Sam

On 16 February 2024, Pamela Anne Marking – who was unable to give a complete history due to cognitive issues – was admitted to the Emergency Department at East Surrey Hospital from her home address after unknowingly vomiting blood-stained fluid, with right sided and suprapubic abdominal tenderness. She was diagnosed as having had an epistaxis (nosebleed) by a Physician Associate  and discharged home later that afternoon without a medical review or direct medical supervision of the Physician Associate who had a lack of understanding of the significance of abdominal pain and vomiting and had undertaken an incomplete abdominal examination which would have been likely to have found a right femoral hernia. Mrs Marking re-presented to the Emergency Department two days later with grossly dilated small bowel obstruction due to an incarcerated right femoral hernia containing ischaemic bowel requiring emergency surgery later that evening. Despite maximal support Mrs Marking died at East Surrey hospital on 20th February 2024. The clinical management Mrs Marking had on her first admission and thereafter during the Rapid Sequence Induction materially contributed to her death. The medical cause of death given was: 1a Respiratory failure and Sepsis   1b Aspiration of feculent gastric contents at induction of anaesthesia 1c. Strangulated femoral hernia. Coroner's concerns 1. The term ‘Physician Associate’ is misleading to the public. Mrs Marking’s son was under the mistaken belief that the Physician Associate was a doctor by this title in circumstances where no steps were taken by the Emergency Department or the Physician Associate to explain or clearly differentiate their role from that of medically qualified practitioners. 2. Lack of public understanding of the role of Physician Associate. Witnesses from the Trust gave evidence that a Physician Associate was clinically equivalent to a Tier 2 resident doctor without evidence to support this belief. This blurring of roles without public knowledge and understanding of the role of a Physician Associate has the potential to devalue and undermine public confidence in the medical profession whilst allowing Physician Associates to potentially undertake roles outside of their competency thereby compromising patient safety. 3. The right of patients and family to seek a second opinion. The lack of public knowledge that a Physician Associate is not medically qualified has the potential to hinder requests by patients and their relatives who would wish to seek an opinion from a medical practitioner. It also raises issues of informed consent and protection of patient rights if the public are not aware or have not been properly informed that they are being treated by a Physician Associate rather than a medically qualified doctor. 4. Lack of national and local guidelines and regulation of the scope of practice for a Physician Associate. A diagnosis of epistaxis was made by the Physician Associate without appreciating the relevance of the vomiting and lower abdominal discomfort and in the absence of understanding the need to undertake palpation of the groins in an abdominal examination in a patient who was unable to give a proper clinical history because of short term memory loss. No evidence was presented that the management of Mrs Marking was subject to a reflective practice review. Given their limited training and in the absence of any national or local recognised hospital training for Physician Associates once appointed, this gives rise to a concern they are working outside of their capabilities. 5. Lack of guidelines for direct supervision and consideration of an appropriate level of autonomy for Physician Associates. Whilst there were discussions with the ‘supervising’ consultant the Physician Associate was effectively acting independently in the diagnosis, treatment, management and discharge of Mrs Marking without independent oversight by a medical practitioner. This gives rise to a concern that inadequate supervision or excessive delegation of undifferentiated patients in the Emergency Department to Physician Associates compromises patient safety. 6. Lack of ‘Updated’ National Guidelines for Rapid Sequence Induction (RSI) of Anaesthesia for emergency surgery. Mrs Marking required a rapid sequence induction to protect her airway from aspiration of bowel contents as a consequence of small bowel obstruction. The consultant anaesthetist gave evidence that the ‘traditional’ use of consecutive syringes of induction agent and muscle relaxant was obsolete, and it was common practice locally and nationally to routinely undertake a RSI with Total Intravenous Anaesthesia, in the absence of updated local or national guidelines to support this practice. 7. Lack of ‘Updated’ National Guidelines to support the use of TIVA for RSI. Other than empirically increasing the rate of infusion of TIVA agents (Propofol and Remifentanil) no evidence was forthcoming as to the target range required to ensure and confirm an adequate depth of anaesthesia for patients or the length of time required prior to and following the administration of a muscle relaxant (Rocuronium) to facilitate intubation. This is despite TIVA being known to provide a slower onset of anaesthesia and approximately 50% of all anaesthetic related deaths are due to aspiration (NAP 4). 8. Lack of ‘Updated’ Guidelines for use of Cricoid pressure and other measures to protect the airway in a RSI anaesthetic. Evidence was heard that as cricoid pressure was ineffective it was not routinely applied for a RSI intubation. After aspiration on Induction, the only suction device was attached to the nasogastric tube giving rise to a possible delay in timely suctioning of the feculent aspirate which was in excess of two litres after intubation was achieved.

Healthcare has, in many ways, always been a form of ‘learning system’. Driven by a diverse community of stakeholders, including health care professionals, patients and the public, a learning health system (LHS) uses internal and external knowledge to continually learn about and improve patient care. However, while LHSs have huge potential to support service transformation and population health, there is a lack of consensus about what an LHS actually is, and how to get started. This research report from The Health Foundation helps people understand LHSs and how they can be developed.  Key points A learning health system (LHS) is a way of describing a systematic approach to iterative, data-driven improvement. Learning health systems are able to learn from the routine care they deliver, and improve it as a result – as part of ‘business as usual’. This research suggests there is a large gap between the promise and practice of LHSs. This is partly due to the lack of a clear definition, vision and evidence base around LHSs, meaning it can be difficult to know where to start or how to make progress. This report, part of Health Data Research UK’s (HDR UK’s) Better Care programme, was informed by a literature review, interviews, a survey of more than 100 expert stakeholders and a series of practical case studies, offering real-world examples of LHS approaches already being taken. It explores four important areas especially relevant to LHSs: learning from data, harnessing technology, nurturing learning communities and implementing improvements to services. In these areas, targeted action by policymakers and organisational leaders could lead to tangible progress in developing LHSs. Amid all the pressures the health and care services are facing, we should be wary about seeing LHSs as a ‘nice to have’. A step change in the health service’s learning and improvement capability is needed if it is to find a sustainable route to recovery and effectively reshape care to meet future health needs.