE (personal Protective Equipment)
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Content Article
An update attached on the COVID-19 Airborne Transmission Alliance (CATA) involvement in the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry and their plans for the future. -
Content Article
Most hospitals have stopped testing all patients for Covid-19 when they are admitted and no longer require masking. Ten hospitals in the Mass General Brigham hospital system ended both these precautions simultaneously in May 2023 but restarted masking for health care workers in January 2024 during a winter respiratory viral surge. This study in JAMA Network Open looked at the association of these changes with the relative incidence of hospital-onset Covid-19, influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). The study showed that stopping universal masking and Covid-19 testing was associated with a significant increase in hospital-onset respiratory viral infections relative to community infections. Restarting the masking of health care workers was associated with a significant decrease.- Posted
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- Infection control
- Healthcare associated infection
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Content Article
In this interview, David Osborn, chartered occupational safety and health practitioner and member of the Covid-19 Airborne Transmission Alliance (CATA), speaks to Lotty Tizzard, Digital Content Manager at Patient Safety Learning, about how CATA was established during the pandemic to advocate for adequate respiratory protection for NHS employees. David explains how CATA advocated for the government and heath service to recognise that Covid-19 is passed on by aerosol transmission (through microscopic particles in the air). He also outlines why surgical masks do not adequately protect people against catching airborne viruses and describes how inadequate respiratory protective equipment (RPE) contributed to thousands of NHS staff catching Covid-19 at work. As a result, many healthcare workers died and a large number still live with the ongoing symptoms of Long Covid. David describes CATA's involvement as a Core Participant in the Covid-19 Inquiry and outlines what he hopes will be done to ensure the UK is better prepared for future pandemics. Patient Safety Learning is also a member of CATA. Clarification David wishes to clarify a point raised in the interview: "When talking about the “IPC Cell” I said that they 'didn’t produce minutes'. In fact, notes or minutes were taken at all IPC Cell meetings. The point I was making is that they were not published ('produced' in the sense of being released into the public domain), when the minutes of most other groups such as SAGE and NERVTAG were published. The few IPC Cell minutes that have trickled into the public domain have mostly been as a result of Freedom of Information requests by a colleague and a few that I have managed to obtain myself. In some cases, public authorities have taken around 18 months to disclose documents, and it has required the intervention of the Information Commissioner's Office. I anticipate that more minutes will be disclosed for public scrutiny as time goes on." You can read more about CATA and the Covid-19 Inquiry in David's blogs and presentations on the hub: Respiratory protective equipment: An unequal solution for healthcare workers? A blog by David Osborn Healthcare workers with Long Covid: Group litigation – a blog from David Osborn Covid-19 : A risk assessment too far? A blog by David Osborn CATA and the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry: Presentation from David Osborn Join the conversation Were you working in health and social care during the pandemic? We'd like to hear about your experience of health and safety at work. Were you provided with adequate PPE to carry out your job safely? Did you catch Covid-19 while at work? You can join the conversation by commenting below (you'll need to sign up first) or get in touch with us directly by emailing [email protected]- Posted
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- Long Covid
- Staff safety
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Content Article
The NHS has been an expert in infection control for years. Or so we thought. Turns out that the evidence base for much of what we do is alarmingly weak. As one expert witness put it “ Infection control people are very traditional and slow to change. We do things the way we always have”. A commentary from Professor Brian Edwards on the ongoing Covid-19 Inquiry. He concludes that we don’t need to wait for the Inquiry report to commission an urgent review. -
News Article
Long Covid health staff 'abandoned and forgotten'
Patient Safety Learning posted a news article in News
Healthcare workers with Long Covid say the government needs to do more to support those left with life-changing disabilities since catching the virus. Nurse Rachel Hext, 37 from Paignton, insisted she caught Covid in her job as a nurse in a small community hospital in Devon. "We were clapped and called heroes, and now those of us who have been bereaved or disabled by it have been forgotten," she said. The government said it knew Long Covid could have a debilitating impact on people's physical and mental health, that there was a "range of support for staff" and it was funding research into it. Mrs Hext is one of a group of healthcare workers with long Covid who have taken their fight to the High Court to try to sue the NHS and other employers for compensation. The staff, from England and Wales, said they believed they first caught Covid at work during the pandemic and said they were not properly protected from the virus. She said: "I want acknowledgement and I want support for the people who need it. "Long Covid is absolutely life-changing. It's devastated us as a family." Read full story Source: BBC News, 20 March 2025 Related reading on the hub: "Forgotten heroes" – the sequel: a blog and resources from David Osborn The pandemic – questions around Government governance: a blog from David Osborn Healthcare workers with Long Covid: Group litigation- Posted
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- Long Covid
- Staff safety
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Community Post
In a new blog on the hub, Laura Evans discusses the lack of protection against Covid-19 for vulnerable patients when going for a GP appointment or into hospital and shares her personal experience of being dismissed when asking for basic patient safety measures to be put in place. We'd like to hear your experiences. Are you a vulnerable patient? What is your Trust or GP practice doing to make you feel safe? Please comment below (sign up first for free) or you can email us at [email protected].- Posted
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- High risk groups
- Infection control
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Content Article
As reported recently, the Scottish Healthcare Workers Coalition called upon the Scottish Government to reinstate 'universal masking' in health and social care settings. In this statement written in support of their campaign, an occupational safety and health practitioner, David Osborn, explains the legal requirements for risk assessments that the Government ought to have undertaken before reaching such a decision that exposes healthcare staff to the life-changing consequences associated with repeat Covid-19 infections. He also explains the legal duty of the Government to consult with workers before implementing changes that may affect their health and safety. Neither duty (risk assessment nor prior consultation with workers) appears to have been well met, putting the Scottish Government and Health Boards in breach of UK-wide health and safety law. The decision by the Scottish Government to withdraw the coronavirus guidance for extended use of facemasks across health and social care is clearly a matter that has significant implications for the safety of health and social care workers. It is a legal requirement under the Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 that employers (including Governments and their Health Boards) must do at least two things before implementing a change that may materially and substantially impact workers’ health and safety at work: They must conduct a suitable and sufficient risk assessment of the proposed actions; and They must consult with all employees or their elected representatives concerning the proposed change. 1. Risk assessment To be “suitable and sufficient” the risk assessment for the abandonment of universal masking should have considered several factors such as: The fact that variants of the SARS-CoV-2 virus continue to evolve which are becoming more immune resistant and subject to vaccine escape. The opportunity for viruses to mutate in this way depends upon the sheer number of viruses in circulation within the population. The greater the number, then statistically the more likely it is that a variant could evolve with potential to partially or wholly defeat our current vaccines and greatly impair the nation’s recovery from the pandemic. It just takes for one single virus to mutate in a certain catastrophic way for this to happen – as will have been the case in Wuhan in 2019. Any responsible Government and Health Board should take all reasonably practicable steps to reduce the number of viruses circulating in the population, particularly in health and social care premises. The Scottish Government appears blind to this simple but important duty that it owes to the Scottish people and its healthcare workers in particular. Evidence is emerging that cases of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection and associated hospitalisations and deaths have increased in relative frequency as new Omicron lineages have emerged with enhanced transmissibility or immune escape characteristics. The evidence also suggests that the time interval between repeat infections is decreasing, particularly (and rather peculiarly) amongst individuals who have previously been infected with the Alpha (‘Kent’) variant which arose during the second wave (winter 2020-21). Many healthcare workers will have been infected during that period. The consequence is that these workers are (a) that these infections may recur more frequently and (b) are at greater risk from these repeat infections. It has long been established that each time a person is infected or reinfected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus they have a risk of developing Long Covid, which can have severe detrimental effect on their health and quality of life – sometimes causing debilitating, irreversible, long-term health conditions. The more times they become reinfected, the worse these conditions may be and the longer they may last. By law, the risk assessment must be recorded (on paper or electronically) and be made available to employees and their representatives immediately upon request. I therefore call upon the Scottish Government to confirm whether or not such a risk assessment was undertaken before the decision was taken to abandon universal masking. If one was done, then the Government and the Health Boards should publish it so that interested parties, such as the Coalition, can determine whether it has properly considered all relevant factors that have a direct bearing on the increased risk of healthcare worker infection and how they plan to mitigate that risk. If no such risk assessment was done, either by the Government centrally or by its Health Boards, then they have acted recklessly and unlawfully. 2. Consultation For clarity, the “consultation”, which is required by the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 and the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996, has a very clear meaning. It means: a) providing employees, or their safety representatives, with all relevant information relating to any proposed change in health and safety arrangements (including giving them sight of any risk assessments) before that change is implemented; b) allowing the employees and their representatives sufficient time to discuss amongst themselves and seek any further advice they may need to inform an opinion about the change; c) the employer must then take account any the feedback that it receives. These are serious matters. The UK Government and the devolved administrations, through inept planning for pandemics and the issue of seriously flawed guidance, failed to provide health and social care workers with the necessary PPE to prevent them inhaling airborne virus whilst they cared for highly infectious patients. It is quite understandable that our brave healthcare workers are now so aggrieved by the Government’s decision. These are the same people for whom we, the public, stood and clapped so proudly at our doorsteps during those dark days. The chaotic state of the UK’s planning and preparedness for pandemics has been laid bare at the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry. During future sessions, the Inquiry will receive evidence concerning the deception which was wrought upon healthcare workers that the flimsy paper masks they were given would keep them safe from the disease when health and safety law requires proper tested and certified respirators to be used (such as FFP3 and equivalent) when workers are exposed to dangerous microbiological hazards in their workplace. Current World Health Organization guidance still advocates that universal masking policies in health and social care premises do still have their place in Governments’ armoury of defence measures to keep healthcare workers safe. Given all that they have already been through, combined with the ongoing suffering that many of them are experiencing from the disease they have contracted whilst caring for us, surely it is now time for the Scottish Government to pay greater consideration and respect for their health and safety. Some commentators may view the abandonment of universal masking as the Government playing “Russian Roulette” with their health by "letting the virus rip" – as sadly it is likely to do as the autumn and winter seasons approach. -
Content Article
In this report, Professor Brian Edwards summarises contributions given to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry by various politicians and senior civil servants, relating to how prepared the UK and Scottish Governments were for the Covid-19 pandemic. It contains reflections on the contributions of: Nicola Sturgeon (First Minister of Scotland during the pandemic) Matt Hancock (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care during the pandemic) Jenny Harries (Chief Executive of the UK Health Security Agency) Emma Reed (civil servant, DHSC)- Posted
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- Investigation
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Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report. Three years after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Health and Social Care (the Department) has spent £14.9 billion of public money overpaying and over ordering significant volumes of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), COVID-19 medicines and vaccines. The Department will never use a significant proportion of the PPE purchased, which will end up being burnt at a significant cost to the taxpayer. The PPE storage costs remain high and were nearly £200 million in the first 9 months of 2022–23 and the Department estimates that its future storage and disposal costs for unusable PPE will be approximately £319 million. The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) became fully operational on 1 October 2021, in the midst of the pandemic. There were significant issues in setting up this new organisation and the Department failed to appropriately support UKHSA during this process. This led to a fundamental absence of governance arrangements and controls. Non-executive directors were not appointed until April 2022 and UKHSA’s financial controls and processes were so poor that the organisation could not prepare auditable accounts for the 2021–22 financial year. This resulted in the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) disclaiming his audit opinions. UKHSA faces a significant challenge implementing strong financial controls and processes and the Department must provide sufficient support and oversight to achieve this. Over the last few years, there have been repeated governance and financial control failings across the Departmental group leading to a number of qualified accounts. This has undermined Parliamentary accountability and resulted in the Departmental group incurring expenditure without Parliamentary approval. The Department has also been unable to lay its accounts before the summer recess, only just managed to do so before the final statutory deadline. It has not yet got a credible plan to return to laying its accounts before the summer recess. The Department must strengthen its governance and financial controls and set out a clear plan to restore timely accountability across the Departmental group. To do this, the Department must work with NHS England and local auditors to restore timely financial reporting across the NHS.- Posted
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UK Covid-19 Inquiry website
Patient Safety Learning posted an article in Covid-19 Inquiry
The UK Covid-19 Inquiry has been set up to examine the UK’s response to and impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, and learn lessons for the future. The Inquiry’s work is guided by its Terms of Reference. Four Modules have already begun: Resilience and preparedness (Module 1) Core UK decision-making and political governance (Module 2) Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare (Module 3) Vaccines and therapeutics (Module 4) which started on 5 June 2023. Structure of the Inquiry January 2024 newsletter Every Story Matters Every Story Matters is an online form that asks you to choose from a list of topics and then tell us about what happened. By taking part, you help us to understand the effect of Covid-19, the response of the authorities, and any lessons that can be learned. Find out more and take part. -
Content Article
The Covid-19 pandemic increased the sense of urgency to advance understanding and prevention of infectious respiratory disease transmission. There are extensive studies that demonstrate scientific understanding about the behaviour of larger (droplets) and smaller (aerosols) particles in disease transmission as well as the presence of particles in the respiratory track. Methods for respiratory protection against particles, such as N95 respirators, are available and known to be effective with tested standards for harm reduction. However, even though multiple studies also confirm their protective effect when N95 respirators are adopted in healthcare and public settings for infection prevention, overall, studies of protocols of their adoption over the last several decades have not provided a clear understanding. This preprint article demonstrates limitations in the methodology used to analyse the results of these studies. The authors show that existing results, when outcome measures are properly analysed, consistently point to the benefit of precautionary measures such as N95 respirators over medical masks, and masking over its absence. -
Content Article
During the bleak early years of the Covid pandemic, if there was one thing we were all doing, it was “following the science”. This, we were repeatedly assured, was what was driving all the government’s tough decisions. We might not like all its policies but we shouldn’t, it was implied, argue. After all, it was – always – just “following the science”. But was it really? In her evidence to the Covid inquiry, former civil servant Helen MacNamara revealed that in April 2020, the then prime minister, Boris Johnson, asked the former chief executive of the NHS in England, Simon Stevens, about reports that female frontline healthcare workers were struggling with PPE that had been designed for men. Stevens is said to have “reassured” the prime minister that there was “no problem”. However, as Caroline Criado Perez highlights, report after report over decades has found that while PPE is usually marketed as gender-neutral, the vast majority has in fact been designed around a male body, and therefore neither fits nor protects women. In fact, more often than not, it’s a hindrance.- Posted
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The only masking that’s going on is that of the government’s continued failure to get to grips with the virus, writes George Monbiot in this Guardian opinion piece. For some people, going to hospital may now be more dangerous than staying at home untreated. Many clinically vulnerable people fear, sometimes with good reason, that a visit to hospital or the doctors’ surgery could be the end of them. Of course, there have always been dangers where sick people gather. But, until now, health services have sought to minimise them. Astonishingly, this is often no longer the case. Across the UK, over the past two years, the NHS has been standing down even the most basic precautions against Covid-19. For example, staff in many surgeries and hospitals are no longer required to wear face masks in most clinical settings. Reassuring posters have appeared even in cancer wards, where patients might be severely immunocompromised. A notice, photographed and posted on social media last week, tells people that while they are “no longer required to wear a mask in this area”, they should use hand sanitiser “to protect our vulnerable patients, visitors and our staff”. Sanitising is good practice. But Covid-19 is an airborne virus, which spreads further and faster by exhalation than by touch.- Posted
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- Virus
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Unable to work or to play with their children, forced to sell their homes or facing insolvency—doctors with Long Covid deserve more support from the government and the NHS, writes Adele Waters in this BMJ article. The BMA has joined forces with the Long Covid Doctors for Action and they have set out five demands: Financial support for doctors and healthcare staff with post-acute covid. Post-acute covid to be recognised as an occupational disease in healthcare workers, with a definition that covers all the debilitating symptoms that people with post-acute covid experience. Improved access to physical and mental health services to aid comprehensive assessment, appropriate investigations, and treatment. Greater workplace protection for healthcare staff risking their lives for others. Better support for post-acute covid sufferers to return to work safely, including a flexible approach to the use of workplace adjustments. You may also be interested in: The pandemic – questions around Government governance: a blog from David Osborn "Forgotten heroes" – the sequel: a blog and resources from David Osborn My experience of suspected 'Long COVID' How will NHS staff with Long Covid be supported?- Posted
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- Long Covid
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The 'Living with Long Covid' podcast series from Julie Taylor aims to raise awareness of Long Covid, and provide a platform of support, education and the lived experience. On this episode, Julie speaks to David Osborn, a health and safety consultant. David's specialist area is hazardous substances. He became involved with health and safety concerned with the pandemic in January 2021 in the middle of the second wave. David is currently involved with the Covid public inquiry through being a member of the Covid airborne transmission alliance (CATA). David and Julie discuss Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and he outlines the difference between respirators (such as FFP3s) and surgical masks. David explains the relevance of this to health and social care workers since they were all told that surgical masks were “Personal Protective Equipment” when in fact they are not, and have never been “PPE”. David also explains how he (and the Alliance) made representations to Government throughout the pandemic that healthcare workers were being put in extreme danger by not being equipped with effective respiratory protection but to no avail. This included a detailed report that he submitted to the Commons Health and Social Care Select Committee at the request of the Committee’s Chairman, the Right Hon Jeremy Hunt MP. David describes his disappointment that the MPs in the Select Committee completely ignored his concerns that healthcare workers’ lives were being endangered. They discuss the lack of RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations) reports which employers should have completed for frontline healthcare workers who were infected by the virus. They highlight the blog David wrote for the hub, which includes links to a template letter that can be completed and sent to their employer requesting that they complete a RIDDOR report. David explains that RIDDOR-reporting is not time-limited and reports can therefore still be made. Even if their employers refuse to submit the RIDDOR report (as most NHS Trusts and Boards have done throughout the pandemic – and may continue to do) it could nevertheless be very helpful to healthcare workers living with Long Covid should they become eligible for any future State support scheme such as the Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit. A letter to their employers confirming the circumstances of their infection(s) and how, when and where they were exposed to the disease would be relevant evidence in the event they need to submit a claim for the benefit.- Posted
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- Long Covid
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I guess that a common feature linking most visitors to Patient Safety Learning is that they have a profound interest in two things. First, recognising and applauding innovations and ‘best practice’ in healthcare. Second, recognising, exposing and denouncing bad practice. The thing they have in common is the desire to learn from the mistakes in the past to do better in the future. When it comes to ‘bad practice’ in healthcare it is usually in connection with some adverse and damaging impact on patients. Our thoughts turn perhaps to certain medical failures, such as the ‘Mid‑Staffs scandal’. Seldom do we find the need to consider the adverse and damaging impacts on the doctors, nurses and all the other staff who work in the health and social care sector. However, those of you who watched the recent BBC Panorama programme, 'Forgotten heroes of the Covid frontline' will have been appalled at the scandal that now confronts so many frontline staff for whom we stood outside our front doors and clapped for so enthusiastically back in those dark days at the height of the pandemic. This blog is dedicated to those 'forgotten heroes'. I hope that it demonstrates that they are not, in fact, forgotten I hope that the resources linked to this blog may be of help to them. The BBC Panorama programme, Forgotten heroes of the Covid front line, touched on a number of important issues, which I will briefly summarise. Transmission of the disease from person to person The Government (and World Health Organization) claimed that Covid-19 was spread by droplets from the nose and mouth of infectious patients, which would quickly fall to ground within 2 metres. Many eminent scientists across the world warned that the disease is also spread by a more insidious mechanism known as 'airborne transmission'. This refers to tiny aerosols that hang in the air and can cause infection by inhalation. But these warning were ignored. Protection of healthcare workers It doesn’t take a rocket scientist or a competent epidemiologist to appreciate that these brave people were at considerable risk of catching Covid-19 themselves while caring for infectious patients in hospitals, residents in care homes, etc. We had all seen the news in February 2020 as the disease rampaged through Italy and noted, with considerable alarm, the number of healthcare workers who were dying from the disease. The UK Government and health authorities had plenty of time to ensure that our healthcare workers were properly protected with the best possible equipment. But they weren’t. Instead of being provided with proper respirator masks, such as those known as FFP3s (Filtering Face‑Pieces), they were provided with flimsy surgical masks which (a) do not filter out the virus‑laden aerosols, and (b) do not provide a tight seal to the face, meaning that the aerosols can get in via the gaps around the edge. Anyone who has ever worn that type of mask and also wears glasses will have evidence of how the exhaled aerosols escape from the mask and mist up their glasses. What goes out, can come in… To add insult to injury the authorities had the effrontery to refer to these masks as “personal protective equipment” (PPE), assuring workers that these would protect them from the disease. For the avoidance of doubt: they are not designated as PPE under UK legislation. They never have been PPE and they are not fit for that purpose. Surgical masks do not protect against airborne hazards such as infectious aerosols. Those who recommended them for this purpose either knew that or should have known that. The "unkindest cut of all” As healthcare workers became infected with the disease, many NHS health trusts and health boards robustly denied that there was any possibility whatsoever that their infections could possibly have been associated with their work. “Nothing to do with us” they said (or words to that effect). Then, once those who were so badly afflicted with the after effects of the disease (known as Long Covid) had been off work for a certain length of time, they were unceremoniously sacked. As the Panorama programme reveals, it is this “denial of occupational exposure” by the NHS which is the most hurtful and vile aspect of the treatment meted out to our “heroes of the Covid frontline”. It is nothing less than a national scandal. As a society, we surely owe it to our healthcare workers who have been harmed in this way to support them through the difficulties that lie ahead of them. In many cases they will have the after effects of Covid-19 for the rest of their lives. We should never forget that their grievous situation has arisen through no fault of their own, but is directly attributable to their selfless bravery back in the darkest days of the pandemic and the misinformation they were given about PPE. Help for health and social care workers Earlier, I mentioned resources that may be of help to those health and social care workers who wish to stand up for themselves and demand that their cases of Covid-19 be recognised as “occupational exposure” (as defined in UK law) and have their cases officially recorded and reported as required by health and safety legislation known as RIDDOR (The Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013). There are two important points to remember: You do not have to prove that the actual virus which triggered your disease entered your body at work rather than out in the community. It just has to be more likely than not (otherwise known as 'the balance of probabilities), which is easy to demonstrate, given the circumstances of the work at the time. The excuses given by health trusts and health boards for not RIDDOR-reporting generally centre around claims that they were “following Government guidance” and “issued PPE in accordance with that guidance”. However this has no legal validity whatsoever. Let’s take a look at what the RIDDOR actually require… If a disease was (a) diagnosed by a doctor based on symptoms alone or, in the case of Covid-19, by a positive test result (since it was not always possible to see a doctor); and (b) was more likely than not caught through your work, then it is reportable. Whether the employee was given no PPE, the wrong PPE or the very best PPE, it is still reportable. Whether the employer was or was not following official guidance, it is still reportable. There is nothing whatsoever in these regulations that exempts an employer from making the statutory report on these grounds. Four resources you may find useful 1. A letter sent to NHS Employers. This challenges the advice that NHS Employers issued in the form of a flow-diagram regarding RIDDOR-reporting and explains why it was flawed and bore little resemblance to the RIDDOR regulations. In fairness, upon receipt of this letter NHS Employers have replied confirming that they have removed the offending diagram and are now consulting with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). https://www.tridenthse.co.uk/riddor/Letter_NHS_Employers_2023-03-20.pdf 2. A letter sent to HSE, which is overtly critical of the fact that they did not properly enforce RIDDOR reporting within the healthcare sector. Although this is a long letter, the intention was to set out an unassailable argument, based on the law, HSE guidance and the implementation of RIDDOR in other sectors of industry, as to why healthcare workers’ disease should be reported. The aim of this letter was not just to communicate these facts to the HSE (since they should already know them) but mainly to provide information and assistance to any affected healthcare workers who may wish to read them. HSE have replied to this letter, giving the following explanation: “RIDDOR was originally drafted to capture single one-off unexpected events (accidents and incidents). It was not intended to be used in a pandemic involving thousands of instances of infection, where an employer may be required to make a judgement as to whether a worker caught the infection as a result of a workplace exposure or in the wider community.” One would have hoped that the HSE would have a better understanding of the role of RIDDOR and its origins. The Regulations have never just been about 'accidents and incidents'. It has always been about diseases and long-term health issues – that is what the first 'D' in RIDDOR stands for. Neither has it been solely about 'capturing single one-off unexpected events', it has been about identifying trends that need further investigation. Dating back to HSE Guidance L.73 in 1995: “The [RIDDOR] reports alert the enforcing authorities to individual incidents. They also provide data which indicates how risks arise and show up trends.” Had RIDDOR-reporting been properly enforced trends would (or should) have been spotted in relation to overall infection-rates among healthcare workers. In any event, I am not persuaded that this is a valid reason for denying recognition and official recording of 'occupational exposure' to a lethal disease against which our healthcare workers so valiantly battled at extreme risk to their own health. It only takes a few minutes to tap the relevant details into the online RIDDOR system for each case. It is not a lot to ask. Interestingly, whereas my concern centres around under-reporting, HSE respond by saying that “they have found a significant amount of over-reporting”. I am lost for words! Please refer to the last page of my letter to them and make up your own minds. https://www.tridenthse.co.uk/riddor/Letter_HSE_2023-03-20.pdf 3. In response to the flawed flow-diagram produced by NHS Employers, I have prepared my own flow-diagram setting out the way in which RIDDOR should have been (and should continue to be) implemented in the healthcare sector during the pandemic. I must emphasise that this diagram represents my own personal and professional interpretation of the reporting mechanism and has no official status. HSE will undoubtedly push back on some aspects of this, particularly the aspects of worker-to-worker cross-infection within healthcare premises which their guidance states is non-reportable. I state that it is reportable and I give my reasons. I am pleased to note that in their letter of reply they do not contest this point. https://www.tridenthse.co.uk/riddor/Flow_Diagram_2023-03-20.pdf 4. For healthcare workers with Long Covid, I have produced a template letter which you are welcome to download and adapt according to your own particular circumstances, with a view to sending it to your health trust, health board or other employer, setting out your reasoning as to why your case is, even now (may be a year or two after their initial infection), RIDDOR-reportable. https://www.tridenthse.co.uk/riddor/HCW_RIDDOR_Template_Letter.doc I have also provided some guidance notes to assist you in using the template letter: https://www.tridenthse.co.uk/riddor/HCW_RIDDOR_Template_Letter_Notes.pdf. Even if this letter fails to persuade the more intransigent health trusts/boards to RIDDOR-report (and one can anticipate them being instructed by HSE not to), such a letter may be helpful in demonstrating 'occupational exposure' in the event that they eventually become eligible for some form of State support which they so richly deserve. Conclusions Healthcare workers have not been, and are still not, treated fairly or ethically by the Government, their Departments and Agencies or their own employers. Health and Safety legislation is not being applied equitably between the healthcare sector and other industry sectors. This applies both to the regulations known as COSHH (relating to safe working with hazardous substances, including pathogenic organisms), where the basic requirements for respiratory protection have not been met, and RIDDOR (as described above), where it is basically a postcode lottery as to whether healthcare workers’ COVID-19 infections are recognised and recorded as 'occupational exposure' or not. Going forward, to strike a more positive note, my greatest hope is that a just and fair arrangement is put in place to support those health and social care workers whose lives have been ruined through their selfless devotion to duty during the pandemic. It matters not whether this is achieved via the Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit scheme or a bespoke scheme comparable with the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme for injured veterans. After all, throughout the pandemic we have referred to them as “frontline workers”. -
News Article
Nearly 70 healthcare workers with Long Covid will take their fight to the High Court later to sue the NHS and other employers for compensation. The staff, from England and Wales, believe they first caught Covid at work during the pandemic and say they were not properly protected from the virus. Many of them say they are left with life-changing disabilities and are likely to lose income as a result. The Department of Health said "there are lessons to be learnt" from Covid. The group believe they were not provided with adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) at work, which includes eye protection, gloves, gowns and aprons. In particular, they say they should have had access to high-grade masks, which help block droplets in the air from patient's coughs and sneezes which can contain the Covid virus. But the masks they were given tended to be in line with national guidance. Rachel Hext, who is 36, has always insisted that she caught Covid in her job as a nurse in a small community hospital in Devon. "It's devastating. I live an existence rather than a life. It prevents me doing so much of what I want to do. And it's been four years." Her list of long Covid symptoms includes everything from brain fog and extreme fatigue to nerve damage, and deafness in one ear. Solicitor Kevin Digby, who represents more than 60 members of the group, describes their case as "very important". He says: "It's quite harrowing. These people really have been abandoned, and they are really struggling to fight to get anything. "Now, they can take it to court and hope that they can get some compensation for the injuries that they've suffered." Read full story Source: BBC News, 6 March 2024 Related reading on the hub: Healthcare workers with Long Covid: Group litigation – a blog from David Osborn The pandemic – questions around Government governance: a blog from David Osborn- Posted
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- PPE (personal Protective Equipment)
- Long Covid
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