Covid-19 Inquiry: Module 3 Report – The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare systems of the United Kingdom (19 March 2026)

Summary

The Covid-19 Inquiry published its third report and recommendations following its investigation into ‘the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare systems of the United Kingdom’ on Thursday 19 March 2026.

It examines the governmental and societal response to Covid-19 as well as dissecting the impact that the pandemic had on healthcare systems, patients and healthcare workers.

Content

Recommendations

There are many lessons to be learned from the experiences of the UK’s healthcare systems during the Covid-19 pandemic and many areas for improvement. The Inquiry has made 10 recommendations and considers them all to be necessary to prevent healthcare systems being overwhelmed in the next pandemic:

Recommendation 1: Ensure that decision-making on infection prevention and control is underpinned by clear structures and a cautious approach to transmission risk

The UK government must ensure that there is a body (equivalent to the UK Infection Prevention and Control Cell) in place ready to be convened at the outset of any future pandemic, to consider and draft infection prevention and control guidance for healthcare settings. This body must:

• have clear lines of responsibility and a clear, pre-defined role and remit during a pandemic
• have multidisciplinary membership, including experts in the science of viral transmission as well as those with clinical expertise
• ensure that its guidance accounts for the risk of all plausible routes of transmission until sufficient evidence emerges to rule out specific routes
• ensure that guidance clearly explains the underlying rationale for the precautions recommended.

Separately, the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS National Services Scotland, Public Health Wales and the Public Health Agency (Northern Ireland) should review the national infection prevention and control manuals and any future guidance to ensure that the approach to identifying risk of transmission is not confined solely to specific procedures. Emphasis should be placed on a combination of risk factors, such as rates of transmissibility, environment, setting and procedure.

Recommendation 2: Guidance for visiting restrictions

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should publish guidance for the implementation of visiting restrictions in hospitals in the event of a future pandemic. The guidance should identify the circumstances in which visiting restrictions should be introduced, escalated, decreased and removed alongside the measures and exemptions at each level. The guidance should be led by the following core principles:

1. Measures applied should be the least restrictive possible, both in terms of severity and the length of time for which they apply.
2. Restrictions should be decided upon and applied at the most local level possible.
3. Unless restrictions are applied at a specified level, trusts and health boards should take decisions on the severity of restrictions based on local risk assessments.
4. Communications with the public must clearly explain the measures in place and the reasons why restrictions apply.

The guidance should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4)

Recommendation 3: Better preparation for fit-testing

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with employers, including health boards and trusts, to review the availability of qualified fit testers and take steps to increase the number of fit testers accordingly. Availability should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). The Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland should update their guidance to employers to emphasise the need to ensure that sufficient fit-testing capacity is available. 

Recommendation 4: Improve data systems to identify individuals at high risk during a pandemic

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive must ensure that health data and digital systems have the capability to identify individuals at high risk of morbidity or mortality from a pandemic disease quickly and accurately in a future pandemic. This should include action to improve health data systems and patient record-keeping by:

• improving patient data by enabling more granular diagnostic coding
• ensuring that care records are compatible across primary and secondary care
• enabling secure data-sharing and linkage across multiple health datasets and systems for identifying individuals at high risk.

Recommendation 5: Prepare to scale up urgent and emergency care capacity

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, in conjunction with organisations responsible for delivering services, should plan for surge capacity in urgent and emergency care during a pandemic.

Plans must ensure that there is sufficient workforce capacity and the ability to surge, including the number and type of staff required, recruitment and training provision.

This should be completed as part of the whole-system civil emergency strategy recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). Plans should be published and subject to review every three years.

Recommendation 6: Prepare for and test the ability to scale up hospital capacity

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with trusts and health boards to ensure that pandemic plans include practical steps to rapidly scale up hospital capacity to treat acutely unwell patients. This should include critical care services that can deliver multiple levels and types of organ support. It should also cover necessary equipment, supplies, space and staff, including redeployment and training.

All trusts and health boards must keep an easily accessible, up-to-date record of the information needed to implement these plans in the hospital sites they operate. This should include technical aspects of critical care expansion such as power, ventilation, oxygen and waste management systems.

Plans for expanding capacity should be published, subject to review every three years and tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6).

Recommendation 7: A framework to guide the allocation of intensive care resources in the extreme event of saturation

The UK government and devolved administrations should publish a UK-wide framework setting out ethical and operational principles to guide the allocation of adult intensive care resources in the extreme event that they are saturated during a pandemic. That framework must:

• be informed by comprehensive engagement with the public and developed in conjunction with professionals across healthcare, law and ethics, as well as with regulators of healthcare professionals
• set out clearly established triggers for its use, based at least in part on a UK-wide system that measures critical care capacity strain and facilitates mutual aid (such as the CRITCON tool used in England)
• establish clinicians’ legal and professional duties in applying the framework, which should be clearly explained to clinicians through guidance
• be regularly reviewed with reference to contemporary patient data during a pandemic, and any future use of it must be evaluated and reported on publicly.

A plan and timeline for completing this work should be published within six months of this Report. Application of the framework should be tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6).

Recommendation 8: Systematically recording and publishing healthcare worker deaths

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with their respective public health agencies and healthcare employers to develop nation-specific mechanisms to collect, analyse and publish data systematically on the deaths of healthcare workers in the event of a pandemic outbreak. The UK Statistics Authority should work with data providers to ensure that the data are comparable across the four nations of the UK.

Recommendation 9: A standardised process for advance care planning across the UK

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with trusts and health boards, should establish and promote one standardised process across the UK (such as ReSPECT, the Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and Treatment) for clinicians to ascertain and record their patients’ wishes and preferences for future care and treatment in order to inform individualised decision-making, including Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) notices.

Recommendation 10: Psychological and emotional support for healthcare workers

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with healthcare employers and professional bodies, should put in place plans to deliver effective support for healthcare workers at scale from the outset of a pandemic. Plans should cover the nature and level of support that will be provided during and after a pandemic. All four governments should develop a programme of peer support visits that can, from the outset of a pandemic, be targeted towards areas of acute hospitals under considerable strain. The purpose of the visits should be to support front-line staff, collect insights on the pressures that healthcare workers are facing and understand what further support they might need.

See also:

• UK Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom
• Covid-19 Inquiry: Module 2, 2A, 2B, 2C Report – Core decision-making and political governance