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Showing results for tags 'Human error'.
Found 272 results
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Content ArticleAcross multiple disciplines undertaking airway management globally, preventable episodes of unrecognised oesophageal intubation result in profound hypoxaemia, brain injury and death. These events occur in the hands of both inexperienced and experienced practitioners. Current evidence shows that unrecognised oesophageal intubation occurs sufficiently frequently to be a major concern and to merit a co-ordinated approach to address it. Harm from unrecognised oesophageal intubation is avoidable through reducing the rate of oesophageal intubation, combined with prompt detection and immediate action when it occurs. These guidelines provide recommendations for preventing unrecognised oesophageal intubation that are relevant to all airway practitioners independent of geography, clinical location, discipline or patient type.
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Content ArticleNHS Resolution received 172 claims relating to anti-infective medications between 1 April 2015 until 31 March 2020. Anti-infective medications include antibiotics, antivirals and antifungals. The analysis in this leaflet focuses on closed claims that have been settled with damages paid and concern an element of the prescribing process: prescribing, transcribing, dispensing, administering and monitoring. Claims concerning a failure to recognise that an anti-infective was indicated have not been included within the analysis.
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Content ArticleThis Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) investigation aims to help improve patient safety in relation to the use of a flush fluid and blood sampling from an arterial line in people who are critically ill in hospital. As its ‘reference case’, the investigation uses the experience of Keith, a 66 year old man who during a stay in a clinical care unit had blood samples taken from an arterial line which were contaminated with the flush fluid containing glucose. As a result he received incorrect treatment which led to his blood glucose levels being reduced to below the recommended limit.
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Content Article
We need to fix it (HindSite, 2021/22)
Sam posted an article in Digital health and care service provision
While ‘human error’ is often blamed when things go wrong, the ‘technical’ part of ‘sociotechnical systems’ often escapes the spotlight. In this article, Harold Thimbleby outlines how hidden risks with digitalisation have far-reaching consequences, and how we can start to fix them. -
Content ArticleJerome Groopman is a doctor who discovered that he needed a doctor. When his hand was hurt, he went to six prominent surgeons and got four different opinions about what was wrong. Groopman was advised to have unnecessary surgery and got a seemingly made-up diagnosis for a nonexistent condition. Groopman, who holds a chair in medicine at Harvard Medical School, eventually found a doctor who helped. But he didn't stop wondering about why those other doctors made the wrong diagnoses. You can listed or read his interview from the link below.
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Content ArticleEach year, 7,000 to 9,000 people die as a result of a medication errors in the US, and the total cost of looking after patients with medication-associated errors exceeds $40 billion. Alongside this financial cost, adverse events caused by medication errors also cause patients significant psychological and physical pain and suffering. The article aims to: identify the most common medication errors. review some of the critical points at which medication errors are most likely to occur. outline strategies to prevent medication errors occurring. summarise multidisciplinary team strategies for decreasing medication errors.
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Content ArticleMost healthcare systems across the globe are dealing with the reality of limited resources and staffing shortages. Therefore, it is more important than ever to ensure that health care professionals spend time on doing what matters most and providing the most value for service users. Meaningful time spent face to face is a high priority for both service users and health care professionals. Paying more attention to computers than people because of the demands of burdensome documentation diverts our attention from direct care. It is a situation that is unsatisfactory for all parties. The Danish municipality of Sønderborg, a safety leader in nursing home and home-based care for more than a decade, decided to see what could be done. With improvement science already embedded in their organisation, they decided to take a deep dive into their processes as a first step. Mistakes in documentation, coordination, and communication have been identified as among the top 10 of root causes of patient safety incidents in Denmark, so it made sense to start there. Patient safety is often cited as the reason for documentation, but some research indicates that burdensome documentation is associated with increased medical errors, mistakes in documentation, and burnout among health care providers. Working from the theory that safely simplifying or streamlining documentation would free up time for direct care, Sønderborg and the Danish Society for Patient Safety embarked on an improvement journey that started with understanding the workflow of documentation that enabled staff to seek and share information from one another to plan and perform different tasks.
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Content ArticleHealthcare can be risky. Adverse events carry a high cost – both human and financial – for health systems around the world. So in an effort to improve safety, many health systems have looked to learn from high-risk industries. The aviation and nuclear industries, for example, have excellent safety records despite operating in hazardous conditions. And increasingly, the tools and procedures these industries use to identify hazards are being adopted in healthcare. One prominent example involves the Hierarchy of Risk Controls (HoC) approach, which works by ranking the methods of controlling risks based on their expected effectiveness. According to HoC, the risks at the top are presumed to be more effective than those at the bottom. The ones at the top typically rely less on human behaviour: for example, a new piece of technology is considered to be a stronger risk control than training staff. This article looks more deeply at the (HoC) approach to explore its usefulness and effectiveness in healthcare. To investigate this issue, a team of social scientists examined the risk controls introduced by four hospital teams in England and Scotland after they had identified hazards in their systems.
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Content ArticleIn 1999, the pivotal report “To Err is Human” by the Institute of Medicine led to sweeping changes in healthcare. This report outlined how blaming individuals does not change the underlying factors that contribute to medical errors. It also stated that blaming an individual does little to make the system safer – or prevent someone else from similar errors. It is unusual for a nurse to be charged criminally, when there is no intent to harm a patient. However, the recent trial in America of nurse RaDonda Vaught could set a precedent for future medical errors to be treated as criminal cases. The case may ensure that for every step that has been taken forward in patient safety, we have now taken two steps backwards. This article from Human Factors 101 looks at the case of RaDonda Vaught, the criminal trial and conviction, and discusses the impact this will have on healthcare.
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Content Article
Blog - Is human error a crime? (2 November 2022)
Patient-Safety-Learning posted an article in Legal matters
Martin Anderson, author of the Human Factors 101 blog, looks at the case of US nurse RaDonda Vaught, who was found guilty of criminally negligent homicide and abuse of an impaired adult following a medication error that led to a patient death in 2017. He provides a timeline of the events that occurred in the run up to the criminal trial and highlights concerns that the case will set a precedent in bringing criminal charges against nurses when there is no intent to harm a patient. He then looks at the system factors that may have contributed to the medication error, asking a number of questions about the circumstances under which Vaught made the error. The blog goes on to outline the serious impact the case could have on healthcare professionals' willingness to report errors, take on complex cases and use innovative treatments—it may even put people off taking on a career in the healthcare sector in the first place. -
Content Article
BD - Voices of safety videos
Patient-Safety-Learning posted an article in Patient stories
This series of videos produced by pharmaceutical company BD features patients, caregivers and healthcare professionals telling their stories about patient safety. Each video highlights an experience of avoidable harm, with topics including sepsis, antimicrobial resistance, medication errors and healthcare associated infections. -
Content ArticleIn this analysis, published by the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, the authors look at the impact of double checking medication to reduce errors and improve patient safety.
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Content ArticleMr B was 71 years' old and was undergoing treatment for cancer of the oesophagus. During surgery, a nasogastric tube that had been inserted became dislodged and was put back into place by medical staff, despite guidelines against this. The family realised that something had gone wrong in the operation and Mr B became very seriously ill, dying five months later. When the family asked the hospital for an investigation, they revealed that a hole had been made in Mr B’s stomach when the nasogastric tube was replaced. There was no assurance given that steps would be taken to prevent similar errors in the future, and no apology from the hospital. The family sought legal advice and came to an out of court settlement with the hospital.
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Content ArticleM was a young boy who had severe asthma, resulting in regular trips to A&E. His condition was eventually well controlled with a Seretide inhaler. When M's family moved house and changed their GP, they requested a new prescription of Seretide, but when they got to the pharmacy were given the wrong type of inhaler used to treat a different form of asthma. The GP had unwittingly chosen the wrong medication from a drop-down menu. M and his family were unaware that he was taking the wrong medication, and after a few days, M became breathless and his family decided to take him to hospital. Sadly, he died on the journey to A&E. At the inquest, the Coroner found that there two main issues that contributed to M’s death: the unintentional prescription of Serevent the failure to arrange and organise follow up contributed to M’s death.
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Content ArticlePreventable harm, from the systems of care intended to improve health, continues to occur at an unacceptable rate in the United States. Healthcare systems have an opportunity to learn and improve from each episode of preventable harm. Accordingly, every preventable patient death or injury must energise our efforts to prevent future patient harm. The Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) believes that criminal prosecution of healthcare providers will make the work of preventing harm more difficult since it continues to shift the focus away from system improvements. They have released a position and policy statement outlining the rationale for opposing criminal prosecution and, equally important, recommends that all healthcare systems and organisations aggressively act, now, to improve their culture, processes, and training to reduce errors of all kinds and, specifically in light of recent events, medication errors. Some specific actions are recommended as examples of what can be done. Individual healthcare professionals should be mindful of their role in preventing errors and reporting errors that occur as well as taking action to encourage and enable their organization to improve the flaws in the systems in which they work that lead to harm to patients.
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Content ArticleSafety in aviation and maritime domains has greatly improved over the years, but there is no room for complacency. This is especially the case as we approach systems with ever more automation and use of remote control in both industries. It is also more complicated because ‘human error’ is often seen as the root cause, when usually it is the system that leads people into mistakes, and seafarers and flight crew alike so often save the day. Accidents, incidents and near misses all offer us valuable lessons from which to improve safety, to do better next time. Yet in the aftermath of adverse events, the wish to blame someone, which makes sense of something that was never intended to happen, might make us lose sight of the real causes of accidents, leading to more tragedy and loss. The key to learning is using the right tool with which to understand what happened and why. This means going beyond the surface ‘facts’ and suppositions, seeing beneath the ‘usual suspects’ of factors that yield little in terms of how to prevent the next one. The SHIELD (Safety Human Incident & Error Learning Database) taxonomy has been developed by reviewing a number of existing taxonomies - in this case, a set of related terms for describing human performance and error - to derive a means of objectively classifying events in a way that helps us develop safety countermeasures afterwards. Whilst it can analyse single events it is particularly insightful when looking - and learning - across related events
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Content ArticleLearning from mistakes generally is considered the upside to failure. But in healthcare, where staff members regularly face stressors and systemic issues that impede a strong culture of safety, creating that standard can be difficult. To understand why medical mistakes and care complications occur repeatedly Becker's spoke with Patricia McGaffigan, vice president of safety programmes for the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Ms. McGaffigan outlined three factors that contribute to repeat medical errors, care complications or lost progress on quality improvement initiatives: A "whack-a-mole" approach to safety. Lack of focus on systemwide changes. Unhealthy or unsafe work environments.
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Content ArticleThis dashboard presents the results of a patient safety survey conducted by the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM) and European Collaborative Action on Medication Errors and Traceability (ECAMET). The dashboard shows variations in different hospital-reported measures of patient safety across thirteen European countries. The questions in the survey focus on accreditation, training, electronic health records and recording, tracking and publishing of medication error data.
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Content ArticlePatient safety is often compromised by confusion over the graphic information on drugs packaging. Injectable medicines are particularly susceptible to medical error. This study gives design guidance to make such packs safer.
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Content ArticleAs an industry, biopharmaceuticals is immature when it comes to the integration of human performance into operations. This article from BioPhorum aims to accelerate the industry’s maturity by building a greater understanding of what is desired and explaining how to get there. Human performance is believed by many companies in the biopharmaceutical industry to be a focus on human error reduction, where work outcomes will improve by adding more requirements and coercing people to try harder to be infallible. This archaic approach is not sustainable today and is not human performance. The environment that we operate within – both externally and internally – is changing and yet we are still applying decades-old mental models of what good problem solving looks like, and how this drives overall performance and results. Human performance is the way to make a shift towards systems thinking. Without making this change, organisations will continue to stagnate and actually be unable to keep up with the increasing complexity of the environments they work in, and the environments they create. This blue-sky vision of human performance takes time and patience to properly implement and must be viewed as a fundamental change to how an entire organisation executes work. Essentially, this is a transformation of the organisation’s systems and thinking over a period of several years. This article provides guidance that has worked within the biopharmaceutical industry and the unique regulatory space it operates within.
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Content ArticleWhen things go wrong, we seem to display a reliable tendency to do one thing: blame those at the ‘sharp end’. No matter how complex the system, how uncertain the situation, or how inadequate the conditions, our attention post-accident seems to turn to those proximal to the consequence, whom we judge to have failed to control the hazard in question. The notion of ‘just culture’ has developed over the past decade or so in response to this and is highly valued by front line staff. Just culture is, however, borne of the Safety-I mindset. Since the advent of ‘just culture’, the Safety-II perspective has emerged. Safety-II defines safety not as avoiding that things go wrong but as ensuring that things go right. Safety-II views the human not as a hazard, but as a resource necessary for system flexibility and resilience. In light of this, it has been proposed that the idea of just culture should be abandoned. If we take a Safety-II view, ‘just culture’ might indeed seem unnecessary. Steve Shorrock explores this further in his latest blog.
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Content ArticleLarouzee and Le Coze describe the development of the “Swiss cheese model” and the main criticisms of this model and the motivation for these criticisms. The article concludes that the Swiss cheese model remains a relevant model because of its systemic foundations and its sustained use in high-risk industries and encourages safety science researchers and practitioners to continue imagining alternatives combining empirical, practical and graphical approaches.
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Content ArticleTo find out how checklists and monitoring work in actual practice, Benjamin and Dismukes observed line operations during 60 flights conducted by three air carriers from two countries. They used a structured technique to observe and record checklist and monitoring performance, and situational factors that might affect performance. Because an important function of checklists and monitoring is to catch, or “trap,” operational errors, they also recorded deviations in aircraft control, navigation, communication and planning. When a deviation was observed, they tracked whether crewmembers identified and corrected it, and whether there were any consequences that might affect the outcome of the flight. They found that checklists and monitoring are not as effective as generally assumed.
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An encounter with an error trap by Steve Highley (6 August 2015)
Sam posted an article in Error traps
Steve Highley looks at responding positively to error using a personal experience involving his car and highlights how to find and deal with error traps. -
Content ArticleIn these presentation slides, Paul Gantt and Ron Gantt, Safety Compliance Management, discuss human error and its effect on occupational safety. They identify the role of error traps in human error, how an organisation can identify and eliminate error traps to prevent incidents and they review case studies involving human error.
