Epistemic injustice and illness (8 February 2016)

Summary

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. It begins by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalisation, and the negative impact this has on their care. The authors offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. They detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. They claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. The authors end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

"Without the narrative acts of telling and being heard, the patient cannot convey to anyone else – or to self – what he or she is going through. More radically and perhaps equally true, without these narrative acts, the patient cannot himself or herself grasp what the events of illness mean."