Summary
Amar Alwitry is a consultant ophthalmologist and medico-legal expert. Over his expert-witness career he has reported on more than 30 clinical negligence claims with the same cause: a fine cannula detaching from its syringe under injection pressure during eye surgery and being propelled into the open eye. Almost none of these events appear in any incident or device-vigilance database.
In this blog, Amar describes how claims files revealed a pattern that reporting systems could not see; why he believes a doctor’s professional duty extends beyond reporting a recurring harm to trying to stop it; how he came to develop an engineered safeguard* and the obstacles he has met. Chief among them is an uncomfortable paradox: acquiring a commercial interest is the only way to get a safety device made, yet it makes it harder to be heard on the safety problem itself.
*Amar has a financial interest in the device discussed and a full declaration is included below.
Content
The same case, again and again
Every expert witness knows the feeling of opening a new set of instructions and realising, within a page, that you have read this story before. Different hospital, different surgeon, different patient. Same mechanism, same injury.
For me the story is this. In cataract and other intraocular surgery, fluids are injected into the eye through a fine cannula attached to a syringe. Occasionally, under the pressure of injection, the cannula detaches and is fired into the open eye. I have now reported on more than 30 such claims: torn irises, ruptured lens capsules, retinal damage and, in the worst cases, permanent loss of sight in the very eye the operation was meant to help.
It is an uncommon event. A well-made connection usually holds, and tightening it properly genuinely matters. But cataract surgery is the most common operation the NHS performs, every case involves several syringe–cannula connections, and the fluids we inject lubricate the very junction that is supposed to hold. Uncommon per case becomes a steady stream at scale.
What litigation could see and reporting systems could not
When a cannula detaches, neither the syringe nor the cannula has malfunctioned. Each met its specification; it is the interface between them that failed. So no device incident is reported, no manufacturer is told and the event is absorbed as a surgical complication, usually with a quiet assumption that somebody in theatre did not tighten it properly.
The first published report dates from 1999.[1] In 2018, the Royal College of Ophthalmologists issued a safety alert after the national patient safety team noted a continuing trend of incidents; the advice was to use Luer-lock syringes and check the connection.[2] It was sensible advice, but the cases kept coming.[3]
The only place the pattern was visible was in the claims files, and claims are settled one at a time. Nobody is tasked with noticing that the thirtieth looks exactly like the first. That, to me, is the real lesson about learning from litigation: a claims file is a concentrated record of how care goes wrong, but it only becomes learning if somebody joins the dots and something then changes.
So I surveyed cataract surgeons, with the help of the UK and European societies. 84% had experienced a cannula detachment, 78% had seen a patient harmed by one and 87% thought a safety device was needed.[4]
Everyone had a story. Almost nobody had filed a report.
Then it happened to me
Then a cannula came off in my own hands, even though I checked the connection every single time precisely because I knew where a detachment could lead. No harm was done, but it changed how I saw the problem. If it can happen to the surgeon who checks obsessively, then “check it carefully” is a necessary habit not a safeguard.
Any defence that depends on a person remembering to do something, every time, under pressure, will eventually fail. Aviation and anaesthesia learned that long ago. You design the failure out.
Does the duty stop at reporting?
The GMC’s Good medical practice says doctors must act promptly if they think patient safety is, or may be, seriously compromised (paragraph 75), and must report adverse incidents involving medical devices that put patients at risk “or have the potential to do so” (paragraph 73).[5] That last phrase matters. Near misses count, and a failure at the interface between two devices is still a device incident.
I reported, I published and I wrote to the bodies that could act. But when the same avoidable harm keeps arriving on your desk and you can see a workable way to stop it, I believe the duty extends to trying. Not every doctor needs to invent something; raising concerns, gathering data and publishing all count. Here, though, awareness had been tried for 25 years.
Designing a backstop
I set myself criteria. A safeguard had to work without anyone remembering to check it, fit every syringe used in eye surgery, add nothing to the surgeon’s task and be cheap enough for every case in every health system. A small number of manufacturers, to their credit, supply a securing feature with their own viscoelastic syringes, which recognises the risk. But the other syringes in the same operation, carrying balanced salt solution, antibiotic or anaesthetic, remain unprotected.
What I arrived at is a small adhesive device that the scrub practitioner applies to the syringe in about a second, with the cannula passing through an aperture in it. It does not stop a cannula coming loose. It is a passive backstop that arrests a detached cannula before it can enter the eye, and it doubles as the syringe’s drug label. It is called Cannusafe—for full disclosure, it has not been used in patients, independent bench testing and an NHS service evaluation are still ahead, and it will be CE marked before any product is released.
What I had not expected
I assumed the hard part was over. It was not. A physical device needs a manufacturer, and under the EU Medical Device Regulation taking on any new product is a substantial undertaking. Established companies were sympathetic, but few wanted that burden for somebody else’s idea, and it took a long search to find a specialist manufacturer willing to make it to the required standard. Along the way I have had to learn about patents, quality management systems and product liability insurance, none of which features in surgical training.
Then there is the evidence trap. The event is rare per case and barely reported, so there is no reliable baseline, and the usual health-technology assessment methods are not built for rare intraoperative events. “Show us the data” is a reasonable request that the under-reporting itself makes hard to meet.
The conflict of interest paradox
The third obstacle is the one I most want to share, because I suspect it applies well beyond ophthalmology. A device cannot reach patients unless somebody makes it, certifies it, insures it and sells it. So, the moment a clinician decides to build the fix, they acquire a commercial interest, and from that moment their voice on the safety problem is discounted.
Doors that open readily to a concerned clinician open more cautiously to an inventor.
I understand why, and I do not criticise it. National bodies, colleges and regulators must be even-handed and cannot be seen to endorse a product. Good medical practice (paragraph 95) rightly requires me to be open about my interest and to be prepared to exclude myself from decisions, and I do both.[5][6] But the unintended effect can be that the hazard is parked along with the product. The problem existed for decades before my device did, and it will still exist if my device fails.
My suggestion is to separate two questions. First: is this hazard real, and is a manual check an adequate defence against it? That can be answered without reference to any product, or to me. Second: if an engineered safeguard is needed, which one? That should be settled by independent specification, open evaluation and normal procurement, and for that conversation I should be outside the room.
I have been fortunate to find the part of the system built for this. The NHS Innovation Service and my regional Health Innovation Network have given me structure, realism and encouragement, and I would urge any clinician in a similar position to find them early.
What I believe the standard should become
We have been here before. Slip-tip connections gave way to the Luer lock. Wrong-route errors led to the ISO 80369 connectors, designed so that unrelated delivery systems cannot be connected to each other. Once a simple engineered defence existed, reliance on vigilance alone stopped being acceptable.
And it is no longer only me saying that checking is not enough. In June 2026, a Viewpoint in JAMA Ophthalmology from Johns Hopkins, written on behalf of a consortium of leading US eye centres, described their own cases and five years of education and reinforcement. It concluded that what is needed is a mechanism that prevents forceful ejection of the cannula “without relying solely on a human to check it before each use”.[7] The authors have no connection with me and do not endorse any device. But they describe the requirement exactly.
My belief, declared interest and all, is that every syringe–cannula connection used inside the eye should have a passive engineered safeguard alongside good technique, whichever device provides it. Going further than they do, I have argued in print that once such a safeguard is cheap and available, relying on a manual check alone will become difficult to defend.[8] That step is my argument, not theirs. But courts set standards in retrospect, and it is for professional bodies, not inventors, to lead that change. That is exactly why independent evaluation matters.
What I would like to see happen
Report every detachment, harm or no harm, to the learning from patient safety events (LFPSE) and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) Yellow Card scheme, as a device interface incident rather than an individual’s lapse. This problem is invisible because we have each treated it as a private embarrassment.
Assess the hazard on its own merits. I would ask national and professional bodies to consider the risk independently of any product, and to say what an adequate safeguard must do.
Evaluate safeguards openly and independently, mine included.
Build a route from claims to change. Lawyers, indemnifiers and expert witnesses see recurring mechanisms of harm long before reporting systems do. That knowledge needs somewhere to go.
If you keep seeing the same avoidable harm and can see a fix, persevere. Declare your interest early and often and find the innovation support that exists.
My aim is simple: for this particular case to stop appearing in expert reports, mine or anyone else’s, and to save patients from avoidable visual loss. We have the rare chance to abolish a complication and I would love to be part of that. I’m hoping I can leave a legacy of safety and that the UK can lead in the charge, the fruit of our culture of safety and learning.
General Medical Council. Good medical practice. 2024. Paragraphs 73, 75 and 95.
General Medical Council. Identifying and managing conflicts of interest. 2024.
Opinions expressed in blogs and other content are those of the author. Patient Safety Learning welcomes sharing content and opinions that promotes safer patient care and for the reduction of avoidable harm. The views expressed on the hub however do not necessarily represent Patient Safety Learning's views or values. References to a specific product or service does not imply a recommendation or endorsement.
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The NHS will not pay to improve patient safety: a blog by Kate Pym
Why NHS procurement must change if we want to improve patient safety
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About the author
Mr Amar Alwitry is a consultant ophthalmologist and medico-legal expert based in the East Midlands. He has prepared expert reports in clinical negligence claims for many years, has worked with NHS Resolution on learning from litigation, and is the author of Complaints, Litigation and Clinical Errors. He has published on the prevalence and health-economic burden of cannula detachment in intraocular surgery.
Declaration of interest
I am the inventor of a safety device discussed in this blog (Cannusafe), and the founder and a director of Cannusafe Ltd, the company that holds the patents and will supply it. I stand to benefit financially if it is adopted. I identified the safety problem through clinical and medico-legal work years before I had any commercial interest. I declare that interest here because Good medical practice requires me to be open about it, and I am writing because the same guidance tells me to act on risks to patients. My argument is for an engineered safeguard, whichever one proves effective, and I take no part in purchasing decisions about the device in any organisation where I work. Please weigh the above accordingly.
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